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The arms trade and armed conflict. An analysis of european weapons exports to countries in armed conflict

The arms trade and armed conflict. An analysis of European weapons exports to countries in armed conflict, a report by the Delàs Centre of Studies for Peace and the School for a Culture of Peace analyses arms exports by the member states of the EU during 2015 (the most recent year for which data is available) to countries which were involved in armed conflict in that same year. The report analyses weapons exports to 13 countries which were the setting for 16 armed conflicts, and offers an analysis of the context of each of the different struggles, referring to the recent history of each armed conflict, as well as to the most relevant concrete events which took place in 2015. In the context of an upsurge in arms trade exports from the EU, and at the same time, increasingly severe consequences for the civilian population – higher death tolls linked to these conflicts and a growing number of people forcibly displaced due to this violence – this report aims to enrich the public debate around the impacts that EU policies regulating the arms trade have on those countries that are the scene of armed conflict. At the same time, this report is also a tool to generate greater political commitment both at the Spanish level as well as on the European level with a specific agenda aimed at the control, reduction and elimination of arms exports to countries in armed conflict.



2017

The arms trade and armed conflict. An analysis of European arms exports to countries in armed conflict was prepared by the Delàs Centre of Studies for Peace and the School for a Culture of Peace

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1. INTRODUCTION

The Delàs Centre of Studies for Peace and the School for a Culture of Peace present *The arms trade and armed conflict. An analysis of European arms exports to countries in armed conflict*, a report of arms exports by member states of the EU to countries which are the setting for armed struggle. This report analyses the export of arms to 13 countries in a situation of armed conflict during 2015, countries which were on the list of the top 50 nations importing weapons from EU member countries. The goal of this publication is to contribute to the reduction of arms exports to countries in conflict by informing and mobilizing local and international citizenry. The report is part of a combined project of research and intervention carried out by the Delàs Centre of Studies for Peace and the School for a Culture of Peace, with the support of the Province of Barcelona. The data is intended to enrich the public debate around the impact that EU policies regarding arms trade have on the countries where armed conflicts are occurring. At the same time, *The arms trade and armed conflict. An analysis of European arms exports to countries in armed conflict*, is a tool to generate greater commitment from Spanish and EU leaders for a concrete agenda for the control, reduction, and the elimination of weapons exports to countries in armed conflict.

The current international legislation in matters of arms trade regulates the sale of weapons to countries affected by armed conflict. In the case of the EU, in December 2008, the EU adopted the Common Position, a judicially binding legislation governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment. The Common Position, which replaced the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports adopted by the Council in 1998, established that it was the responsibility of the member nation to verify the final destination of arms exports and confirm that the country importing the arms respected international humanitarian law. In that regard, criteria 3 refers to the internal situation of the country of final destination of the arms, and establishes that the member states will not permit exports which provoke or prolong armed conflicts or which worsen tensions of existing situations in the country which is the final destination of the weaponry. As well, in 2014, the Arms Trade Treaty came into effect, which obliges governments to guarantee that their weapons exports will not be used to commit human rights abuses, terrorism, violations of international humanitarian law or for international criminal organizations. Member states must evaluate their shipments of arms to guarantee that these criteria are fulfilled. This treaty introduces a perspective on gender in a very relevant way, with a clause relating to gender-based violence, obliging exporting nations to take into account whether the arms being sold will be used to commit or facilitate acts of gender violence such as violence against women and minors.

Given this legal framework and based on the fact that militarization and arms purchases are extremely important factors in the initiation, the extension and the escalation of armed conflicts, this report analyses 2015 European arms exports to countries which were in a situation of armed conflict. This is the most recent data available at the time of publishing.¹ In addition to analysing this data, the report also offers an analysis of the different conflicts being fought in the countries which received armed exports, including both to the recent history of each armed conflict as well as relevant events which occurred in 2015. The report, in this way, is a tool to improve the knowledge of the

¹ Council of the EU (2017), *Eighteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment*.

2. AN ANALYSIS OF 2015 EUROPEAN WEAPONS EXPORTS

destinations of European arms and their impact on the context of armed conflict, highlighting the consequences that these exports are causing in situations of armed conflict on a global level. In an international context in which the consequences of these conflicts are increasingly dire for the civilian population, as confirmed by the growing death toll, as well as the growing number of people forcibly displaced due to this violence, it is urgent to put an end to the arms trade and promote policies for the construction of peace and the defence of human rights, and to end the global arms trade, which represents a threat to the lives of millions.

The analysis of the exportation of arms from the EU has been carried out on the basis of data of the Official Report which the European Union publishes annually with information about the exportations of military material of every category. These include traditional arms and equipment and military technology which make up the arms, and also include vehicles, communications technology and all that which is used by the military and armies to carry out their activities. The list of that which we from this point on refer to as weaponry is made up of 22 categories specified by the Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP from the 8th December 2008, which are subject to European regulation with which member states are obliged to comply.

This report analyses 2015 arms exports, and compares them to the trend over time. Data for comparison starts in 2003, since it is the first moment for which there is complete data. The methodology of the analysis is based in the information of the Official Report of the EU, in which much of the information about the weaponry which is eventually exported is incomplete, or else completely missing, for some of the top exporters; and apparently incomplete in some other member states. For example, the United Kingdom has not reported on their exports since 2002 nor has Germany since 2007. For this reason, at all times both the authorized exports and real exports in the year in question are taken into consideration. The difference between the two resides in that the authorised exports refer to transfers can be carried out that same year or can be, more likely shipped in future years, while real exports refer to those arms which were actually exported.

Finally, in this section, we also analyse the totals of authorized and real arms exports, specifying the weaponry by category². In addition to a global tally, exports are also identified by destination and by country of origin. Subsequently, in regards to countries which import European weaponry, an approximation by region has been prepared, as specified by the EU in its own Official Report. Lastly, exports are analysed in detail for the 13 nations in 2015 which took part in armed conflict and received or were able to contract weaponry from European manufacturers.

² In the annex there is a list with a brief description of the 22 existing categories.

2.1. Overall EU arms exports in 2015 and the trend over time.

Arms exports by member states of the EU in 2015 reached record numbers of authorizations, doubling the previous year. Actual exports also reach records for the EU, at least 21% beyond that of 2014, even if one discounts the lack of knowledge for two of the largest arms exporting nations of Europe and of the world. As can be seen in the table, the exponential growth of weapons exports begins in 2012, especially that of authorisation of sales, which has grown nearly by 400%, but no less worthy of note is the 53% growth in the actual weapons exports. That is to say, from 2013 to 2015 member states of the EU have begun an extraordinary increment in the rhythm of arms exports, which will certainly mean unprecedented multi-million euro present and future contracts for European weapons manufacturers


The categories of weapons exported in 2015 should be analysed paying attention to the combination of information which is available in terms of both authorised and actual exports, since many member states give precious little detail on much of the actual exports which are carried out, incorporating a good part of them into the catch-all category “Miscellaneous”. However, if one pays attention to the authorized exports, one can deduce that many of them could be placed into more specific categories. Despite this lack of information, the available data show that in 2015, the majority of the approvals for arms contracts by member states of the EU were for weapons in categories 2, 4, 9, 10 and 11, which account for 71% of total authorisations. That is to say, the EU approved the sale of large amounts of smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of 20 mm or more, which includes rifles, howitzers, mortars or projectile launchers (category 2), bombs, torpedoes, missiles and rockets (category 4), war ships and military submarines (category 9), military aircraft including fighter planes (category 10) and electronic equipment designed for military use (category 11). With respect to the actual arms exports, the available information shows two notable categories of exports: military aircraft, making up at 24% of the total, and small and light arms which made up 17% (categories 1 to 6).

Exports authorized by EU member states in the period from 2003-2015


YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	28,396,886,701	3,307,017,284
2004	27,042,836,474	10,144,851,920
2005	26,156,722,360	8,820,825,564
2006	27,434,404,273	9,555,303,129
2007	27,109,551,773	10,295,029,870
2008	33,418,646,761	8,424,733,412
2009	40,126,068,836	10,097,791,988
2010	31,727,536,680	8,684,433,331
2011	37,522,546,184	10,573,767,328
2012	39,347,633,841	11,125,127,030
2013	36,483,998,304	13,971,930,651
2014	98,400,451,437	14,017,250,941
2015	195,720,495,150	17,050,020,044
Total	648,887,778,774	136,068,082,492

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

Authorised export of EU member states in the period 2003-2015



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.



Source: the authors


Authorised and actual weapons exports from the EU in 2015 by category				
CATEGORIA	AUTHORISED	%	ACTUAL	%
Miscellaneous		0%	9.274.437.509	54%
ML 1	2,325,501,826	1%	377,943,594	2%
ML 2	10,797,864,110	6%	202,852,832	1%
ML 3	6,235,769,372	3%	665,935,038	4%
ML 4	46,895,613,608	24%	441,597,604	3%
ML 5	13,340,223,830	7%	266,721,033	2%
ML 6	12,189,642,853	6%	811,624,583	5%
ML 7	1,384,064,338	1%	7,184,967	0.04%
ML 8	378,519,694	0.19%	92,486,372	1%
ML 9	22,723,729,561	12%	274,444,533	2%
ML 10	46,262,894,396	24%	4,038,113,348	24%
ML 11	14,105,662,952	7%	125,419,914	1%
ML 12	89,301,200	0.05%	735,439	0%
ML 13	1,097,195,906	1%	104,032,706	1%
ML 14	916,959,189	0.47%	44,154,233	0.26%
ML 15	8,416,962,357	4%	79,067,332	0.46%
ML 16	457,542,804	0.23%	36,140,392	0.21%
ML 17	226,118,940	0.12%	28,142,562	0.17%
ML 18	806,176,896	0.41%	53,889,108	0.32%
ML 19	11,260,016	0.01%		0%
ML 20		0%		0%
ML 21	763,874,526	0.39%	38,957,847	0.23%
ML 22	6,295,616,776	3%	86,139,098	1%
Total	195,720,495,150		17,050,020,044	

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

2.2 EU arms exports in 2015 by country of origin and the trend over time.


In 2015 France is the European country that stands out with the greatest number of authorisations of future arms exports, making up 77% of the approvals for which information is available. Following France come some of the greatest potential arms manufacturing nations: the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany. Authorisations for French exports, which have always been greater than that of any other EU member, have grown exponentially in the last two years. This reflects the real drive for contracts of French military industry. This could be owing to an increase of the demand for military commodities in a environment of increasing competition, but also inevitably demonstrates a clear political will to export weaponry.

In regards to the actual exports, not forgetting that the information from the United Kingdom and Germany is incomplete, it is once again France, Spain and Italy who are the leading exporting EU member nations in 2015. Sweden, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, and the Netherlands also



Source: the authors

8 THE ARMS TRADE AND ARMED CONFLICT. AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN WEAPONS EXPORTS TO COUNTRIES IN ARMED CONFLICT




Source: the authors

are responsible for a sizable part of the volume of arms exports, despite being countries with a smaller military industry.


The two following tables analyse the volume of exports over time, by country of origin. Despite the preponderance of French exports, the growing role

of Spain since 2010 can be seen, even surpassing France in 2013 in actual exports and vying for second European exporter of weapons, along with the United Kingdom, Germany, and Italy, which change positions in the ranking of exporters depending on the year. The rest of the exporting nations have more modest exports, which change

Authorised exports of EU arms by country of origin 2003-2015



Authorised exports of EU arms by country of origin 2003-2015



Source: the authors

less over time. It should be mentioned that Sweden, despite being the next military exporter after the five big powers, shows signs of reduction of its exports in recent years.

2.3. Destinations of EU arms exports in 2015 and the trend over time

Authorised and actual EU arms exports by destination region from 2003-2015				
REGION	AUTHORISED		ACTUAL	
	2015		2003-15	
Other Regions	4,498,937	76,102	28,627,648	3,482,810
Central America and the Caribbean	3,174,830,271	242,295,693	6,268,541,191	1,536,961,631
Central Asia	1,269,348,709	264,321,309	3,144,797,162	690,237,759
European Union	29,454,292,152	4,490,182,858	165,628,620,145	43,308,259,213
Middle East	78,828,095,185	4,947,281,824	184,889,977,957	28,235,137,230
North Africa	5,049,245,557	359,389,063	16,482,660,602	4,695,826,973
North America	11,371,111,149	1,312,807,771	57,996,423,444	10,466,412,178
Northeast Asia	6,063,614,851	374,850,817	31,084,290,799	4,173,259,143
Oceania	4,405,085,568	297,058,386	17,030,833,507	4,828,755,569
Other European Nations	9,572,052,960	1,187,753,440	35,439,714,180	8,971,788,581
South America	9,709,523,074	515,710,444	24,968,109,872	5,915,310,455
South Asia	17,558,003,451	1,494,469,501	48,197,879,969	9,360,358,916
Southeast Asia	16,094,741,554	1,281,616,788	46,507,388,764	9,872,817,834
Sub-Saharan Africa	3,166,051,732	282,206,048	11,219,913,534	4,009,474,200
Global total	195,720,495,150	17,050,020,044	648,887,778,774	136,068,082,492





Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

The authorized exports of 2015 show the specific analyses by member states of the EU in deciding which regions of the world can contract exports of military material. This year four out of every ten licences for export (in terms of absolute value) were granted to the Middle East, which also was the recipient of 29% of actual European arms exports in 2015. The EU itself has large numbers of authorised (15%) and actual exports (26%) due to several combined military projects (the Eurofighter or the A-400 military transport plane, for example) and a part of total exports are transfers within the

EU each year in this way. The next regions that receive large amounts of European weaponry are Southeast Asia and South Asia, which together make up 17% of the authorisations and 16% of the actual exports.

By contrast, if the period from 2003 to 2015 is analysed, it can be seen that a large part of those weapons transfers which are internal to the EU have diminished, having been replaced by a clear increase in arms exports to the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. There is also a notable

increase to Central Asia. A region which has reduced exports in 2015 is Oceania, which fluctuates on specific purchases of warships or military aircraft. Later we shall see an analysis of the specific regions specified in the EU report, as well as others of particular interest such as the NATO region.




EU Arms Exports to Central America and the Caribbean 2013-15

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	37,718,791	34,088,179
2004	58,492,381	57,634,191
2005	54,847,664	42,050,485
2006	233,969,329	12,116,436
2007	48,010,862	11,840,767
2008	37,895,537	11,646,683
2009	169,702,808	64,701,200
2010	514,112,455	176,563,360
2011	660,249,564	188,636,397
2012	458,381,524	439,058,112
2013	50,177,770	117,324,909
2014	770,152,235	139,005,219
2015	3,174,830,271	242,295,693
Total	6,268,541,191	1,536,961,631

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU arms exports to South America 2003-15




Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to Central Asia 2003-15

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	28,119,155	145,600
2004	18,199,156	4,820,717
2005	32,045,928	2,361,319
2006	11,895,856	2,468,773
2007	71,234,431	6,809,927
2008	20,125,346	1,998,607
2009	20,046,916	22,788,396
2010	70,715,469	18,809,815
2011	516,991,680	23,078,684
2012	452,908,442	100,574,016
2013	337,234,928	86,391,010
2014	295,931,146	155,669,586
2015	1,269,348,709	264,321,309
Total	3,144,797,162	690,237,759

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU arms exports to Central America and the Caribbean 2003-15



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.


EU Arms Exports to South America 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	339,886,766	55,361,642
2004	482,718,538	181,632,992
2005	1,273,240,752	345,190,740
2006	1,045,671,890	489,614,422
2007	484,985,528	345,808,986
2008	769,521,756	257,254,557
2009	2,170,543,265	279,102,695
2010	1,625,993,930	633,095,508
2011	714,016,890	1,014,488,393
2012	2,240,891,332	512,234,223
2013	918,394,216	831,076,865
2014	3,192,721,935	454,738,988
2015	9,709,523,074	515,710,444
Total	24,968,109,872	5,915,310,455

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

Exports of arms and military systems from the EU to Central America have increased considerably from 2010, reaching peak authorised exports in 2011 and actual exports in 2012. After that,

EU arms exports to Central Asia 2003-15



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

exports continued in this vein until 2015, when authorisations sky-rocketed, equivalent to the previous 12 years combined. In regards to South America, there is also a large increase of authorisations in 2015, reaching record numbers in the last decade. The largest importer by far is Brazil.

The EU has produced exponential growth in exports to two particularly conflict-prone regions – the Middle East and Central Asia, not only in terms of authorisations, but also in terms of actual exports. Central Asia is no longer a region which barely receives EU weapons exports, there


is no denying the important role in arming this region. In the Middle East, European nations are showing a remarkable increase in the willingness to export military equipment, given the 2014 and 2015 authorizations of over 100 billion euros. All indications point to elevated numbers of weapons exports to the region in the coming years, even numbers above and beyond those since 2012.

Exports from member states of the EU to other European countries, both members and non-members of the EU are also on a rising trend, but as can be seen in the tables here, the notorious share of the increase is that of exports to non-member

EU Arms Exports to the Middle East 2003-2015		
YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	8,415,956,379	301,908,646
2004	5,647,231,391	4,097,370,574
2005	4,701,848,468	1,623,675,950
2006	5,103,383,312	1,589,227,882
2007	4,043,449,364	1,550,682,825
2008	4,963,003,627	1,139,699,841
2009	9,633,900,937	1,502,456,248
2010	6,660,200,079	1,782,557,575
2011	7,975,207,290	1,568,357,839
2012	9,722,934,723	1,897,969,425
2013	7,653,975,250	3,406,075,450
2014	31,540,791,952	2,827,873,151
2015	78,828,095,185	4,947,281,824
Total	184,889,977,957	28,235,137,230


Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU arms exports to EU members 2003-15



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

nations. Even so, authorizations for exports since 2012 have been on the rise throughout the entire continent, which paints a picture of increasing interconnectedness of the European military industry. The African continent maintains a constant and



Source: the authors

EU Arms Exports to EU member countries 2003-2015		
YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	9,165,070,074	1,395,632,073
2004	10,483,334,834	2,603,022,244
2005	9,572,834,240	3,198,968,633
2006	10,072,225,981	3,603,434,464
2007	10,673,307,789	3,904,427,671
2008	10,647,509,462	3,367,473,036
2009	13,360,564,334	3,587,335,780
2010	8,985,709,106	2,589,673,229
2011	14,494,403,948	2,636,745,180
2012	12,584,731,498	3,197,347,265
2013	10,718,512,328	4,066,085,227
2014	15,416,124,399	4,667,931,553
2015	29,454,292,152	4,490,182,858
Total	165,628,620,145	43,308,259,213

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.


light growth in importation of European weaponry. As occurs in other regions, the largest increase in authorisations starts the last two years that are analysed. This has meant an increase in arms arriving to Sub-Saharan Africa since 2012,

EU Arms Exports to non-EU European countries 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	1,885,190,713	311,735,576
2004	1,220,919,500	547,317,018
2005	1,558,182,435	818,577,087
2006	1,535,691,490	732,765,377
2007	2,133,141,372	846,848,574
2008	3,093,824,416	675,289,892
2009	1,668,582,646	618,834,693
2010	1,746,640,842	362,478,116
2011	1,835,616,441	828,197,381
2012	2,127,003,327	612,457,127
2013	2,054,496,690	540,481,674
2014	5,008,371,348	889,052,626
2015	9,572,052,960	1,187,753,440
Total	35,439,714,180	8,971,788,581

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU arms exports to North Africa 2003-15




Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to Sub-Saharan Africa 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	657,080,310	325,439,771
2004	704,547,280	477,768,104
2005	886,710,228	433,512,070
2006	453,318,703	427,292,899
2007	621,242,476	245,326,055
2008	364,397,968	337,646,027
2009	569,701,909	373,696,196
2010	304,709,754	199,544,491
2011	493,481,427	252,897,203
2012	678,519,505	171,134,819
2013	476,504,286	229,026,422
2014	1,843,647,956	253,984,095
2015	3,166,051,732	282,206,048
Total	11,219,913,534	4,009,474,200

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU arms exports to other European nations 2003-15



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.


EU Arms Exports to North Africa 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	91,551,276	30,332,156
2004	127,432,169	43,184,798
2005	372,429,342	199,636,343
2006	243,139,321	101,830,250
2007	578,348,656	136,128,871
2008	985,031,445	300,308,359
2009	1,960,336,524	538,628,475
2010	1,664,145,541	421,794,771
2011	1,200,899,302	544,173,996
2012	982,611,914	475,906,003
2013	1,897,103,782	251,607,689
2014	1,330,385,773	1,292,906,199
2015	5,049,245,557	359,389,063
Total	16,482,660,602	4,695,826,973

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

which had until then had been on a downward trend. The Sub-Saharan region is the setting for a large number of the armed conflicts in the world each year.

EU arms exports to Sub-Saharan Africa 2003-15



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

Exports of European weaponry to North America and Oceania show trends similar to other regions, only that for the most part, the minimum export in a given year was higher. Starting in 2012 in North America and in 2014 in Oceania, authorizations sky-rocketed. However, in the case of Australia, the actual exports have more than halved in the last two years. In any case, that reflects the changing nature of arms exchanges between the so-called Western countries, and will likely be maintained in the short to long term. If one


takes into account the trend of exports to NATO members, the trend of increase is clearly alarming.

Exports to Asia have been shown large increases in the last years. The militarization of Pacific relations and the presence of various emerging powers have caused arms imports to shoot up all over the continent. This is particularly acute in South and Southeast Asia, where both authorisations and actual exports in 2014 and 2015 went well beyond previous years.

EU Arms Exports to North America 2003-2015		
YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	2,216,734,649	231,372,802
2004	2,276,969,453	440,561,208
2005	2,959,773,291	547,097,050
2006	3,094,533,131	672,394,710
2007	2,866,108,009	538,115,671
2008	3,176,162,507	661,300,340
2009	4,642,787,112	822,069,235
2010	3,984,055,775	894,142,954
2011	3,588,433,981	1,123,476,557
2012	3,832,184,017	844,614,086
2013	5,237,627,830	1,291,001,679
2014	8,749,942,540	1,087,458,115
2015	11,371,111,149	1,312,807,771
Total	57,996,423,444	10,466,412,178

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.


EU arms exports to Oceania 2003-15



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

This first section uses different approaches to analysing the reality of exports of weapons and military equipment of all types from EU member states. It can be seen that there was a clear increase in sales of European arms to almost every geopolitical region in 2015. The EU exports

EU arms exports to North America 2003-15



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to Oceania 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	387,713,614	29,761,084
2004	454,758,767	67,116,212
2005	472,453,624	178,168,964
2006	492,078,794	169,849,906
2007	913,313,719	549,880,971
2008	2,235,114,184	195,432,825
2009	1,032,960,108	208,216,106
2010	1,493,160,652	243,437,893
2011	945,851,675	721,601,048
2012	1,454,679,377	863,568,776
2013	1,697,900,017	896,095,044
2014	1,045,763,408	408,568,354
2015	4,405,085,568	297,058,386
Total	17,030,833,507	4,828,755,569

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.


all types of military equipment and material, but above certain kinds of small and light arms, of military aircraft and warships, as well as electronic products and high-tech components needed for complex weapons systems. There has been an profound intensification of authorisations since

EU Arms Exports to NATO Member Countries 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	11,389,053,219	1,534,754,486
2004	12,223,748,203	3,029,921,952
2005	12,374,574,000	3,996,565,842
2006	12,541,185,524	4,452,893,324
2007	13,078,528,514	4,657,400,531
2008	15,127,493,077	4,199,656,885
2009	17,668,436,391	4,543,478,386
2010	12,917,232,187	3,422,071,022
2011	18,189,546,601	4,176,953,163
2012	17,029,276,483	4,104,796,208
2013	16,011,264,625	5,245,734,331
2014	24,794,377,324	6,048,526,885
2015	43,075,913,867	6,196,387,123
Total	226,420,630,015	55,609,140,138

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to Northeast Asia 2003-2015




Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to South Asia 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	1,498,906,663	85,250,373
2004	1,879,474,439	572,834,417
2005	1,634,502,936	499,782,937
2006	2,347,835,684	606,308,865
2007	2,019,917,317	633,031,111
2008	1,757,989,748	663,720,142
2009	2,072,044,502	789,862,832
2010	1,907,214,138	760,612,308
2011	2,463,746,757	819,382,175
2012	2,159,455,123	953,176,531
2013	1,930,588,129	697,848,971
2014	8,968,201,082	784,078,753
2015	17,558,003,451	1,494,469,501
Total	48,197,879,969	9,360,358,916

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU arms exports to NATO members 2003-15




Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to Northeast Asia 2003-2015

YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	1,061,921,884	17,926,979
2004	2,038,766,226	299,643,918
2005	1,156,340,719	503,565,805
2006	1,458,447,797	659,195,314
2007	693,555,382	445,930,067
2008	2,726,274,219	281,568,260
2009	789,227,320	309,432,681
2010	830,461,240	217,821,629
2011	854,489,620	204,138,623
2012	640,592,591	290,849,221
2013	827,275,193	286,459,764
2014	11,943,323,757	281,876,065
2015	6,063,614,851	374,850,817
Total	31,084,290,799	4,173,259,143

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to South Asia 2003-2015




Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to Southeast Asia 2003-2015		
YEAR	AUTHORISED	ACTUAL
2003	2,595,801,951	487,051,370
2004	1,649,125,379	751,353,876
2005	1,475,899,976	426,575,464
2006	1,342,148,638	488,803,831
2007	1,962,936,868	1,080,198,374
2008	2,641,710,882	531,393,644
2009	2,035,346,711	980,662,801
2010	1,940,361,669	383,901,682
2011	1,778,862,051	648,593,852
2012	2,012,378,488	766,237,426
2013	2,683,747,747	1,272,432,897
2014	8,294,326,850	773,995,829
2015	16,094,741,554	1,281,616,788
Total	46,507,388,764	9,872,817,834

Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

EU Arms Exports to Southeast Asia 2003-2015



Source: the authors. Millions of current euros.

2014, which could mean large volumes of exports of weaponry in the coming years, weapons that may wind up in countries embroiled in armed conflict. The next section focuses on the destination nations of European arms that were also the setting for armed conflict in 2015.

3. ARMED CONFLICTS IN 2015

In 2015, humanity was troubled by 35 armed conflicts³ of diverse types, with different levels of militarisation and intensity, and which had terrible effects on human security. The majority of the armed conflicts occurred in Africa and Asia, with 13 and 12 cases, respectively, while the Middle East was the scene of six armed conflicts. Europe was the site of 3, while in the Americas there was only one conflict, as in previous years. These 35 conflicts happened in 27 countries. Of these 27 nations, 13 of them were among the top 50 importers of EU arms exports: Egypt, India, Turkey, Iraq, Thailand, Algeria, Pakistan, China, Russia, Israel, Ukraine, Nigeria, and Colombia, in order of volume of exports from greatest to least. Some of these countries were the setting for more than one armed conflict, such as India, with armed conflicts in the states of Assam as well as in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and with the Maoist group CPI-M in several states. In Pakistan, conflict between the State and Taliban militias and other insurgents, as well as the conflict in the province of Balochistan. It is worth noting that the situation in India (Assam) was no longer considered an active armed conflict because of the drop in violence, in keeping with a pattern of de-escalating hostilities in recent years.

31% of the wars in 2015 (11 conflicts) had high levels of violence.⁴ That was the case in Libya, Nigeria (Boko Haram), Somalia, South Sudan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Ukraine, Egypt (Sinai), Syria, and Yemen (Houthis). In many of these conflicts the numbers of mortalities far exceeded the threshold of a thousand deaths per year. Five of the 11 high-intensity armed conflicts in 2015 occurred in countries which were among the largest importing nations of European arms: Nigeria, Pakistan, Ukraine, Egypt and Iraq. Of these, it is worth noting that armed conflict in Iraq in 2014-2015, which caused at least 17,578 and 20,218 civilian deaths respectively, which according to Iraq Body Count (IBC) was the highest death toll

3. This report uses the School of a Peace Culture's definition of armed conflict, which defines armed conflict as any clash involving regular or irregular armed groups whose goals are perceived as incompatible, in which the continuous, organised use of violence: a) leads to at least 100 deaths per year and/or a serious impact on the land (destruction of infrastructures or nature) and human safety (such as an injured or displaced people, sexual violence, food insecurity, impact on mental health and the social fabric or the disruption of basic services); b) aims to achieve objectives which are distinguishable from the objectives of everyday violence, usually associated with: - demands for self-determination and self-governance, or identity-based aspirations; - opposes the political, economic or social system of a state or the internal or international policy of a government, which in both cases motivates the struggle to gain or erode power; - seeks control over the resources or the land."

4. The School for a Culture of Peace defines high-intensity armed conflicts as those that cause over 1,000 fatalities per year, as well as affecting a significant proportion of the territory and population, and involving several actors (who forge alliances, confront each other or establish a tactical coexistence).

Armed Conflicts and weaponry imported from the EU in 2015

AFRICA (13)	ASIA (12)	MIDDLE EAST (6)
<p>Algeria (AQMI) -1992- Burundi -2015- Ethiopia (Ogaden) -2007- Libya -2011- Mali (North) -2012- Nigeria (Boko Haram) - 2011- CAR -2006- DRC (East) -1998- DRC (East-ADF) -2014- Somalia -1988- Sudan (Darfur) -2003- Sudan (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) -2011- South Sudan -2009-</p>	<p>Afghanistan -2001- China (East Turkestan) -2014- Philippines (CPP-NPA-NDF) -1969- Philippines (Mindanao-Abu Sayyaf) -1991- Philippines (Mindanao-BIFF) -2015- India (Assam) -1983- India (Jammu & Kashmir) -1989- India (CPI-M) -1967- Myanmar -1948- Pakistan -2001- Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005- Thailand (south) -2004-</p>	<p>Egypt (Sinai) -2014- Iraq -2003- Israel-Palestine -2000- Syria -2011- Yemen (Houthis) -2004- Yemen (AQAP) - 2011-</p>
		EUROPE (3)
		<p>Russia (Dagestan) -2010- Turkey (Southeast) -1984- Ukraine -2014-</p>
		THE AMERICAS (1)
		Colombia -1964-

In bold are the armed conflicts which happened in countries importing arms from EU member nations. The year indicates the start of armed conflict. Source: The School for a Culture of Peace, *Alert 2016! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2016; European Network Against Arms Trade; and Official Journal of the European Union annual reports on the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports

since 2007. The rest of the importing nations faced lesser levels of mortality from armed conflict. According to the 2016 Global Terrorism Index, the armed group Boko Haram killed 4,095 people in terrorist attacks in Nigeria, as well as 4,422 killed due to violence between the group and state forces. Likewise, around 4,400 people died in Ukraine due to armed conflict in 2015; 3,682 people died in Pakistan – 2,403 insurgents, 940 civilians and 339 members of security forces, according to the totals of the South Asia Terrorism Portal. In Egypt, some 3,000 insurgents died in the Sinai in 2015

in counter-insurgency operations, according to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. According to the 2016 Global Terrorist Index, there were 662 deaths from terrorism in Egypt in 2015, the highest levels since 2000, and the ISIS branch Province of Sinai were responsible for 78% of these victims.

Aside from the high intensity armed conflicts in countries importing EU weapons, other high intensity armed conflicts also took a particularly heavy toll, such as in Syria. The war in Syria in 2015 caused the deaths of 55,000 people (with

Countries with armed conflict among the 50 leading importers of EU arms production			
ARMS IMPORTING COUNTRY	ACTIVE ARMED CONFLICT IN 2015	VOLUME OF IMPORTS OF EU ARMS	POSITION IN THE RANKING OF IMPORTERS
AFRICA			
Algeria	Algeria (AQIM) -1992-	2,097,041,932	25
Nigeria	Nigeria (Boko Haram) - 2011-	564,221,052	45
ASIA			
China	China (East Turkestan) -2014-	1,303,584,122	32
India	India (Assam) -1983-	15,180,179,129	4
	India (Jammu and Kashmir) -1989-	15,180,179,129	4
	India (CPI-M) -1967-	15,180,179,129	4
Pakistan	Pakistan -2001-	1,918,756,103	27
	Pakistan (Balochistan) -2005-	1,918,756,103	27
Thailand	Thailand (south) -2004-	2,260,146,001	22

18 THE ARMS TRADE AND ARMED CONFLICT. AN ANALYSIS OF EUROPEAN WEAPONS EXPORTS TO COUNTRIES IN ARMED CONFLICT

AMERICAS			
Colombia	Colombia -1964-	477,468,161	50
EUROPE			
Russia	Russia (Dagestan) -2010-	1,039,519,830	36
Turkey	Turkey (Southeast) -1984-	2,600,449,052	17
Ukraine	Ukraine -2014-	679,613,487	42
MIDDLE EAST			
Egypt	Egypt (Sinai) -2014-	19,477,824,206	2
Iraq	Iraq -2003-	2,281,079,174	21
Israel	Israel-Palestine -2000-	966,901,248	37

Source: the authors with data from The School for a Culture of Peace, *Alert 2016! Report on conflicts, human rights and peacebuilding*. Barcelona: Icaria, 2016; European Network Against the Arms Trade; and the Eighteenth Annual Report according to Article 8(2) of Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP defining common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment (2017/C 153/01), in the Official Journal of the European Union, C153/1, 16th May, 2017.

Leading destinations of authorised and actual exports of weaponry from EU member states in 2015				
YEAR	AUTHORISED 2015	RANKING AUTHORISED EXPORTS 2015	ACTUAL 2015	RANKING ACTUAL EXPORTS 2015
Saudi Arabia	22,241,829,866	1	1,858,407,125	1
Egypt	19,477,824,206	2	1,376,513,726	2
Qatar	16,584,950,507	3	158,503,342	28
India	15,180,179,129	4	1,228,266,631	3
United Arab Emirates	10,022,725,784	5	550,415,023	8
United States	9,127,772,498	6	1,199,585,664	4
United Kingdom	6,661,187,158	7	965,800,801	6
Brazil	5,890,330,139	8	226,455,530	18
Poland	5,720,673,200	9	153,575,446	30
Singapore	4,905,730,418	10	187,564,002	21
Malaysia	4,739,321,197	11	351,827,899	11
Australia	4,232,361,065	12	279,195,744	16
Germany	4,083,768,110	13	1,196,533,934	5
Indonesia	2,778,346,427	14	314,823,519	13
Mexico	2,775,282,012	15	165,026,736	25
Kuwait	2,611,473,125	16	20,621,585	69
Turkey	2,600,449,052	17	414,817,805	9
France	2,590,581,713	18	618,205,009	7
Morocco	2,483,219,518	19	48,891,262	51
South Korea	2,409,002,855	20	180,314,623	22
Iraq	2,281,079,174	21	380,342,218	10
Thailand	2,260,146,001	22	134,880,188	32
Canada	2,243,338,651	23	113,222,107	35
Italy	2,209,884,995	24	212,770,469	20
Algeria	2,097,941,932	25	285,715,478	15
Japan	1,947,711,836	26	52,189,558	50
Pakistan	1,918,756,103	27	142,386,724	31
Switzerland	1,913,242,700	28	48,441,253	52
Spain	1,616,515,660	29	175,954,172	23
Lebanon	1,546,114,580	30	10,449,358	84

Oman	1,495,947,816	31	264,856,214	17
China	1,303,584,122	32	114,758,218	34
Norway	1,243,152,676	33	323,644,137	12
Jordan	1,240,472,210	34	22,861,885	68
Peru	1,135,958,779	35	160,494,560	26
Russia	1,039,519,830	36	88,930,314	41
Israel	966,901,248	37	293,426,732	14
Greece	943,299,929	38	72,585,652	46
Azerbaijan	938,103,293	39	158,279,098	29
Vietnam	736,624,634	40	107,036,616	37
Uzbekistan	688,038,950	41	130,497,796	33
Ukraine	679,613,487	42	31,954,160	61
Serbia	657,975,224	43	13,662,956	77
Sweden	599,501,768	44	85,674,148	42
Nigeria	564,221,052	45	35,126,182	58
Denmark	562,161,046	46	45,882,230	54
Belgium	533,453,116	47	111,871,473	36
Netherlands	493,193,216	48	165,537,437	24
Chile	477,827,044	49	46,385,418	53
Colombia	477,468,161	50	28,851,442	63

Source: the authors. Millones de euros corrientes.

more than 260,000 killed since the start of the war in 2011) and in those countries participating in this conflict there were countries among the top 50 importing nations of weaponry from EU member states. Among them were the members of the US-led international coalition against ISIS - among them Australia, Jordan, and countries of the EU itself, such as France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Netherlands - as well as Russia, among others. In the same way, the high-intensity conflict in Yemen (Houthi) caused more than 6,000 deaths in 2015, more than half of whom were civilians, according to UN estimates. The UN High Commissioner of Human Rights held the international coalition led by Saudi Arabia - the leading importer of EU weaponry - responsible for a high number of attacks with civilian victims.

The causes of conflict in 2015 were multidimensional, and several factors came together in the majority of cases. The main causes of two-thirds (24 cases, or 69%) of all armed conflicts included opposition to the government's internal or international policies, as well as as opposition to the political, social or ideological system of the state. This factor was also present in 10 of the 13 armed conflicts which occurred in countries among the top 50 importers of EU weapons exports: in Algeria, Nigeria (Boko Haram), Colombia, China (Turkestan), India (CPI-M), Pakistan, Russia (Dagestan), Ukraine, Egypt

(Sinai), and Iraq. On the other hand, 19 of the 35 wars of 2015 (54%) had among their main causes conflicts concerning demands for autonomous identity and governance, with a greater prevalence in Asia and Europe. Of those 19 countries involved in an armed conflict, nine were among the 13 that were at the same time receiving arms from the EU: China (East Turkestan), India (Assam), India (Jammu & Kashmir), Pakistan (Balochistan), Turkey (Southeast), Ukraine, Iraq, and Israel-Palestine. On the other hand, it should be noted that the rivalry for control of the resources was present either directly or indirectly in most conflicts, including those among the top importing nations of EU arms.

The armed conflicts had serious consequences on the population, including human rights violations and impacts on human security. Among the most serious consequences was the forced displacement of the populace. By the end of 2015, 65.3 million people had left their home due to the threat of violence, according to UNHCR⁵. Of these, 21.3 million were refugees (16.1 million under the mandate of UNHCR and 5.2 million Palestinian refugees under the mandate of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 40.8 million people were internally displaced

5. UNHCR, *Global Trends. Forced displacement in 2015*, UNHCR, 20 June 2016, <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html>

Countries in armed conflict with high or very high levels of gender discrimination, including countries among the 50 leading importers of arms originating in EU member nations

	High levels of discrimination	Very high levels of discrimination
ARMED CONFLICT	Ethiopia Iraq India (3) Myanmar Pakistan (2) Afghanistan CAR	Nigeria Syria DRC (2) Egypt Somalia Mali Sudan (2) Yemen (2)

-In parenthesis are the number of armed conflicts in the country.
 -In bold, countries among the leading 50 importers of arms originating in EU member nations
 -Source: Table prepared from the levels of gender discrimination SIGI (OECD) and from the classification of armed conflict and tension of the School for a Culture of Peace. The SIGI identify five levels of classification in terms of the level of discrimination: very high, high, medium, low, very low.

and another 3.2 million were requesting asylum. In total, this shows a 75% increase from two decades ago (37.3 million in 1996). The ten countries producing the greatest number of refugees were Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, South Sudan, DRC, CAR, Myanmar, Eritrea, and Colombia. These countries accounted for 76% of the refugees (12.1 million people) under the mandate of the UNHCR in 2015, and the conflict in Syria alone drove 4.9 million people from their homes. One of the ten – Colombia – is among the top 50 importers of EU arms. The number of Colombian refugees grew to around 340,200 by the end of 2015. Other countries which were also among the leading importers of EU armament also faced crises of forced displacement, with an elevated number of people who fled out of the country. This was the case of Ukraine, with 321,300 refugees at the end of 2015, according to the UNHCR and a total of 1.07 million Ukrainians sought asylum or other forms of legal residence in neighbouring countries as a result of the conflict in the east of the country. Pakistan also had some 297,800 refugees.

Internal displacement rose to record numbers, 40.8 million people, according to the UNHCR. At the end of 2015, the countries with the most internally displaced people were Colombia (6.9 million), Syria (6.6 million, a reduction from the 7.6 million of 2014, among other factors due to an increase of the population looking for shelter outside of the country), Iraq (4.4 million, rising from 3.6 the previous year), Sudan (3.2 million, rising from 2.1 in 2014), Nigeria (2.2 million, compared with 1.2 million in 2014) South Sudan (1.8 million), DRC (1.6 million), Afghanistan (1.2 million), Pakistan (1.1 million) and Somalia (1.1 million).

On the other hand, the armed conflicts occurred in contexts of gender inequality and themselves brought about serious infringements of the rights of women and gender-based violence. 21 of the 35 armed conflicts happened in countries with serious gender inequalities, which had high or very high levels of discrimination. No data was available for 5 of the countries. Of these 21 conflicts, seven happened in countries which were among the top 50 importers of arms produced in the EU.

At the same time, among the human rights violations, the presence of sexual and gender violence related to the conflicts continues to be reported by women’s human rights organizations and the UN. In the 2016 report for the period from January to December 2015, the UN Secretary General analysed 19 countries in which the UN had documented sexual violence relating to the conflicts. The same report points out the difficulty in documenting sexual violence and estimated that for every rape reported relating to the conflict, another 10 or 20 cases go undocumented. In relation to the situations of armed conflict from 2015 in countries which are among the top 50 importing nations of EU arms and which are under investigation by the UN Security Council, the Secretary General’s report identifies the Islamic State and the group Boko Haram as actors for which there are strong suspicions of systemic acts of rape and other forms of sexual violence, or who should be held responsible for those acts⁶.

6. In this table the nomenclature of the armed actors is reported directly as quoted from the report of the Secretary General and does not necessarily coincide with that used in chapter 1 and 2 of this publication.

Sexual violence in contexts of conflict in the countries among the 50 leading importers of arms from EU countries

The report of the UN Secretary General on sexual violence in conflicts published in April 2016, covering the period from January to December 2015, only includes cases reported and documented by the UN and, as the report warns, does not therefore reflect the magnitude of the problem. Cases of sexual violence in conflict-affected areas include ongoing conflicts in countries importing arms from the EU.

Colombia	<p>- The report made mention of an order issued by the Constitutional Court which emphasized the persistence of conflict-related sexual violence and urged the authorities to address the structural factors that perpetuated such crimes. Unfortunately, few of these crimes are put to trial. Conflict-related sexual violence is considered to be a widespread risk in at least 10 departments of Colombia, predominantly areas under the influence of armed groups. The National Victims' Unit registered 103 cases of conflict-related sexual violence in 2015, of which 46% of the cases were committed by armed groups. Women of African descent or indigenous women were targeted in 30 per cent of the cases.</p> <p>- The report also points out that despite the agreement between the government and the FARC-EP in December 2015 in terms of truth, justice, and reparations and guarantees of non-repetition for victims of the conflict, which provides for a comprehensive transitional justice process, the truth commission recognizes the disproportionate impact of conflict and conflict-related sexual violence on women, and a special jurisdiction for peace, which identifies sexual violence as a grave crime for which amnesty cannot be granted. The report praises both parts for the advances in the peace process and calls upon the parties to place gender justice and the eradication of sexual violence at the centre of the application of the agreement.</p>
Iraq	<p>- The report gives accounts of sexual violence committed by the Islamic State (ISIS), forced separation of Yezidi children from their mothers, and the transfer of women within Iraq and to the Syrian Arab Republic and presented to so-called "emirs" for sexual exploitation. It also condemns ISIS for incorporating sexual violence into its systems of punishment and reward. It also mentions concerns that sexual violence has been used by the Mahdi Army and Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, in several provinces. It also documents the persistence of sexual violence in displacement settings, including sexual exploitation and child marriage, with adolescent girls being particularly vulnerable.</p>
Nigeria	<p>- The report warns that many of the women abducted by the armed group Boko Haram have been forced into sexual slavery. An estimated 2,000 women and girls have been abducted by Boko Haram between 2014 and the end of 2015.</p> <p>- The report also mentions human rights concerns for when women and children released from Boko Haram are held for prolonged periods by the security forces for screening and rehabilitation.</p> <p>- It also warns that in camps and host communities, women and girls continue to face rape, forced marriage and "survival sex" to meet their families' needs.</p>
Yemen ⁷	<p>- The report of the Secretary General warns of the consequences of the deterioration of the situation for women. In 2015, 5,866 cases of gender-based violence, including rape, sexual harassment and early marriage, were reported. Few medical professionals are prepared to respond to cases of sexual violence. The report also warns of the larger context of human rights violations, which disproportionately affects women, such as forced displacement.</p>

Source: UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on conflict-related sexual violence, S/2016/361, 20 April 2016.

3.1 Armed Conflicts in 2015 in countries importing arms from member states of the EU

3.1.1 AFRICA

ALGERIA

Overview of the conflict:

Algeria was a gruesome scene since the beginning of the 1990s, as armed conflict pitted the security forces against various Islamist groups. The rise of the Islamist movement in Algeria was due to the population's discontent, the economic crisis and the stifling of political participation. The conflict began when the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was made illegal in 1992 after its triumph in the elections against the historic party that had led the independence of the country, the National Liberation Front. The next years of armed struggle brought several groups - FIS,

GIA and the GSPC, a division of the GIA that later became al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) into conflict with the army, supported by the self-defence militias. The conflict caused some 150,000 deaths during the 1990s and continues to claim lives. However, the levels of violence have decreased since 2002 after some of the groups gave up the armed fight. In recent years, the conflict has been led by AQIM, which became a transnational organisation, expanding its operations beyond Algerian territory and affecting the Sahel countries. Algeria, along with Mali, Libya, Mauritania, Niger and others, has fought AQIM and other armed groups that have begun operating in the area, including the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Mourabitoun organisations (Those Who Sign with Blood) and Jund al-Khilafa (a branch of ISIS).

7. Yemen is not among the top 50 importing nations of EU arms, but is the setting for an armed struggle in which Saudi Arabian military is intervening directly, heading up an international coalition. Saudi Arabia is the leading importer of EU arms.

Summary in 2015

The conflict in Algeria remained characterised by recurrent outbreaks of low-intensity violence, but which in total led to more than a hundred killed. Official figures of the Algerian defence force reported a total of 157 insurgents killed, including 12 which had occupied positions of leadership in different operations and clashes in 2015.⁸ Una altra trentena de presumptes membres de grups armats van ser detinguts al llarg de l'YEAR en el marc dels enfrontaments o en operacions contra sospitosos de pertinença a grups armats, a més d'accions contra xarxes de reclutament i de tràfic d'armes. Adicionalment, es va informar de la confiscació de més d'un miler d'artefactes explosius i la destrucció de més de 500 refugis de cèl·lules armades.

Another 30 suspects associated with different armed groups were arrested in different clashes and operations in 2015, as well as actions against fighter-recruiting networks and arms trafficking, the seizure of more than 300 arms, the deactivation of more than 1000 explosive devices, and the destruction of more than 500 hideouts of armed groups.

The most violent clashes of 2015 were clashes with AQIM and Jund al-Khilafa, a branch of ISIS in Northern Africa. In May, various units of the Algerian security forces launched an operation to dismantle an armed cell in an action which resulted in the deaths of 25 combatants. It surfaced that 17 of the militants killed belonged to the ISIS branch in the country and eight were members of AQIM, among them the leader of the group which had taken control after the death of his predecessor in December 2014. The military operation took place during a meeting in which members of the branch of ISIS tried to convince fighters of AQIM to join their ranks, an event that illustrates the tensions between jihadist groups in the region. Some analysts suggested that the branch of al-Qaeda was weakening in the context of a regional and international rise of ISIS, others indicated that during 2015 AQIM may have decided to unite forces with the armed group al-Mourabitoun, headed up by Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Both Belmokhtar and the head of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel, released declarations in which they reiterated their loyalty to the main branch of al-Qaeda and the leader of the network, Ayman al-Zawahiri, successor of Osama bin Laden. That same month of May, AQIM claimed responsibility for several actions, among them attacks in the zone of Batna (Northeast of

the country) which resulted in the death of five soldiers - among them a colonel in the Algerian Army. They also claimed responsibility for an ambush in the Ain Defla province (North) which resulted in the deaths of 11 soldiers in July. Throughout the year Algerian authorities revealed that they thwarted terror attacks on airports in two different cities orchestrated by the terrorist group Jund al-Khilafa, published a list of potential suicide bombers - supposedly trained in Libya and ready to attack Algeria and neighbouring Tunisia - and addressed border security concerns with military reinforcement.

The 2013 attack on the gas compound in In Amenas - brought about by the instability in Mali and Libya - led to internal investigations in Algeria, as well as the decision to intensify surveillance and militarize the borders. Since then it has increased its presence with land and air forces and reorganized the six military zones creating a seventh in the area near Libya. Experts say that the military commander in this new zone has ample resources and autonomy to confront armed groups and issues of contraband, including control over the Army, the Air Force, the Border police, National Guard and Gendarmerie. Algerian diplomatic sources coincided with the International Crisis Group (ICG) in estimating that the total number of troops in deployed in the Algerian border in 2015 had doubled, to 100,000 soldiers.⁹ Throughout the year border controls intensified on various occasions, for example in November, after the attack of ISIS in Tunisia which killed a dozen security forces. After these events, the Algerian authorities increased security measures, adding mobile patrols, supervision operations and reconnaissance flights on the Western border of the country.

Simultaneously, changes in the Algerian security forces had been going in since 2012 and accelerated in recent years, particularly in the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS).¹⁰ In 2015 these transformations resulted in the resignation of the long-time head of DRS, Mohamed "Tewfik" Mediène, in a set of changes which were interpreted as internal rivalries and power struggles between the DRS and the circle closest to president Abdelaziz Bouteflika. According to data available in early 2015, Algeria had increased military spending by 176% since 2004.¹¹ Despite falls



8. Africa Research Bulletin, Volum 52, Número 12, 1 a 31 de desembre de 2015.

9. International Crisis Group, *Algeria and its Neighbours*, Middle East and North Africa Report no.164, ICG: Algeria and Belgium, 12 October 2015 <http://www.refworld.org/pdf/561cd6294.pdf>

10. Florence Gaub, *Algeria's Army: on jihadist alert*, Brief Issue 6, European Institute for Security Studies, March 2015, uploads/media/Brief_6_Algeria_s_army.pdf

in the price of oil, the policy of increasing military spending was maintained throughout 2015, reaching almost \$10,4 billion, a 5.2% increase according to data from SIPRI.¹²

Arms exports



Source: the authors

Algeria imported 285 million euros in military material produced in the EU in 2015. Half of the European weaponry which arrived to the country in 2015 was from the categories of military aircraft

and military ground vehicles. Algeria also bought weapons control systems, bombs, large-calibre torpedoes and projectiles, ammunition of various types, and small arms and light weapons. Export authorisations, however, rose to well beyond €2 billion, and indicate that Algeria plans to acquire large amounts of surveillance systems and electronic equipment which can serve for navigation, encryption of communications, and which shows a process of modernization of their equipment to incorporate materials for policing internally or on the borders. In 2015 the EU also authorized the sale of military land vehicles or military aircraft for future years.

Nigeria

Overview of the conflict:

The armed Islamist group calls for the overthrow of the Nigerian government, demands the establishment of an Islamic state in Nigeria and considers that Nigeria's public institutions are "westernised" and, therefore, decadent. The official name of the sect is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which means "Group of the People of Teachings of the Prophet and for Preaching and Jihad" though they are commonly known as Boko Haram, which means "Western Teachings are Forbidden". Since the fall to British control in 1903 of the Sokoto Caliphate - the region which later made up north Nigeria, Niger, and the north of Cameroon - the area has been the setting of periodic outbreaks of violence and fundamentalist resistance. Boko Haram was founded in 2002 but it was not until 2009 that it began armed actions for the creation of an Islamic State in the north of Nigeria. The execution of the group's leader Mohammed Yusuf that same year only worsened the situation. The government has carried out increasingly fierce attacks on the group, which has also committed numerous crimes and abuses against the civil population. Ansaru, a branch of the group, also made some attacks within the country. The deployment of troops and the formation of self-defence groups has contributed to the increase of violence, and as of 2015 the conflict has become regional, including those countries on the shores of Lake Chad: Chad, Niger, and Cameroon.

Summary in 2015

During 2015 the situation of armed conflict with the group Boko Haram only deteriorated. The group carried out various attacks and suicide bombings on markets, bus stations, mosques, schools (they have destroyed more than 1,000 since 2009), indiscriminate assassination, and confrontations with the security forces in Nigeria and in neighbouring states, particularly in Borno, the epicentre of the violence, but also in Adamawa, Yobe and Gombe, as well as in neighbouring countries - Chad, Niger and Cameroon. Boko Haram used minors and women for suicide attacks. The violent situation in the country and the consequences in neighbouring countries made this armed conflict one of the

11. Ibid.

12. SIPRI, *Trends in world military expenditure*, 2015, SIPRI Factsheet, abril de 2016. <http://books.sipri.org/files/FS/SIPRIFS1604.pdf>

most lethal in the world. The project Nigeria Security Tracker (NST),¹³ documented a total of 7,492 deaths produced in the conflict in the four aforementioned states, with Borno, at 6,162 reported deaths, the epicentre of the violence of the conflict with Boko Haram. The total number of mortalities according to NST has risen to around 44,000 since the beginning of the conflict in 2009. Violence of Boko Haram also has caused the forced displacement of 1.5 million people in the north of Nigeria, while another 150,000 sought refuge in Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, according to data from April 2015 of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC).¹⁴ The agency IRIN quoted another 66,000 internally displaced in Niger, 68,000 in Chad, and 92,000 in Cameroon.

The expansion of activities by Boko Haram and the growing military pressure of Nigeria and the neighbouring countries contributed to the progressive regionalisation of the conflict. The actions of Boko Haram grew as a reaction to the creation and deployment of the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which over the year seized large pieces of the territory held by the militia. Boko Haram started the year with a strong offensive with the goal of boycotting the presidential elections in February 2015, which caused the deaths in January of more than 3,000 people, the second most violent month since the beginning of the conflict after March 2014, when around 3,500 people died, according to the NST. Most of the victims were produced as a consequence of the attack in early January in and around the town of Baga (in Borno state) which overran a military base in a killing spree that left around 2,000 dead. According to various sources, the Nigerian contingent fled from the base and left the local population to their fate. This military defeat helped revitalize the commitment to the creation of a regional force. Until then the Nigerian mistrust of foreign military presence, and the lack of political will had stymied the mission. From that point, the Nigerian president Muhammadu Buhari pushed for the international coalition, made up of 8,700 troops from various countries (Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Benin) and modified military strategy, relocating the centre of operations of the Nigerian army from Abuja to Maiduguri, the largest city in the north and the capital of the state of Borno, where Boko Haram had its beginnings. On July 31st, the presidents of Nigeria and Cameroon announced the deployment

of the MNJTF, promising that this would put an end to the insurgency before the end of the year. The regional headquarters of the MNJTF was relocated to N'Djamena (Chad) the country in the region which had been most proactive in the fight against Boko Haram. The EU, the US, France, and the UK provided logistical support to the regional forces, which has the support of South African mercenaries.

In March of 2015 Boko Haram declared their loyalty to ISIS. During the year the group stepped up activities, with the strategy of suicide attacks against specific targets, the majority committed by women and sometimes even girls. Analysts speculated that the change in *modus operandi* of the group was due to the impact that the loss of territory due to MNJTF operations, that the group was adapting to different conditions, reducing its troop presence. The transformation was modelled on Jihadist organizations similar to those present in the Sahel region, and instead of trying to win and control territory, they relied on a strategy of creation of terror and hit-and-run tactics. The start of the second part of the year was accompanied by new suicide attacks, in the framework of the drive by ISIS to drive up violence during Ramadan, producing periodic attacks on the states of Yobe, Benue, Gombe, Adamawa and Borno. However, the combined actions of the MNJTF had managed to isolate Boko Haram, seizing a large part of their territory, reducing them to the Samba Forest, and limiting their capacity to make attacks. This was reflected in the gradual reduction of mortalities over the year, and according to data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, in January 2015 there had been 3,000 deaths, the second highest of the entire conflict, in November 2015, there were 230, the lowest since February 2013.¹⁵ On December 24th, in the light of advances against insurgents, Muhammadu Buhari declared that Nigeria had “technically” won the war against Boko Haram.¹⁶

Amnesty International (AI) published two reports on Nigeria. In the first, published in April, the NGO condemned that Boko Haram had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity - more than 2,000 women and girls had been captured by the group since the beginning of 2014, and had been subjected to conditions of sexual slavery and training to participate in armed offensives.¹⁷ In June, AI also released a report denouncing the war crimes and crimes against humanity

13. Africa Program, Council on Foreign Relations, available online: <https://www.cfr.org/nigeria/nigeria-security-tracker/p29483>

14. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Nigeria IDP Figures Analysis*, April 2015.

15. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project, *Conflict Trends* (No.44). *Real-Time Analysis of African Political Violence*, December 2015.
16. BBC, “Nigeria Boko Haram: Militants ‘technically defeated – Buhari”, BBC, 24 December 2015. .



committed by the Nigerian Army in their strategy of war against Boko Haram, insisting that the nine high-ranking commanders of the Nigerian Armed Forces be called before the International Penal Court for their role in assassination, extra judicial executions and torture of thousands of persons while fighting BH. In June, AI also released a report denouncing the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Nigerian Army in their strategy of war against Boko Haram, insisting that the nine high-ranking commanders of the Nigerian Armed Forces be called before the International Penal Court for their role in assassination, extra judicial executions and torture of thousands of persons while fighting BH.¹⁸

In parallel, in addition to the attacks and bombings produced in the interior of Nigeria, neighbouring Chad, Cameroon and Niger also suffered attacks as a result of their participation in the MNJTF. This, in turn, generated responses by their respective governments. Cameroon responded by outlawing the burqa, expelling hundreds of Nigerians without documentation, and sending 2,000 more soldiers to the region. In October, the US sent 300 soldiers and military equipment to support the government of Paul Biya in their struggle against the Islamist insurgency, which were deployed in the city of Garoua, in the North Region. In the last months of 2015, there were dozens of attacks and clashes between Boko Haram and the Cameroon army. Niger, in addition to participating in the coalition against Boko Haram with a contingent of 750 soldiers, was forced to seek international aid as a consequence of the humanitarian crisis unleashed by the attacks of the armed group in the region of Diffa, located in the Southeast of the country as well as the arrival of around 150,000 refugees from Nigeria. The region was declared a state of emergency. In Chad, Boko Haram launched their first attack on Chadian soil in February and continuously stepped up insurgent attacks. Idriss Déby sent 2,500 soldiers to the regional fight against the armed group. In June the first suicide bombing in N'Djamena against a police academy killed 30 people and wounded 100, which led to an increase in security measures in the capital city. In July the government announced the establishment of a new anti-terrorism law which was harshly criticized by the opposition and human rights organisations because it used the excuse of the fight against terrorism to undermine

basic rights. The most serious attack of the year occurred on October 10th, with the death of 41 people in several coordinated suicide attacks in Baga Sola, in the Lake Chad region. Finally, in November, the government declared a state of emergency in the region of Lake Chad.

Arms exports

In 2015, Nigeria purchased European weaponry worth more than 35 million Euros. Among the main categories were armoured vehicles, tanks, ammunition, light arms and artillery, explosives, and military aircraft. In terms of authorisation for future exports, these sky-rocketed to 566 million euros, among the same categories. The major producing countries were France, Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic.



Source: the authors

17. Amnesty International, *Our job is to shoot, slaughter and kill' Boko Haram's reign of terror in north-east Nigeria*, Index AFR44/1360/2015, 14 April 2015.

18. Amnesty International, *Stars on their shoulders. Blood on their hands. War crimes committed by the Nigerian military*, Index: AFR44/1657/2015, June 2015.

3.1.2 ASIA

China

Overview of the conflict:

The current conflict in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region – also known as Eastern Turkestan or Uyghuristan – goes back to the beginning of the 20th century with the emergence of the Uyghur national consciousness. Uyghurs are a Turkic ethnic group, predominantly Muslim and with more geographic and cultural ties to central Asia than with the rest of China. Both in the Republic of China as well as the People's Republic of China, the region corresponded to East Turkestan. After a short-lived establishment of the first and second Republic of Eastern Turkestan (in 1933-34 and 1944-49, respectively) some Uyghur organizations moved to oppose the drastic alteration of the demographic structure of the region caused by the massive influx of Han people to the detriment of Uyghur population. Some Uyghur organizations accused the central government of a policies of acculturation and cultural and religious repression. As well, Beijing has recognized on several occasions the geostrategic importance of Xinjiang, not only for its large size, or that it shares borders with several Central Asian countries, but also because it contains significant mineral and hydrocarbon reserves, and for its importance in China's energy supply, as well as the export of hydrocarbons over land via the network of gas and oil pipelines in Xinjiang. In 2008, when the Olympic Games were being held in Beijing, there was an increase in armed attacks by insurgent groups, while 2009 saw the most fierce community clashes in recent decades. Over the following years the violence became more frequent, intense, and complex.

Summary in 2015

After a period in which the violence had grown year after year to reach new heights in 2014, the government declared that in 2015, levels of violence in Xinjiang had dropped significantly. Arguably, this was particularly thanks to the economic development of the region and due to the counter-insurgency strategy. Any analysis of the conflict is clearly conditioned by huge disparities between the official death toll and figures from Uyghur organisations in exile. Media reports and thinktanks put the number of fatalities at around 200 in 2015, well below the more than 340 deaths in 2014. In this regard, a report by the US-based Uyghur Human Rights Project showed that between 656 and 715 people died in Xinjiang due to political violence in 2013 and 2014 and that the number of fatalities in 2014 roughly doubled that of the previous year. The report also found that the number of Uyghur casualties was three times higher than that of Han people and that the state-controlled press had only reported a third of the clashes in the region. In March, the Supreme

Court announced that more than 700 people were convicted of crimes related to terrorism and separatism during 2014. What is more, it is estimated (there is no official data) that dozens of people were executed or sentenced to death for crimes associated with the conflict. Some of the most serious acts of violence in 2015 included 17 people killed in the region of Aksu during a police raid in late February; 18 people killed in an attack on a police station in Kashgar in late June; and an attack in a coal mine in Aksu prefecture in mid-September that killed 16 people and wounded another 50 (media outlets put the death toll at between 50 and 60, while groups in exile said it exceeded 100). The attack triggered a two-month police and military operation that culminated with the killing of another 28 people and the arrest of 1,000. Some media outlets suggested that the detonation of an explosive device in Bangkok in July, considered one of the worst attacks in the Thailand's history, was connected to the deportation of 100 Uyghurs living in Thailand at that time.

Despite the decline in levels of violence, the government recognised that armed groups operating in Xinjiang continued to pose a major threat to the state, and expressed growing alarm for alleged links between Uyghur groups and jihadist organisations with a stable presence in countries like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, or for the growing return to Xinjiang of people who had received military training abroad with the goal of committing attacks in China. According to some media outlets, the growing concern in Beijing of migration in and out of Xinjiang brought with it a substantial increase in arrests in border controls. In the middle of March, for example, the maximum responsible of the Communist party in Xinjiang declared that Uyghur people were joining the ranks of the Islamic State and that some of them were returning to China to commit terrorist acts. Along the same lines, at the end of January the South China newspaper Morning Post published that in a year 800 people had been arrested for trying to cross the border with Vietnam to receive political and military training in jihadist encampments. According to the paper, the majority had a relationship with the ETIM. In this sense, at the end of February the government of Afghanistan declared that 15 Uyghurs were arrested in regions over the border with Pakistan and had been turned over to Chinese police. According to sources in Afghan intelligence, those detained had been in

contact with al-Qaeda and with Taliban militias. Other sources pointed out that Uyghur groups had been settling in the Pakistani region of North Waziristan until the Pakistani government led an offensive against them in 2014.


To address the threat of insurgent groups, Beijing approved new anti-terrorism legislation in late 2015, intensified its counter-insurgency efforts in Xinjiang and stepped up its diplomatic activity in an attempt to involve countries like the US in the fight against armed Uyghur organisations such as ETIM, arguing that these groups pose a risk to the international community and not just to China. In the last years, Beijing alerted of an increase in the frequency and intensity of the violence in Xinjiang, and several analysts warned of increasing sophistication, levels of organisation, and logistical and military capacity of the insurgent organisations. Given the situation, in May of 2014, after the deaths of 43 people in a marketplace in the city of Urumqi, the government started an anti-terrorism campaign in Xinjiang which brought with it the deployment of thousands of additional troops and police officers in the region, a significant increase in the budget intended for the fight against terrorism, an intensification in military manoeuvres and anti-terrorist exercises in Xinjiang, as well as a drastic increase in the number of arrests, trials and executions of people for charges related to armed conflict. The government also declared that between May 2014 and 2015, more than 110 alleged members of armed groups had been turned over to police custody. In May 2015, a year after the start of the operation, Beijing reported that forces had dismantled 181 Islamist cells, 96% of which were planning attacks. According to several media reports, 40% of the raids were made possible thanks to information obtained from interrogation of detained suspects. During the first months of the campaign, 117 religious education centres were closed and the people responsible for them were arrested, and some 18,000 documents were confiscated, as they were judged to fomenting terrorism and religious extremism. Although the campaign initially was to last a year, Beijing decided to extend it to at least the end of 2015.

Several human rights organisations, groups of Uyghurs in exile, and even governments such as Malaysia and Turkey warned of growing religious and cultural restrictions being placed on Uyghur peoples, as well as human rights violations being committed within the setting of the anti-terrorist campaign. In this sense, it is worth


mentioning the criticism of a narrator on issues of freedom of religion and expression, Heiner Bielefeldt, quoting prohibitions on fasting being imposed on minors in the schools during the month of Ramadan.

Arms exports

Of the countries in the world in a situation of armed conflict, China is one of the top purchasers of EU weaponry. From Europe to China there is a dynamic arms trade which in 2015 reached 114 million euros. Some 58% of EU weapons purchased included firing control systems such as targeting acquisition and weapons control systems. Another 39% of the imported weapons were from the category of unmanned airborne vehicles. Authorized exports rose to over 1.3 billion euros. The most requested military categories were those of imaging systems and military aircraft, it is evident that China has the intention to continue importing weapons control systems, all-terrain vehicles, and biological and chemical agents as it has done in previous years. France, Holland, and the Czech Republic are the leading EU nations exporting weapons to China.



Source: the authors



INDIA

Overview of the conflict:

India is the setting of three different armed conflicts, on the one hand associated with the configuration of the territory after the decolonisation and its establishment as an independent state in 1947, and on the other hand, the deep social inequality for which India is notorious. The first - armed conflict in the state of Jammu and Kashmir - is connected to the dispute over the region of Kashmir which India and Pakistan have quarrelled over since their independence and the partition of the two states, three times coming into direct armed conflict (1947-1948; 1965; 1971). Since 1989 the armed conflict has moved to the interior of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, where various armed opposition groups have clashed with Indian security forces, in favour of complete independence of the state or unconditional adhesion to Pakistan. The second, the armed conflict between the Indian government and the Maoist armed group CPI-M (known as Naxalites, for the city from which the movement began) affects more than a dozen states in India and has been considered by the government to be the top threat to security in the country. The Naxalite insurgency arose at the end of the 1960's, calling for the eradication of the system of private ownership of land, as well as strong criticisms of parliamentary democracy, considered to be a legacy of the colonial era. The military and armed activities of the group have been constant. The insurgency, has established parallel systems of governance in the mostly rural zones under their control. Lastly, the armed conflict in the state of Assam began in 1983. The demand from the population of ethnic Assamese origin for recognition of their cultural and civil rights and the establishment of an independent State, as well as the armed opposition group ULFA, emerged as a response the arrival of two million people from Bangladesh to Assam after the independence of India. During the 1980s and 1990s there were various escalations of violence and failed attempts at negotiation. At the same time, other armed groups of Bodo origin emerged, demanding recognition of their identity against the majority Assamese population.

Summary in 2015

During 2015, the armed conflict in the Indian state Jammu and Kashmir stayed within low levels of intensity of violence, killing 174 people in 2015, of which 20 were civilians, 41 were members of the security forces and 113 were insurgents, according to the South Asia Terrorism Portal. During the entire year, there were more than a hundred attacks on the border. In August, in what was one of the bloodiest attacks of the year, a firefight between the two border patrols in the Siakot crossing led to three deaths and 16 wounded on the Indian side, and 8 killed and 47 wounded on the Pakistani side (none of whom were combatants), with damages to homes and livestock. In March an insurgent attack against a police headquarters in Jammu caused the deaths of three members of the security forces, one civilian and two insurgents. It is also worth noting the selective assassination throughout the year of more than a dozen ex-insurgents, in the most part ex-members of Hizbul Mujahideen, especially in Sopore, with no one taking responsibility for the crimes. Several things affected the political climate. On the one hand, with the rise to power of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed (PDP, which governed in alliance with the BJP) as minister of Kashmir, the government decided to free the political prisoners who were not involved in criminal activities. However, after the freeing of Masarat Alam Bhat (APHC), outcry by the BJP led to the revocation of the decision. Declarations by Pakistan that the government of India considered to be provocative also contributed to the tension.

The armed conflict which brought Indian security forces into conflict with the Naxalite insurgency was active all year, with mortalities as a result in the states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkand, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Maharashtra, Odisha and Telengana. According to the numbers recorded by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, there were 251 deaths registered as a consequence of the armed conflict, with almost half of those concentrated in the state of Chhattisgarh, which pointed to a geographic concentration of the conflict in that state, with an increase in incidents and fatalities from 2014. Despite a reduction in overall Naxalite violence in India, in Chhattisgarh the armed conflict intensified, with some of the most violent incidents. In April, the death total due to the fighting rose to 14 members of the security forces and three insurgents, most notably the



attack which occurred in the district of Sukma in which 7 police died after a Maoist ambush. In addition, in Dantewada district, one of the areas most affected by the armed conflict, the explosion of an landmine killed 5 police. In May, Naxalite insurgents kidnapped 250 people just before a visit of the Prime Minister to the district of Dantewada, to sign important agreements with local businesses. Coinciding with this visit, the paramilitary organisation Salwa Judum announced that they were again taking up arms. In 2011 the counterinsurgency militia had been declared illegal and unconstitutional by the Supreme Court and had been dismantled. Human rights organisations decried that the new mobilisations were linked to recent agreements between the government and big businesses to start economic projects in Chhattisgarh, projects that had created opposition a decade earlier. The paramilitaries were accused with serious human rights violations and of arming hundreds of youths from the poorest parts of the state in order to carry out counterinsurgency operations. What's more, much of the local media reported the start of the counter-insurgency operation Mission 2016, which had started in October with helicopter gunships attacks and surveillance. Up until then, several states and even the Air Force themselves had resisted the use of helicopters in operations against insurgents. According to military sources, they had only been used for operations of rescue and evacuation, but with the arrival of Narendra Modi to power in 2014, the states governed by the BJP also began using helicopter gunships for attacks. In August, 5,000 police were also deployed to Chhattisgarh in an intensification of operations against the Naxalite insurgency.

Finally, with regards to the armed conflict in the state of Assam, it is worth noting that during 2015 the intensity of fighting dropped over the year and by the end of the year it was considered to have stopped. Nevertheless, the end of the armed conflict did not mean the violence disappeared, as in 2016 occasional attacks and skirmishes between security forces and the different armed opposition groups operating in the state. The large scale security operation carried out against the separatist NDFB(S) during the first months of 2015 practically led to the break-up of the armed group, which contributed to the reduction of the violence in the state. This operation began after a December 2014 massacre perpetrated by NDFB(S) in

which 72 Adivasi people (an indigenous tribe of India) died when the armed group opened fire indiscriminately in three simultaneous attacks in the districts of Sonitpur, Kokrajhar, and Chirang. That attack had itself was revenge for a police operation against the armed group carried out days earlier in which two Bodo insurgents had been killed. In May, the group had also carried out a massacre, shooting 45 Muslim Bengali speakers and burning 70 houses in the town of Narayanguri, within the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTAD). The attacks of security forces in response to these 2014 events significantly crippled the military capacity of the group. At the same time, the violence in the state dropped due to the weakening of the ULFA(I) owing to the loss of support by the Naga group NSCN-K, after the Naga broke the cease-fire agreement with the government in March. The Naga group had given significant material support to the Assamese group during the cease-fire. Nevertheless, the impact of the violence on the civil population continued, and at least 90,000 of the 300,000 displaced people as a result of intercommunity violence continue to live in temporary refugee camps and are unable to return home. Assam, with 113,000 people internally displaced, was one of the states in India with the most people after Jammu and Kashmir, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre.

Arms exports

India stands out as the top importing country of European arms in the region of South Asia. In 2015 alone, India purchased arms for more than 1.2 billion euros, more than double that of 2014 (which was over 525 million). Among the exported military material, 46% was in the category of ammunition, followed by explosive devices such as bombs and missiles. India also purchased tanks and armoured vehicles, as well as electronic equipment and light weapons and artillery. Authorised exports doubled for 2015, nearly reaching 15.2 billion (up from 7.5 billion in 2014). The main categories were explosive devices, light arms, artillery, warships, electronic equipment, targeting and guidance systems, ammunition, and military aircraft. The main exporting countries are: France, the UK, Germany, Bulgaria and Italy.



Source: the authors

PAKISTAN

Overview of the conflict:

Pakistan is the scene of two different but interrelated armed conflicts. The first among them is the confrontation between the Taliban insurgency and Pakistani security forces, which has its origin in the invasion of Afghanistan by US-led international coalition in 2001. After the fall of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, members of its government and militias, as well as several insurgent groups of several nationalities, including al-Qaeda, found refuge in Pakistan, mainly in several tribal agencies, although the leadership was spread out over several towns (Quetta, Lahore, or Karachi).

Anger over cooperation between Pakistani and US forces led various groups of Pakistani origin who were part of the Taliban insurgency to the creation in December 2007 of the Pakistani Taliban movement (Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan, TTP). The armed group began to commit attacks in the rest of Pakistan against both state institutions and civilians. In June 2014, with violence rising to unprecedented levels, and after a series of attacks that specifically targeted the Shiite, Ahmadiyya and Christian minorities, the Pakistani Army launched Operation Zarb-e Azb to eradicate insurgents from the agencies of North and South Waziristan. The second conflict is set in Balochistan, the richest province in terms of natural resources, but with one of the highest levels of poverty in the country. This province has suffered from four periods of armed violence (1948, 1958, 1963-69 and 1973-77) in which the rebel forces stated goals of greater autonomy and even independence. In 2005, the armed rebel forces reappeared on the scene, attacking infrastructures linked to the extraction of gas. The armed group BLA, became the main opposition to the presence of the central government, which it accused of extracting the wealth of the province without giving any of it back to the local population. As a result of the resurgence of the armed opposition, a military operation was started in 2005 in the province, causing displacement of the civilian population and armed confrontation. In parallel, a movement of the civilian population demands an explanation for the disappearance of hundreds, if not thousands, of Baluchis at the hands of the security forces of the State.

Summary in 2015

Pakistan was plagued by high levels of violence during 2015. As a result of the different situations of armed conflict and tension during the year, a total of 4,612 people died in the country, according to the Center for Research and Security Studies in Pakistan. With respect to armed conflict between security forces and Taliban insurgents, a high death toll was recorded. Of the total toll due to violence in the country, 1,917 deaths occurred in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and 441 in the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province, both of which are zones of conflict. In particular, North Waziristan, with 814 deaths and the Agency of Khyber in the FATA, with 752, were the areas with the highest levels of fatalities linked to the conflict. The launch of Operation Zarb-e Azb by the Armed Forces had a bigger impact than any other single event. This assault, which began in 2014, intensified over the course of 2015 in response to the serious attack of an armed Taliban TTP group on the Army Public School in Peshawar, killing 145 people of whom 132 were children, boys and girls who attended the school, most of them children of personnel in the Armed Forces. The massacre was an act of revenge for the military operations against the insurgency and the deaths of hundreds

of militants in North Waziristan, South Waziristan, and the Khyber Agency.

After the attack, the Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, removed the moratorium on the death penalty for cases of terrorism, which led to the execution of some 350 people accused with acts of terrorism.¹⁹ This retraction was produced within the framework of the acceptance of the National Action Plan against terrorism after the massacre. The situation intensified, with confrontations with security forces and US airstrikes from unmanned military aircraft. According to data from the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, in 2015, the US launched 13 drone attacks in Pakistan territory, which caused the deaths of between 60 and 85 people, of which 2 to 5 were civilians. In addition to executions, skirmishes and airstrikes, tens of thousands of people were arrested across the country. As a result of the military operations, official sources indicated that 3,400 insurgents had been killed since June 2014 (of whom, 183 were leaders) and 21,193 people had been arrested. They also said that they had destroyed 837 hideouts. Intelligence services also admitted that 488 soldiers had been killed and 1,914 had been wounded in combat. The data did not include any figures for civilian casualties as a consequence of the operations, nor the number of families displaced. As well, one of the most serious episodes of violence of 2015 was the attack in September on the Air Force base in Badaber in Peshawar, in which 42 people died, of whom 13 were Taliban insurgents and the rest civilian and military personnel of the base.



With regards to Balochistan, the armed conflict continued throughout the year. According to figures from the Center for Research and Security Studies, 719 people died as a consequence of the armed violence in this province during 2015. The impact on the civil population was serious. The South Asia Terrorism Portal reported the deaths of 247 civilians died this year, though they reported 635 deaths due armed conflict in 2015. The government admitted in September that 204 insurgents died in different operations and that around 8,000 suspects had been arrested. Within the context of the National Plan of Action, approved in 2014, security forces intensified their military operations. Clashes between the different insurgent armed groups operating in the region were frequent during the year. In February there were serious clashes and 15 members of the armed opposition group Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and a

member of the security forces died in a firefight in the district of Kharan. Another 15 insurgents died a day later in the district of Kharan. Another 15 insurgents died the following day in the district of Washuk in armed encounters. In April the BLF claimed responsibility for an attack which ended the lives of 20 Punjabi and Sindhi construction workers which were travelling by bus in the district of Kech, accusing them of working for an organism with ties to the Army. The victims were working in the construction of a roadway to the port of Gwadar, a project with large Chinese investment which the Baluchi nationalist insurgency opposed, for fear that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor would take away resources from the province without benefiting local residents. The next day, the paramilitary Frontier Corps (FC) revealed that it had killed 13 members of the BLF in Turbat. In late May, another bus was attacked, killing more than 20 Pashtuns, and the FC announced it had killed a commander and 12 members of the Balochistan Liberation Army. In the month of July, an attack on a market in the city of Quetta wounded 19 people. The attacks against the Shia community also continued. In October in the month of Muharram, there were several attacks at Shia mosques and on the Ashura commemoration processions. In one of them in Quetta, more than 10 people died in a suicide attack at a mosque. In Bolan, another suicide attack ended the lives of 10 people, six of them minors, and on another occasion in a procession at Jacobabad, 16 were killed. Human rights organizations also condemned the extrajudicial execution of at least 80 people in the region.

Arms exports

Due to the insecurity in the country, Pakistan is one of the most controversial destinations for EU arms shipments. Despite the fact that the country has been immersed in armed conflict since 2004 and that the general security situation has worsened, including having one of the highest rates of forced displacement, Pakistan received more than 142 million euros in EU arms exports in 2015. Of this amount, there were large amounts of military production systems, military aircraft, targeting systems, explosives, and warships. In terms of future arms exports, Pakistan received 1.9 billion euros in authorisations. According to the available data in EU reports, the leading arms exporting nations to Pakistan are France, Italy, Spain, and the Czech Republic.

19. Center for Research and Security Studies, *The NAP Tracker*, Center for Research and Security Studies, 2016.



Source: the authors

Thailand

Overview of the conflict:

The current armed conflict is between the Thai state and various insurgent groups seeking greater autonomy and even independence. The rebels are from the southern provinces with a Muslim majority - the southern provinces of Yala, Pattani and Narathiwat (and, to a lesser extent, Songkhla). The causes of the conflict date back to the beginning of the 20th century, when the then Kingdom of Siam and the British colonial

power on the Malaysian peninsula decided to split the Sultanate of Pattani, leaving some territories under the sovereignty of what is currently Malaysia and others (the aforementioned southern provinces) under Thai sovereignty. During the entire 20th century, the unrest and political violence in the south of the country increased considerably with the measures of political centralisation and cultural and religious homogenisation imposed by Bangkok. The conflict reached its height in the 1960's and 1970's and subsided in the following decades thanks to the democratisation of the country. However, the arrival of Thaksin Shinawatra to power in 2001 led to an increase in social and political polarisation in the country; a dismantling of the means and structures which had allowed the demands and grievances of the Muslim minority to be accommodated in previous decades. The reemergence of armed struggle in 2004 has been followed by a drastic turn to politics of counterinsurgency - with a clear militarisation of the region. According to some analysts, Thailand has become the most deadly country in Southeast Asia.

Summary in 2015

The government pointed out on several occasions that the levels of violence in the south of the country has dropped significantly compared to the previous year and that they were at their lowest since the beginning of the armed conflict in 2004. Both Bangkok and some research centres coincided in that the levels of violence in the south of the country had dropped compared to the previous year, confirming the trend for a reduction in the number of violent clashes in the last years. The research centre Deep South Watch counted 246 fatalities in 2015, clearly lower than the 341 reported the previous year and the 456 in 2013. The number of people injured in the armed conflict also dropped from 987 in 2013 to 544 in 2015. According to the research centre, during the 12-year armed conflict, 6,543 people have died (an average of 545 each year) and 11,919 have been injured (993 each year) in nearly 15,400 documented episodes of violence (an average of 1,281 per year, whereas 674 episodes were reported in 2015). According to statistics compiled by the Southernmost Provinces Research Database, the number of bomb attacks in southern Thailand dropped by 50% compared to 2014 and by 65% compared to 2007, the year with the highest prevalence of this type of attack. Finally it is worth noting that according to official data of the Southern Border Provinces Police Operation Centre, the death toll had dropped from 326 in 2012 to 212 in 2014 (in 2013 there were 322 deaths due to armed conflict).

Bangkok attributed the reduction in the violence to various factors, among which were clearly the resumption of exploratory dialogue between the government and leading insurgent groups which operate in the southern provinces with a Muslim majority, as well as the new counter-insurgency and conflict management strategies put into place after the coup d'état in 2014. Examples included more sophisticated intelligence work; the increase in checkpoints and raids in urban areas; rapprochement with influential people and organisations in the south of the country to reduce the insurgents' room to manoeuvre; or the offering of incentives to some insurgents. In June, for example, the government announced that 473 combatants had accepted a temporary immunity to return to their families during Ramadan, with the commitment not to commit violent acts in the meantime. It is also worth noting another measure that some analysts say could have been a factor in the reduction of violence: the partial withdrawal of troops from the south of the country – at the start of 2015 there were some 60,000 troops – and the compromise of the government to step up recruitment of security force members from the aforementioned three provinces rather than bringing in troops from other parts of the country. With regards to the peace process, contact between the two sides was re-established in 2015. The talks had collapsed in 2013, followed by the coup d'état by the Armed Forces in May 2014. Hopes were poor that the negotiations would lead to an agreement in the short term – the complete negation on the part of the military junta to recognise the basic demands of insurgent groups, doubts expressed by the leading armed insurgent group that the conflict was resolvable by dialogue, and the transitory nature of the military junta, which is expected to be dissolved as soon as a new constitution is drawn up and elections are held, at a date yet to be determined. Despite this and other difficulties throughout the year, some advances improved the climate of confidence between the different parties and probably contributed to the reduction in the intensity of the conflict. Particularly worthy of note in 2015 was the creation of MARA Patani, an umbrella organization of the leading insurgent groups in the country. The goal is to enable compliance with conditions set by the prime ministers of Thailand and Malaysia, to facilitate dialogue between groups in order to initiate peace talks which include all of the armed groups in the south of Thailand and to present common and unified demands on the part of insurgent organizations.


Despite the clear reduction in the intensity of the conflict, on several occasions throughout 2015 the government expressed its concern for the continuing violence in the south of the country and that the insurgency could expand the radius of its activities beyond the southern provinces. In regards to this last concern, some analysts mentioned reasons for the insurgents to change *modus operandi*: more than a decade of struggle had brought them no closer to their goals nor had significant concessions from the state been achieved. Indeed, attacks such as those of July 2013 in Bangkok or in April of 2015 in the Island of Koh Samui – both outside of the traditional range of action of the separatist movement – received more international media coverage than the episodes of violence in the south of Thailand happening every day. In regards to the dynamics of the conflict in 2015, some of the violent events that had the greatest repercussions were the coordinated explosions of some 30 explosive devices over the course of three days in the middle of May in various places in the province of Yala; the explosion in April of a bomb in the tourist island of Koh Samui with seven wounded, the series of simultaneous attacks in mid-July in various places in Songkhla and Narathiwat in which seven people died and another 14 were wounded; or the coordinated attack against various targets (residential areas, a Buddhist temple, and public buildings) in Narathiwat, in which three people were killed and 14 wounded. According to some analysts, some of these episodes of violence were intended by the BRN, the largest armed group in the region, as a display of force to the government, showing control over combatants in the territory, as well as a way of setting the tone for other members of MARA Patani.

In effect, although the BRN officially was part of MARA Patani, on several occasions they distanced themselves from the platform. Some sources maintained that important core leaders within BRN were opposed to the current peace process and were in favour of resuming negotiations with an elected government which would be more open to some kinds of autonomy and decentralisation and would still be around once the military junta had stepped down. Be that as it may, it wasn't clear if declarations opposing the peace process broadcast by different members of the BRN reflected a certain internal factionalism within the group or whether this was a strategy to maintain control of MARA Patani and to put pressure on the

military junta at the same time. In any case, it is worth remembering that one of the main reasons for the breakdown of the previous peace talks which led to the continuation of armed hostilities was precisely the incapacity of the BRN, then the only representative at the table, to show their command and control over combatants in the field and to achieve a reduction in the violence.

Arms exports

In 2015, Thailand registered an increase in weapons imports. In terms of actual exports, the EU delivered 134 million euros in technology, firing control systems, ammunition, military aircraft, small arms, and above all a large quantity of weapons for which there is little data. Authorised exports, reached 2.26 billion euros, a huge increase from 660 million in 2014. Among the main categories were warships, military aircraft, explosives, light arms and artillery, and chemical agents.



3.1.3 AMERICA

COLOMBIA

Overview of the conflict:

In 1964, in the context of an agreement for the alternation of power between the Liberal party and the Conservative party (National Front), which excluded other political options, two armed opposition movements emerged with the goal of taking power: the ELN (made up of university students and workers, inspired by Guevara) and the FARC (a communist-oriented organisation that advocates agrarian reform). In the 1970s, various groups were created, such as the M-19 and the EPL, which ended up negotiating with the government and pushing through a new Constitution (1991) that established the foundations of a welfare state. At the end of the 1980s, several paramilitary groups emerged, instigated by sectors of the armed forces, landowners, drug traffickers and traditional politicians, aimed at defending the *status quo* through a strategy of terror. At the end of the decade, the FARC had significantly strengthened their organization, managing to pull together around 17,000 combatants. Nevertheless, with the rise to power of president Álvaro Uribe, an intense phase of counterinsurgency began with the policies of Democratic Security, with an unprecedented deployment of military force, with US support within the framework of Plan Colombia. This offensive and the peak of para-militarism weakened the armed groups. Simultaneous to the development of the armed conflict, drug trafficking has permeated and influenced the economic, social, and political sphere, contributing to an increase in violence on all sides.

Summary in 2015

The intensity of the armed conflict in Colombia diminished significantly over the course of the year, as a result of the peace talks between the government and FARC guerrillas. At the end of December 2014, the FARC announced a unilateral cease-fire which was to be observed as long as security forces did not attack the insurgent group. The FARC requested international oversight to supervise and monitor the truce, and although the government received the announcement with satisfaction, they rejected any implication by third parties, and indicated that they would not suspend military actions. Despite various incidents in December which endangered the peace, throughout January there was a reduction in violence and counterinsurgency operations. In March, in response to the reduction in violence, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos announced a 30-day suspension of aerial bombardments against the bases of the FARC. However, an attack in April by the FARC in Cauca which left 11 soldiers dead and several more wounded led Santos to announce that Aerial bombardments would resume. This led to


an intensification of the conflict in the month of May, when after an aerial attack which killed 26 members of the insurgent group, the FARC announced the suspension of the unilateral cease-fire which had been in force in previous months. This had been the most deadly episode for the FARC since 2012, when 30 members of the armed group had been killed in a military operation in Arauca. That led to a bomb attack on Nariño and skirmishes between guerrillas and armed forces. Nevertheless, despite the unravelling crisis, the groups did not abandon peace talks. In July the Colombian government and the FARC guerrillas reached an agreement on a measure for the reduction of conflict, although this agreement did not represent a bilateral cease-fire. The agreement was produced after Cuba and Norway - the countries guaranteeing the process of negotiations - announced the need for an “urgent de-escalation of armed conflict”, and called for severely restricting any actions that would cause victims or suffering in Colombia, and to step up the implementation of confidence-building measures. As a consequence of the acceptance and implementation of these measure for de-escalation, there was a notable reduction in the violence associated with armed conflict. Prior to this, the FARC announced a new unilateral cease-fire which implied an end to all offensives against state armed forces or public and private infrastructure. For their part, the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (CERAC) registered the lowest levels of offensive actions by both parties in the history of the conflict.²⁰ As well, there was a significant reduction in the violence with respect to the period of unilateral cease-fire. In this period, CERAC recorded 16 clashes between the FARC and security forces in which 17 guerrillas and 3 soldiers died.

With regard to the ELN guerrillas, despite some advances in the exploratory negotiations with the government, episodes of violence continued throughout the year, as well as the practice of kidnappings by the armed group. At several moments of the year, both parts intensified their military offensives, which on the one hand generated doubts about the genuine will to advance a dialogue to end the armed conflict, and on the other hand was interpreted as pressure to get the other side to come to the table. The security forces attributed several bomb attacks in Bogotá to the ELN, such as that in March directed at the police which left seven people wounded. In July, two attacks were attributed to the ELN. These attacks brought about the arrest of 13 people accused

of participation in a urban guerrilla cell. Various social organisations pointed out that these were not guerrilla fighters, but social leaders, arbitrary arrests in order to criminalise social movements. However, the most serious violent episode of the year took place when the ELN attacked an electoral commission in the department of Boyacá leaving 11 soldiers and one member of the police dead, and 5 missing. After the attack, president Santos ordered the intensification of military operations. On the other hand, throughout the year, human rights organisations condemned repeated harassment against human rights defenders and social leaders. Also, as the CICR pointed out, despite the fact that in 2015 there was a reduction in armed conflict, in January 2016 the official numbers of internally displaced people had reached 7.9 million, of whom around 116,000 were victims of events in 2015.


Arms exports

The trend for exports to Colombia by member countries of the EU, in terms of authorisations, is on the rise. For 2015, they grew to almost 477 million euros. Of those, 62% of the authorisations were for warships, military aircraft, helicopters and unmanned aircraft, biological and chemical agents, weapons control systems and armoured equipment and components. However in terms of actual sales, all types of equipment were accounted for, but especially military aircraft, equipment for military simulation, bombs, rockets, torpedoes and missiles. For the 2015 year, real exports rose to 28 million. Among the main exporters of weapons to the South American country were Spain, Holland, France, and Italy.



Source: the authors

20. CERAC, *Monitor of De-escalation of Internal Armed Conflict in Colombia. Monthly report number 5. Period under observation: 20th July - 20th December 2015*, CERAC 2015.



Source: the authors

3.1.4 EUROPE

Russia

Overview of the conflict:

Dagestan, a republic of the Russian Federation in the North Caucasus, is the setting of an armed conflict between local and federal security forces and islamist-inspired armed organizations, which were initially grouped around the so-called Caucasus Emirate. Under the mandate of the anti-terrorist operations, and in a context of institutional impunity, the republic is also undergoing a serious human rights crisis. Armed conflict in Dagestan is related to the regionalisation and transformation of armed actors who participated in the wars of neighbouring republic Chechnya in the 1990's. In 2007 the insurgency in the North Caucasus proclaimed the Caucasus Emirate, under the leadership of Chechen Dokku Umarov, with provincial structures (*vilayets*) in several republics in the region. The increase of violence in Dagestan, particularly starting in 2010, moved the epicentre of violence from Chechnya to Dagestan. Between 2014 and 2015 insurgent actors in Dagestan and other zones of the Caucasus announced their allegiance to the Islamic State (ISIS)

Summary in 2015

Although the low-intensity armed conflict in the republic of Dagestan - in which Russian and

Dagestan security forces confront armed Islamist actors - has been affected by the influence of the Islamic State on the local and regional insurgency, the overall death count associated with the conflict has dropped. In June, the Islamic State (ISIS) announced the creation of a branch Province of Caucasus (*Wilayat Qawqaz*) after commanders from the rebel organisation Caucasus Emirate joined ISIS in 2014 and created Ishtok, a publication in Russian. Among rebel leaders who proclaimed their loyalty to ISIS in 2014 was the leader of the Dagestan insurgency, Abu Muhammad Kadarsky (Rustam Asildarov) who was named as the leader of the branch of ISIS in the Caucasus. At the same time, the Caucasus Emirate suffered losses in the leadership throughout the year in the special operations carried out against them by the security forces. The maximum leader of the Caucasus Emirate, Aliaskhab Kebekov (alias Ali Abu Muhammad), died in April during a special operation of the security forces in the Buinaksk district (central Dagestan). The insurgent leader of the Untsukul district, Shamil Gasanov, and that of the central sector, Omar Magomedov, as well as (according to Caucasian Knot) the wives of Kebekov and Magomedov, Zukhra Abdulaeva and Magomedkhanova Jamilya Guseinovna, were also assassinated, in a police-run anti-terrorist operation in the settlement of Gerei-Avlak. In the middle of August, Kebekov's successor, Magomed Suleimanov (Abu Usman Gimrinsky), also of Dagestan origin, as well as the leader of the insurgent branch of Dagestan, Kamil Sidov, and another local commander Abu Dudjuna, also died, according to official reports, in another special operation. As well, among the violent incidents this year, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack at the end of December next to the Derbent citadel, a tourist area in the second largest city of Dagestan. Ten people were injured and one federal security agent died.

The annual death count due to the conflict in Dagestan reached 126 victims, according to the website of the independent Caucasian Knot - 97 insurgents, 16 civilians and 13 members of security forces, as well as 27 wounded - 13 civilians and 14 members of the security forces. It was a downtrend from previous years (208 deaths and 84 wounded in 2014; 341 killed in 2013 and 300 wounded; 405 deaths and 290 wounded in 2012; 413 killed and 411 wounded in 2011). Under the cover of continuing special security operations carried out by the authorities, there were reports of human rights violations. Amnesty International (AI) in the North Caucasus


warned that organisations responsible for complying with the law continued practices of forced disappearances, illegitimate arrests, torture and other mistreatment to people being held in custody. As well, according to AI in 2015, reports of human rights agencies stopped being filed due to the repression specifically directed at defenders of human rights and independent journalists, such as harassment, threats and violence, even directed at civil servants and pro-government groups.²¹

A report from Human Rights Watch (HRW) in 2015 indicated that security forces and agencies involved in anti-terrorism operations in Dagestan often disregarded national and international human rights legislation.²² The report documents human rights violations committed by the security forces during special operations, including forced displacement of civilians, destruction of private property, a lack of compensations, and in some cases the destruction of homes of relatives of alleged insurgents. The anti-terrorist operations often involved raids and searches of houses, neighbourhoods, and entire towns, with documented cases of force being used against civilians and disregard for human rights. They also recorded many cases of suspects being arrested with extreme violence and then disappeared or held in unspecified centres without access to communication with their family or a lawyer. In some cases of the disappeared, they have been found later to be in custody, and in some cases alleging torture. HRW also questioned the legality of the practice of watchlists for salafist Muslims with no specific accusation, practices of continued interrogation, and also interrogations around family members. HRW also condemned the cases of threats, violence and surveillance of lawyers representing salafist persons and against journalists that published news of human rights violations against the salafist population.

Arms exports

EU reports pointed to a reduction in weapons exports to Russia in 2015 with respect to 2014. Exports from the EU in 2015 reached 88,930,314 euros in categories such as military aircraft, small arms, and ammunition. However, export authorisations sky-rocketed from the previous year (240,492,399 euros) to a total of 1,039,519,830

euros. The categories authorised were warships, image forming systems, electronics, armoured vehicles and tanks, as well as small arms and firing control systems. France, Germany, Italy and the Czech Republic were the leading business partners in the EU weapons trade to Russia.



Source: the authors

Turkey

Overview of the conflict:

Turkey has been the setting of armed conflict since 1984 between the Turkish state and the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK) around the status and rights of the Kurdish population in the country. Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in the country and the fourth largest ethnic group in the Middle East, present in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq - countries which resulted from the partitioning of the Ottoman Empire – and Iran. One factor of the Kurdish question in Turkey has among its fundamental causes the politics

21. Amnesty International, "Russian Federation" in *Report 2015/2016. The state of the world's human rights*, AI, pp.193-194.

22. Human Rights Watch, *Invisible War. Russia's Abusive Response to the Dagestan Insurgency*, 18 June 2015, in <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/18/invisible-war/russias-abusive-response-dagestan-insurgency>

of assimilation of the State. Historically, the Turkish State has defended national unity with a centralist territorial model, and a large military component. As well, the PKK has called for cultural, political, and civil rights and self-governance. The armed conflict has taken around 40,000 lives, displaced between one and three million people, has resulted in several thousand missing persons and unsolved murders, among other problems. The war has gone through many phases, including cycles of violence, periods of cease-fire and attempts at negotiation; and has been influenced by regional and international factors, such as the war in Syria since 2011 and the expansion of a *de facto* Kurdish government in Kurdish areas of Syria.

Summary in 2015

The situation of conflict deteriorated significantly in Turkey, after the collapse of the peace process at the beginning of the year and the restarting of warfare in July, with grave consequences for the civil population in areas of the Southeast. The peace process was dismantled just after the so-called “Dolmabahçe Declaration” (a joint declaration between the representatives of the government and the pro-Kurdish party HDP, at the end of February) which conditioned a set of steps for the PKK to put down their guns. The declaration was questioned by the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The armed group condemned an increase in military activity and in May, the PKK accused the Turkish Army of ending the ceasefire that had been an implicit response to the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire declared in 2013. The armed group pledged not to engage in offensive actions during the election campaign in June, for fears of increases in the nationalist vote. The army, in turn, alleged PKK attacks. One of the incidents in April involved the deployment of soldiers in the zone of Diyadin (in Arı Province) which resulted in the deaths of a civilian who stepped in as a human shield and a PKK militant. The Army justified that they had deployed to prevent pro-PKK propaganda in civic ceremonies. As well, the HDP was the object of dozens of attacks against its offices in 60 provinces in May, and in an attack against one of their rallies in June in Diyarbakır, four people were killed and hundreds more wounded. The Kurdish movement warned of the existence of cells of ISIS in Turkey. Meanwhile, the government raised warnings of a possible territorial union of the Kurdish areas in Syria under control of the YPH/YPJ guerrillas, who had links to the PKK. In the elections, the AKP lost absolute majority (40.9%, 258 seats of 550) and called for a coalition government. The HDP, for their part, gained 13.1% of the vote (80 seats).

The situation worsened, threatening a resumption of the war, in the middle of a regional crisis. Several things contributed this degradation. The increase

in military activity included highway attacks by the PKK on shipments of construction material, an increase in flights of warplanes and drones; military operations supported by Sikorsky and Cobra helicopter gunships, according to the Kurdish press. An attack on a Kurdish cultural centre in Suruç (on the Syrian border) attributed to ISIS caused 33 deaths and over a hundred wounded. The Kurdish movement attributed responsibility of the massacre on the Turkish government and protests were violently repressed by security forces, in Istanbul and the Southeast, where militant Kurds also burned vehicles and made roadblocks. The attack in Suruç was followed by various assassinations of police, attributed to the PKK in the press, while the PKK denied involvement. On July 24th, Turkish authorities launched large-scale operations with arrest warrants for alleged members of ISIS and the PKK, with thousands of police backed by helicopters, in 22 provinces, which continued for several days. In parallel, Turkey also began a huge military campaign against the PKK in the north of Iraq, with the deployment of 75 F-16s and F-4E 2020s between the 24th and the 26th of July and the launch of 300 “smart bombs” against 400 PKK targets, in addition to attacks against ISIS in Syria. After the beginning of this aerial campaign, the PKK announced the end of the cease-fire. Militants of the YDG-H dug trenches and blocked streets in some districts, such as Silvan, and several co-mayors of the Kurdish movement released declarations of autonomy in the middle of August. The government declared more than a hundred special security zones, according to the ICG, with curfews and the deployment of security forces. According to the Foundation of Human Rights in Turkey (TIHV), between August 16th and the December 12th the State imposed 52 curfews, in 17 districts and 7 cities in some cases lasting 8 days (Cizre), 12 (Sizran) or 14 days (Nusaybin). This led to a war with an urban element. However, the violence continued in rural areas, such as the attack of the PKK in Dağlıca (Hakkâri) which killed 16 soldiers in August and another attack the same month in Iğdır in which 14 police were killed.

The violence in the areas where the special operations and the curfew were being applied had terrible consequences. 198 civilians were killed in these operations between August 16th and January 21st, 2016 including 39 minors, according to the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV). Human Rights advocates condemned the disproportionate character of the security measures and the grave impacts on human security (deaths, wounded, denial of access to health services, hunger, thirst, destruction of homes, information blackouts, restriction of movement, among others). In the siege of Cizre in September, over 20 civilians were


killed (according to human rights observers) as well as 40 PKK militants killed and 25 police wounded according to the government. The recognized human rights advocate Tahir Elçi was assassinated in November in Diyarbakır while calling for a cease-fire from the government and the PKK. The TIHV condemned the lack of legality of the curfew operations, and warned of an escalation of militarisation in December, due to the deployment of 10,000 troops in Cizre, Sur, and Silopi. The TIHV pointed out that hundreds of armoured vehicles, such as tanks and panzers, had been deployed in the districts and affected cities. Hundreds of thousands fled from the violence – 200,000 according to a local paper, many more according to some sources, 100,000 according to police.

OHCHR alerted that domestic assurances of human rights in South-East Turkey were non-existent since at least July 2015.²³ It also said the Government responded to attacks attributed to the PKK by intensifying its military activity in the region, as well as by employing disproportionate security measures. They pointed out the use of security operations which included hundreds of combat infantry, artillery, armoured divisions of Army and the Air Force. What is more, the increase in militarisation also added to the deterioration of the social and political climate. Among the events, an October attack attributed to ISIS before the elections in Ankara at a pro-dialogue demonstration killed more than 100 and wounded hundreds. The same day of the attack, the PKK offered a cease-fire that was rejected by the government. The AKP won the majority of the seats in October elections. As well, at the end of the year, the Kurdish movement made a call for the creation of autonomous regions, which was highly criticized by the government.

Arms exports

Turkey, after Iraq, is the second importer of EU arms of the countries selected in this analysis. In 2015, the actual EU exports of 414,817,805 euros to Turkey overwhelmingly were in the category of military aircraft, followed by firing equipment, armoured equipment and components, ammunition, vehicles, and tanks. And in terms of authorised exports, the value rose to 2.6 billion euros, almost double that of 2014. The biggest categories were military aircraft and warships, but also notable amounts of explosives (grenades, missiles and bombs). It should also be noted that Spain, as in 2014, was the leading exporter of EU arms to

Turkey, for a total of 167,954,965 euros. Others included France, Italy, the UK, and Holland.



Ukraine

Overview of the conflict:

Ukraine has been embroiled in armed conflict since 2014 in the east of the country between state security forces and the self-proclaimed republics of Donetsk and Lugansk. The warring is over the status of those areas and is tightly linked to the geostrategic conflict between Ukraine and the West on one hand, and Russia on the other. The conflict was preceded by a number of crises at the end of 2013, such as the pro-European and anti-government protests; a slide into violence of the conflict between the government and opposing sectors, including sectors of the far-right; the annexation of Crimea by Russian forces – a peninsula with a majority Russian population (58%) and Ukrainian and Tartar minorities, which had historically been under control of the Imperial and soviet, but was transferred to the Ukraine in 1954; anti-Maidan and pro-federalist

23. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Report on the human rights situation in South-East Turkey July 2015 to December 2016*, February 2017, at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/TR/OHCHR_South-East_TurkeyReport_10March2017.pdf

protests in the east and the emergence of armed actors in these areas, which led to the self-proclaimed People's Republics and the start of war in 2014 between the new pro-western Ukrainian government, and the Russian-supported political and military structures of Donetsk and Lugansk.

The war in Ukraine in 2015 had very high levels of militarisation and violence, with escalations at several times throughout the year and the attainment of agreements with components of laying down weapons, but with fragile implementation. Between January and February there was a serious escalation of violence, which included indiscriminate bombing on densely populated areas by both sides. Among the events, 31 people died and 112 were wounded in attacks on January 24th against Mariúpol, a strategic city under government control. Another 13 civilians died and 18 were injured by a rebel attack with a "Grad" multiple launch rockets (MLRS) against a bus at a Ukrainian control post outside the town of Volnovakha. On January 22nd, another 13 civilians died from the impact of a projectile against a trolleybus and a car in Donetsk. Another 7 civilians were killed in attacks on Kramatorsk on February 10th. The government and rebel forces accused each other heatedly for the series of attacks and bombings within this escalation. An investigation of HRW found evidence of the use of cluster-bomb rockets in at least six locations between January 23rd and February 12th, three of which were in territory controlled by the government and four in rebel territory.²⁴ According to HRW, the weapons used included 300mm Smerch rockets (Tornado) and 220mm Uragan (Hurricane) rockets, which use 9N210 or 9N235 fragmentation submunition. The escalation of January and February also affected the airport of Donetsk. The bombardments in this period had serious impacts on the civilian population, homes and crucial civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, colleges and childcare facilities. The civilian population in the conflict zone faced shortages of electricity, gas, heating, water, and food, according to a report of OHCHR.²⁵

Despite dire straits, the Minsk II agreement was reached on February 12th. In addition to political and humanitarian elements, the agreement included a cease-fire, a withdrawal of heavy ordnance and the creation of a security zone of at least 50 kilometres minimum distance from heavy (100+ mm) artillery, a 70 kilometres safe zone

from MLRS, and 140 kilometres from the MLRS "Tornado-S", "Uragan", "Smerch" and the "Tochka U" tactical missile systems. All of this was to be supervised by the OSCE. Despite the agreement, rebels maintained the siege on Debaltseve, despite the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops on February 18th. In the next months, large-scale offensives ended, reducing the civilian deaths, even though the withdrawal of heavy weaponry was partial and there continued to be violations of the cease-fire agreement. Among them were daily incidents of heavy ordnance fire near Shyrokyne (in the region of Donetsk) in April. Both sides continued using mortars, cannons, howitzers, tanks and multiple launch missile systems. Explosive remnants of war and IEDs also took a serious toll on the civil population. The violence escalated in June and again in August, with bombardment and use of heavy artillery, until a new cease-fire was reached, which entered into force September 1st. That was followed by another agreement at the end of September for the withdrawal of tanks, mortars, and medium (<100mm) artillery to at least 15 kilometres from the security line. This reduced the violence and civilian casualties in the last quarter of the year, although in practice the OSCE continued informing of the presence of heavy artillery, tanks, and medium artillery on both sides of the conflict line. December 23rd, a new truce came into effect, to allow the observation of the Orthodox Christmas.

In terms of human security, the population was harmed in multiple ways. The armed conflict caused around 4,400 deaths during the year, with around 11,000 wounded. The IDMC estimated that 1,679,000 people were displaced in total, including 942,000 new victims in 2015. Additionally, 1,103,212 people applied for asylum or other forms of legal residency in neighbouring countries. At the same time, in the conflict zone there continue to be 2.9 million people (2.7 million in areas under rebel control and 200,000 in government-controlled territory). The OHCHR reported that restrictions of movement along the line of contact drawn in January 2015 by the government, maintained through the year, made access difficult to medical assistance and other social services. As well, the OHCHR informed that during the year of allegations and evidence of arbitrary arrests. Under the cover that the conflict provided, there were also reports of torture and abusive treatment both by rebel authorities and by the Ukrainian authorities, especially the security forces. In the case of the rebel authorities, the OHCHR informed of cases of assassinations.²⁶


24. Human Rights Watch, *Ukraine: More Civilians Killed in Cluster Munition Attacks*, HRW, 19 March 2015, in <https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/19/ukraine-more-civilians-killed-cluster-munition-attacks>

25. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015*, OHCHR, in <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/9thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>

Arms exports

Ukraine has been in armed conflict since 2014. This has not slowed the country’s acquisitions of EU arms. In 2015, the EU exported a total of 31,954,160 euros, in the categories of explosives devices, ammunition, military aircraft, armoured

vehicles and tanks, and significant amounts of ammunition and light arms and artillery. In terms of authorisations, the trend is on the rise, rising to 679,913,487 euros in exports, in the categories of electronic equipment, munitions, firing systems, military aircraft, armoured vehicles and tanks. France, Bulgaria, Poland, and Austria were the main supplying nations.



Source: the authors

26. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine 1 December 2014 to 15 February 2015*, ACNUDH, en <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/9thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>; *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 February to 15 May 2015*, ACNUDH, en <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/10thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>; *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 May to 15 August 2015*, ACNUDH, en <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/11thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>; *Report on the human rights situation in Ukraine, 16 August to 15 November 2015*, ACNUDH, en <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/12thOHCHRreportUkraine.pdf>

3.1.5 Middle East

EGYPT

Overview of the conflict:

A scene of episodes of violence and insurgent activity in recent years, the Sinai peninsula has hosted a growth of armed activity since 2011, following the ousting of the Hosni Mubarak regime. Armed groups based in the Sinai initially directed their offensives against Israeli interests, but after the coup d'état against Islamist president Mohamed Morsi, in 2013, they have focused their operations against Egyptian security forces. The armed group that most visibly operated in the region was Ansar Beit al-Maqdis (ABM), which at the end of 2014 declared their loyalty to the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS), renaming it the Province of Sinai (PS). The majority of the armed actions in the conflict are concentrated in the peninsula, but some offensives have shown their ability to act beyond as well. There are a variety of factors underlying and shaping the complexity of the conflict, including the longtime political and economic marginalisation of the Bedouin peoples who inhabit the peninsula, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, regional turmoil which has facilitated the transit of weapons and fighters to the area, and internal fluctuations in Egypt after the seizure of power by sectors of the military.

Summary in 2015

The armed conflict centred in the Sinai Peninsula worsened in 2015, especially in the second half of the year. The violence intensified, with episodes that demonstrated the capabilities of the new branch of ISIS in Egypt, which was formerly the ABM, renamed as Province of Sinai (PS) in November 2014. Throughout the year, the armed conflict mainly consisted of attacks by the PS against Egyptian soldiers and police – including suicide bombings, car bombings, shootouts and the detonation of improvised explosive devices on roads – and in offensives by the security forces against the branch of ISIS in Sinai. Although the acts of violence were concentrated in Sinai, some incidents also took place in Cairo – for some of which Ajnad Misr claimed responsibility - and in tourist areas such as Giza and Karnak.

Among the most relevant events during the year was an offensive at the end of January in the area of el-Arish, the capital and biggest city in the province of North Sinai, which left more than 30 soldiers dead and sparked a military operation that led to dozens of insurgent deaths, according to official sources. In February, ISIS also called for the execution of at least 8 people accused of collaboration with Israel. Another incident was the assassination in June of the Prosecutor General of Egypt, the most senior official to be victim of an attack since the failed attack on the Ministry of the Interior in 2013. The bombing was attributed to ISIS, which had made a call to attack members of the Egyptian Judiciary, considering them complicit with the policies of the government of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. The armed group had pronounced this sentence after the Egyptian justice system condemned six presumed members of ISIS to death, and in May and the following weeks, led to the shooting of three judges in el-Arish. Following the assassination of the Prosecutor General, the worst escalation of violence in the Sinai began since the war of Yom Kippur in 1973. In early July, ISIS launched an attack that was unprecedented in terms of coordination, numbers, and weaponry in Sheikh Zuweid, a town also located in the province of North Sinai, between el-Arish and Rafah (bordering Gaza). An estimated 300 combatants from the group launched a coordinated attack on 15 control points and other strategic points of the city, with mortars, car bombs, and other explosive devices, as well as anti-tank missiles and anti-aircraft missiles to repel an Egyptian security force airborne response. The offensive, whose goal was the annexation of the city to the caliphate proclaimed by ISIS, led to skirmishes lasting days and dozens of deaths. Body counts differ, but it led to an extension of the state of emergency in the Sinai which had been in vigour in the area since 2014. In the next weeks there were many more episodes of violence, including some which made international news, such as the kidnapping and beheading of a Croatian worker at the hands of ISIS in August; the attack of security forces on a group of tourists which they mistook for insurgents (killing eight Mexicans); the detonation of explosives which wounded six members of the peacekeeping mission between Israel and Egypt since 1979. This was the context in which the government in early September launched the operation baptised the “Right of the Martyr”, a

coordinated operation of the Egyptian military forces and police focused on breaking up the insurgent activity in the towns of el-Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuweid, in the north of the peninsula. Authorities reported hundreds of combatants killed in these operations. ISIS, however, made a new demonstration of force and capacity for action before the year was out, in taking responsibility for the downing of a Russian airliner which took off from Sharm el-Sheikh and caused the deaths of 224 people at the end of October. After initially denying it, authorities in Moscow admitted that it had been a bombing. In contrast, the Egyptian government denied the crash was due to a bomb until the end of 2015.


It should be noted that several of the measures imposed by the el-Sisi government as part of the campaign in the Sinai were controversial. One of those was the approval of a polemical anti-terrorist law after events in Sheikh Zuweid which, among other things, made it illegal to disseminate information which didn't coincide with official versions. This approach was questioned by various critical voices which have underlined the difficulties to contrast in an independent way what is happening in the Sinai. This information blackout imposed by the regime made it difficult to size up the conflict or to estimate a body count. Even so, centres like the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy based in the US estimated that insurgent attacks had grown ten times in 2015 compared to 2012 – with more than 350 incidents – and that the operations of the Egyptian security forces may have caused as many as 3,000 deaths during the year. The government policy in the Rafah area of forced evictions, demolitions of homes, and sealing of tunnels was also criticised. Organisations like Human Rights Watch (HRW) stressed that the el-Sisi regime decided to create a buffer zone on the border with Gaza with scant evidence of supposed collaboration between groups in the Strip with the branch of ISIS in the Sinai. Additionally, HRW underlined that the available data pointed out that the PS armed group had attained most of their weaponry from Libya and from assaults on the barracks of Egyptian security forces, and that if Cairo had doubts about the activities occurring in the tunnels, expensive tunnel monitoring equipment received in recent years from the US could have been used instead of destroying the homes of thousands of people (in July and August alone,

more than 3,200 homes were destroyed in 2015)²⁷. In this context, some analysts warned of consequences in terms of alienation and animosity of the populace for actions which were perceived as collective punishments, which could lead to popular support for the insurgent groups operating in the peninsula. Among them was the policy of arrests - on many occasions accompanied by torture - the numbers of which had grown significantly since 2011, reaching almost 3,600 detentions in 2015.²⁸

Finally, it is worth mentioning that in April 2015 the US government decided to end the arms embargo imposed on Egypt after the military coup in mid-2013, reactivating its military partnership with the Arab nation. In the case of the EU arms embargo, according to data from SIPRI, it was interpreted as a political statement and did not result in determinations or specific regulations. This meant that since 2014, several European Union member states have supplied or signed contracts for the sale of light and heavy arms.²⁹

Arms exports

Egypt is the second country in the Middle East and North African region, after Saudi Arabia, in terms of receiving EU arms exports. In terms of actual exports, the total purchases climbed to 1.37 billion euros. Although the majority of the armament was classified in the Miscellaneous category - 1.25 billion euros, there are significant amounts of other categories, such as military aircraft, helicopters and drones representing 82% of the rest, equivalent to 102 million euros. After this were the categories of electronics, tanks, small arms and ammunition. 2015 authorisations for exports rose to 19.47 billion euros, of which 40% were explosives such as missiles, bombs, rockets, and grenades. Also authorised were military aircraft, electronics, warships and light arms and artillery. Among the leading suppliers to Egypt are France, the UK, Spain, and Italy.



Source: the authors

IRAQ

Overview of the conflict:

The armed conflict began in March of 2003, following the invasion of Iraq by an international coalition led by the US, justified by the supposed presence of weapons of mass destruction in the country and the alleged support for terrorism by the regime of Saddam Hussein. The military offensive, which was not backed by a referendum from the UN, led to a conflict with multiple armed groups, including international troops, Iraqi armed forces, insurgent groups, militias, private security agencies, al-Qaeda, and others. After the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime and the establishment of a new sharing out of power among Sunni, Shia, and Kurds in the country, the dynamics of the conflict have evolved and the difficulties have compounded and overlapped, going from a period characterised by the armed opposition against an international presence to a more sectarian component, which reached a critical point in 2006 and 2007. After the announced withdrawal of US troops from the country in 2011, the dynamics of violence have persisted and since 2014 intensified with the rise of Islamic State (ISIS), an armed group which evolved from the Iraqi affiliate of al-Qaeda. The current conflict involves ISIS,

27. Human Rights Watch, "Look for Another Homeland": Forced Evictions in Egypt's Rafah, Human Rights Watch, 22 de septiembre de 2015. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/22/look-another-homeland/forced-evictions-egypts-rafah>

28. The Economist, "The peninsular war: Egypt is losing control of the Sinai", *The Economist*, 14 de noviembre de 2015. <https://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21678260-egypt-losing-control-sinai-peninsular-war>

29. SIPRI, "EU arms embargo on Egypt", SIPRI, 2 de febrero de 2017. https://www.sipri.org/databases/embargoes/eu_arms_embargoes/egypt/eu-arms-embargo-on-egypt

a conglomeration of forces made up of Iraqi forces, Shia militias supported by Iran, Sunni tribal militias, and Kurdish combatants with support from an international anti-ISIS coalition led by the US, which in recent years has renewed their military presence in Iraq. The elevated levels of violence in the country since 2003 have had a grave impact on the civil population, by far the leading victim of the hostilities.

Summary in 2015

The armed conflict in Iraq led to intense levels of violence in 2015. According to the estimates of the organisation Iraq Body Count (IBC), during the year, 17,578 civilians died due to the conflict, a figure slightly lower than that of 2014 (20,218).³⁰ Nevertheless, this slight drop in mortality didn't imply a change in the trend of the intensification of the violence in the country since 2013. In fact, the total number of victims of 2015 still was greater than those who died in 2010, 2011, and 2012 combined. The UN mission to the country gave a more conservative death toll, but the organisation recognised the difficulties of compiling detailed information of the impact of the violence in the country and of identifying which victims died due to secondary threats resulting from the conflict, such as the lack of basic food, water, or health services.

Violence in Iraq mainly took the form of clashes pitting the armed group ISIS against Iraqi troops and other armed groups like Shia militias, Sunni tribal forces, popular mobilisation units (PMUs) and Kurdish combatants (peshmerga); as well as bomb and suicide attacks, and air raids. The incidents and violent events mostly occurred in the Iraqi provinces or governorates of Baghdad, al-Anbar, Nineveh, Diyala, and Saladin. In early 2015, one of the centres of conflict was Tikrit (140 kilometres northwest of Baghdad), which prompted the Iraqi government to launch a military operation with help from pro-governmental militias. In April, authorities managed to recover control of the city from ISIS. Another epicentre of hostilities during the first half of the year was Baiji (a city 200 kilometres north of the Iraqi capital), the headquarters of the biggest oil refinery in the country. Fighting in this area began at the end of 2014 and didn't lead to the withdrawal of ISIS until October 2015. During the first half of the year, one of the gains of ISIS was the seizure of Ramadi, capital of the province of Anbar, a city of 300,000 inhabitants located only 110 kilometres west of Baghdad. The capture of Ramadi, in May, was considered by analysts as a terrible setback for Iraqi forces

– the worst since the occupation of Mosul by ISIS in June 2014 – and a demonstration of the limitations of the aerial campaigns of the US-led international coalition. During the second half of 2015, the Iraqi government launched a military offensive to try and expel ISIS from the province of Anbar. The hostilities centred around Fallujah and Ramadi. After an intensification of the offensive in November, with airstrike support from the anti-ISIS coalition, authorities in Baghdad announced at the end of 2015 that Ramadi was back under their Iraqi control, with a visit from the Prime Minister. Nevertheless, ISIS continued to make its presence known within the city, and skirmishes with Iraqi forces continued during the first months of 2016. Another of the active fronts during the last quarter of 2015 in Iraq was the region of Sinjar (in the province of Nineveh, in the North of the country) where Kurdish forces, with the support of the anti-ISIS coalition, launched an offensive to expel the armed group, responsible for multiple atrocities against the Yazidi community inhabiting the area. The campaign led to the liberation of Sinjar in November and revealed the inter-Kurdish tensions between the KDP and the PKK.

Iraqi forces were criticized over the year for their response to the crisis in Ramadi and also after the admission of the Iraqi government of errors committed during the seizure of Mosul by ISIS the prior year. Baghdad admitted to Iraqi troops abandoning a large amount of military material in the city, including some 2,000 armoured vehicles. At the same time, during 2015 the UNAMI and the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights as well as various NGOs, continued compiling complaints of violations and abuses committed by Iraqi troops and pro-government forces under the cover of the conflict. Examples included military operations targeting townships or civil infrastructure, operations which did not take into account the necessary precautions to avoid the effects of the violence on the civil population, executions, kidnappings, arbitrary arrests and destruction of civil property or restrictions of movement to displaced peoples, among other practices.³¹ Some of these acts affected people accused of collaborating with ISIS. Organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International warned of acts carried out by Shia militias and the risk of episodes of revenge in the context of sectarian tensions. Additionally, on several occasions, UNAMI and OHCHR condemned the consequences of aerial bombardment on civilians, without being able to clearly establish

30. Iraq Body Count, *Another year of relentless violence in Iraq*, IBC, 12 January 2017.

31. UNAMI and OHCHR, *Report on the Protection of Civilians in the Armed Conflict in Iraq: 1 May – 31 October 2015*, UNAMI and OHCHR, 11 January 2016.



blame. According to data from the IBC, a total of 1,295 civilians had lost their lives because of aerial offensives from Iraqi forces or from the international coalition (or from joint operations) throughout 2015.³² ISIS was also blamed for multiple abuses, including massacres, assassinations, destruction of heritage and the use of sexual violence. According to the report of the Secretary General of the UN on sexual violence in conflicts in 2015, the abuses of ISIS in this regard include situations of sexual slavery which especially affected Yazidi women, who were separated from their children in order to be sexually exploited in Iraq or Syria.³³ The conflict has also resulted in large numbers of forced displacements. According to data from the UN, the number of displaced persons due to the conflict from early 2014 until the end of 2015 had ascended to 3.2 million.

Despite the context of armed conflict and despite facing an unstable and fragile political setting – characterised by internal tensions, power struggles, controversy around the growing role of Shia militias, doubts about the Prime Minister, accusations of corruption and the failure to provide services, among other problems – the country continues to intensify the acquisition of arms. According to data from SIPRI, Iraq registered an increase in the imports of its arsenal by 83% when comparing the periods from 2006-2010 and 2011-2015, including significant purchases of armoured vehicles provided by the US as well as military aircraft (18 planes sold by the US and 21 helicopters from Russia).

Arms exports

In Iraq, after the military occupation of 2003, there has been a context of permanent violence. However that has not hindered that exports of weapons increased in 2005, 2009, 2014, and in 2015. In fact, in terms of actual exports, the EU in 2015 doubled the value of exports to Iraq to 380 million (from 123 million in 2014). The categories of military exports included: munitions, armoured vehicles and tanks, explosives such as grenades, missiles, bombs, and small and light arms, and artillery. However, in terms of authorised exports, the arms trade between the EU and Iraq is a booming business, with 2 billion in authorisations, more than double the 760 million in 2014. Among the categories most sought after are targeting systems; explosives; military aircraft; tanks; electronic equipment; toxic,

biological, and chemical agents; and thousands of small arms, light arms, and artillery. It should be noted that this growing tendency has its origin in the conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU, where it was agreed that due to the apparition of DAESH, some EU member states should support the Iraqi Minister of Defence with supplies of military material. Among the leading supplier nations are France, Bulgaria, Spain, and the Czech Republic.



Source: the authors

ISRAEL

Overview of the conflict:

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict started in 1947 when the United Nations Security Council Resolution 181 divided Palestinian territory under British mandate into two states and soon after proclaimed the state of Israel (1948), without the state

32. Iraq Body Count, *Iraq 2015: A Catastrophic Normal*, IBC, 1 de enero de 2016.

33. UNSG, *Informe del secretario general sobre la violencia sexual en los conflictos*, S/2016/361/Rev.1, 22 de junio de 2016

of Palestine having been able to materialise itself since then. Since then various Arab-Israeli wars have been fought. After the 1948-49 war, Israel annexed West Jerusalem and Egypt and Jordan took over control of Gaza and the West Bank, respectively. In 1967, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza after winning the "Six-Day War" against the Arab countries. It was not until the Oslo Accords in the early 1990's that the autonomy of the Palestinian territory would be formally recognised, although its introduction was to be impeded by the military occupation and the control of the territory imposed by Israel. In this context of failure of the peace process, the conflict between Israel and the various Palestinian actors started up again in 2000 with the outbreak of the Second Intifada, and it continued, leading to several escalations of violence. Hotly contested and unresolved issues continue to be the capital of Jerusalem, the right to return for Palestinian refugees, the delimitation of borders and the question of the Israeli settlements in the occupied territories.

Summary in 2015

During 2015 the levels of violence recorded in the Palestinian-Israeli armed conflict were lower than the previous year, mainly due to the escalation of violence in Gaza between June and August 2014. According to the report of the UN Human Rights Council published in 2015, the escalation of violence in Gaza during the summer of 2014 left 2,251 Palestinian victims – the majority civilians, including 500 children and 73 Israelis dead, of whom 67 were soldiers and 6 civilians. In comparison, the death toll dropped in 2015, was estimated at around 150 to 200 persons during the year, with a rise in the body count during the last quarter. There was more violence in the West Bank and in Jerusalem than in the previous year. During the first half of the year, sporadic incidents were reported, including clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security forces; Palestinians shot dead by Israeli soldiers at checkpoints; and deaths in Gaza caused by the detonation of explosives left over from the hostilities of the previous year.



In the second half of the year, the violence was more systemic. One of the most notorious episodes was in August, an arson attack committed by Israeli settlers against a Palestinian family in July that killed a baby and its parents. The attack, which caused international consternation, was part of the policy of revenge or "price tag" promoted by radical settlers acting against the Palestinian people, often in retaliation for measures that limit the expansion of settlements in occupied territories. The attack sparked mass protests in the Palestinian territories, leading to new

fatalities as young Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza were killed by Israeli security forces. In September, Jerusalem became the flashpoint of tensions between Israelis and Palestinians after the government of Benjamin Netanyahu imposed restrictions on Palestinian access to the Temple Mount (Haram al-Sharif) to facilitate visits by Israelis to the area in order to celebrate the Jewish New Year.

Although pressure from the international community prompted Israel to lift the restrictions on Palestinians, the last quarter of the year was characterized by an intensification of the violence, which culminated in random knife attacks by Palestinians against Israeli citizens in public or on buses; the deliberate hitting of Israelis with cars; the shooting of young Palestinians during search operations, at checkpoints, during demonstrations and clashes and during attacks and alleged acts of aggression against Israeli soldiers and civilians. Although Israel justified these actions assuring that the majority of the Palestinians killed during this period were aggressors. The Israeli response to this phenomenon prompted much criticism from Palestinians, but also from Israeli and international NGOs that accused Israel of killing alleged suspects without evidence and without them posing an imminent threat. Even the United States warned the Israeli government to avoid excessive use of force. According to estimated death tolls, from 1 October to the end of the year, more than 20 Israelis, one US citizen, an Eritrean and over 130 Palestinians lost their lives in this new wave of violence. The Israeli reaction also included the imposition of unprecedented security measures in Jerusalem, additional deployments of soldiers in various cities and an intensification of the use of collective punishment, like the demolition of homes of the alleged attackers and the refusal to hand corpses over to their families. Israel accused the Palestinian authorities of inciting the violence. However, the Palestinian authorities blamed the phenomenon on the frustration of Palestinian youth regarding the occupation, the lack of expectations of a political solution. In this context, the the Palestinian Authority maintained its strategy to internationalise the Palestinian issue. After it signed the Treaty of Rome in late 2014, it presented the International Criminal Court with a record of abuses committed by Israel over the last decade in Gaza, of the settlements in the occupied territories and of the treatment of prisoners in Israeli jails.

Arms exports

According to data taken from the EU report, actual exports to Israel for 2015 are more than 293 million euros. The materials exported include explosive devices, armoured vehicles and tanks, imaging equipment, military aircraft, small arms, targeting equipment, and a large quantity of weapons in the unspecified category *Miscellaneous*. In terms of authorised exports, these have risen to 966 million euros. Most requested this year were warships, imaging equipment and explosives. The leading EU exporting nations to Israel are Germany, France, the UK, and Italy.



Source: the authors

Western arms, Saudi Arabia and the war in Yemen

Arms with their origin in western countries not only fuel conflicts in states plagued by war or sociopolitical crisis via direct arm transfers. They also wind up supplying countries which though they are not the direct setting or principal actor in an armed conflict, but actively participate in hostilities. One particularly illustrative and problematic case is that of Saudi Arabia through its implication in the conflict in Yemen. In the context of a rough process of transition in the country after the Arab revolts, Houthi forces in alliance with supporters of former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh ousted president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, who went into exile in Riyadh. Months later, in March 2015, the Saudi Kingdom decided to get involved militarily in the Yemeni conflict, supporting pro-Hadi forces. The Saudis led an armed coalition made up of the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Sudan – and which also received logistical support from countries like the US and the UK. The strategy was initially based around air support and airstrikes, but later came to include a no-fly zone, a naval blockade, the deployment of ground troops, and the shipment of armoured vehicles from the West to support the pro-Hadi forces.

Since the military intervention of the coalition headed up by Riyadh, the conflict has grown in complexity as a result of the high number of armed actors involved, the sectarian narrative around the clashes, and the influence of regional interests. Yemen is the poorest country of the Arab world and was already affected by conflictive dynamics previous to the current fighting. It is the victim of a new setting for the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran (Riyadh accuses the Houthis of as acting as “proxies” of Tehran). As a consequence, the situation in Yemen has destabilized even more – leading to more activity of groups like AQAP and ISIS – and the levels of violence have intensified with devastating consequences for the population, the main victim of the escalation of the war. Since March 2015, and up to the middle of 2017 the conflict has already caused more than 10,000 deaths, has forced more than three million to flee, and has left 80% of the population in need of humanitarian aid (17 million people are in danger of food shortages) and has contributed to a dramatic rise in cases of child malnutrition and the expansion of diseases like cholera, which are causing extremely high mortality rates. As well, bands on both sides have been accused by human rights organisations and UN investigators of indiscriminate attacks on civilian targets, blocking access to humanitarian aid, and acts which constitute war crimes. Saudi

Arabia has been particularly singled out for their responsibility in attacks on civilian infrastructure – according to a study by the Yemen Data Project in 2016, one of three attacks by the coalition led by Riyadh targeted public facilities, including schools, hospitals, mosques, markets, ports, among other installations; for the use of arms prohibited by the coalition – the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights found evidence of the use of cluster bombs, whose use is condemned since 2015; and for their resistance to independent investigation around their actions in the war in Yemen.

It should be pointed out that the effects of the war in Yemen were rapidly visible and that already in the first year of hostilities several NGOs warned of the devastating impact of the conflict on civilians – in fact, the rapid deterioration of the situation led the Red Cross to issue an alert in September 2015 that after five months of conflict the panorama in Yemen was similar to that of Syria after five years of war. Despite those early warnings about the degradation of the situation, the consequences for the civil population and the evidence that the risk of the flow of arms was leading to war crimes and international human rights violations, Saudi Arabia has not stopped receiving huge amounts of arms in the last years on the part of the West. According to data from SIPRI, in the period from 2011-2015, the Arab country increased its purchases of arms by 275% (compared to the previous five years), a trend that has continued - a 212% increase for the period 2012-2016 compared to the previous five years. The Saudi Kingdom has become the second largest importer of arms in the world, with the US as the leading producer nation (52.04% of the total of Saudi arms sales) followed by several European countries, including the UK (27.12%), Spain (4.19%), France (4.11%), Germany (1.87%) and Italy (1.33%).

In the case of Spain, between 2014 and 2016, the export of arms to Saudi Arabia came to a total of nearly 1 billion euros, most of that in 2015, the year in which Riyadh began to intervene in the war in Yemen. That year alone the Spanish government issued 18 licenses for the exportation of military material to Saudi Arabia for more than 580 million euros (including light arms; ammunition; bombs, torpedoes, rockets, and missiles; targeting systems; military aircraft; and electronics equipment) and exported more than 545 million euros in the categories of small arms; bombs, torpedoes, missiles, and rockets; targeting systems; aircraft for in-air refuelling, and transport aircraft, among other military hardware. Exports in 2016 included another 116.2 million euros of material. Although Spanish

authorities assured that the transfers – especially the ammunition – included documents of control and clauses prohibiting re-exportation or use outside of the country, several organizations and sectors of public opinion have asked for more information, an independent investigation of the use of Spanish arms in Yemen and by part of the coalition led by Riyadh, and particularly that the risk of new exports, including five corvette warships from the Navantia shipyard which could be used indiscriminately to launch attacks in Yemen or to maintain the naval blockade.

In the last two years, the use of Western arms in the war in Yemen have been in the spotlight due to several reports, among them indications that the Houthi armed group had access to Spanish arms sold in past decades to Saudi Arabia, - including grenade launchers and hand grenades made by Instalaza, or the admission by Riyadh that British-made cluster bombs had been used in Yemen, a weapon which had been delivered at the end of the 1980's and which are now prohibited by an international treaty which more than 120 countries have signed since 2018. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the other countries in the military coalition led by Riyadh have signed.³⁴

At the end of 2016, the Saudi attack using US-made weapons on a funeral in the Yemeni capital which killed 140 people and injured another 600 – which Riyadh attributed to the misidentification of the site as a military target – led to renewed criticisms of Western cooperation with Riyadh that led the government of Barack Obama to revise their logical and military support to the Saudi coalition. Although the US resolved to suspend \$400 million in arms sales to Saudi Arabia – after having sold 22 billion dollars in arms to Riyadh since the start of the military campaign by the coalition in march of 2015 – that decision was reverted months later by the Donald Trump administration, which in his first visit to the Middle East announced new agreements for arms sales to the Kingdom for 100 billion dollars.

At the European level, the European Parliament took a stance on the situation in Yemen, pointing out concerns about the actions of the Saudi-led coalition. These concerns included aerial attacks on civilian targets, destruction of basic infrastructures for supply and aid (which has worsened the need for food and fuel), offensives against health infrastructure (particularly the bombardment of a hospital run by Doctors Without Borders) and the irreparable destruction of heritage

34. Despite this, the use in residential areas without security measures constitutes a violation of human rights given the obviously indiscriminate nature of this kind of weaponry.

sites. The Parliament expressed discomfort around the decisions of several EU member states to continue authorising transfers of arsenals to Riyadh despite a clear violation of the Common Position 2008/944/PESC on the export of arms. Given the clear risk that the requested munitions and technology will be used to perpetrate serious violations of human rights and could be a risk for the peace, security, and stability of a region. The European Parliament voted with a majority in favour of imposing an arms embargo on Saudi Arabia, given the serious accusations of breaches of international human rights by the Kingdom against the people of Yemen. Although it was true that this decision was not binding, the measure served to place the shipments of arms to the

Saudi monarchy under scrutiny and to expose the contradictions of the strategic relation of the West with Riyadh. In addition to the rules of the EU, member states also have to respect national legislation which regulates the arms trade, and which in the case of Spain, for example, includes clauses of denial and suspension of arms shipments if there is evidence that the material being shipped can be used to disturb peace and stability, exacerbate conflicts, or be used against human dignity – and the principles of the recently approved Arms Trade Treaty. The Saudi-led coalition in Yemen is a clear case of responsibility and complicity of Western governments with an armed conflict, which is provoking one of the worst humanitarian conflicts in the world.

4. CONCLUSIONS

- Weapons exports from member states of the EU in 2015 reached a record number of authorizations, duplicating those of the previous year. The exponential growth of weapons exports is most marked starting 2012, particularly that of the authorisations, with a growth rate of nearly 400%.
- The leading exporting nations are France, which authorised 77% of the disclosed exports. It is followed by the large military producer nations: the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany.
- The Middle East has been the top destination region of European arms exports, receiving four of every ten authorisation for weapons exports (in terms of value) and which received 29% of the weapons and other European military production in 2015. An overview of the trend of exports, shows that arms transfers within the EU have reduced visibly, what was once the majority has now been replaced by a clear rise in exports to the Middle East and Asia, including Central Asia, Southeast Asia and South Asia.
- There is a deep intensification of authorizations since 2014, which could mean enormous volumes of weapons exports in the coming years, particularly to regions suffering from armed conflict such as the Middle East and Asia.
- 13 of the 50 top purchasing nations of European weapons exports were involved in at least one armed conflict in 2015 (Egypt, India, Turkey, Iraq, Thailand, Algeria, Pakistan, China, Israel, Ukraine, Nigeria and Colombia). These 13 countries were the setting for 16 armed conflicts.
- Five of the 11 high-intensity armed conflicts in 2015 happened in countries which are currently among the 50 top purchasing nations of European weapons exports: Nigeria, Pakistan, Ukraine, Egypt, and Iraq.
- 10 of the 13 armed conflicts in countries among the 50 top purchasing nations of EU arms exports had opposition to the nations government, or the political, social or ideological system among their root causes.
- Among the purchasing nations of EU arms exports are countries which had the greatest numbers of internally displaced peoples in 2015, such as Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan.
- Seven of the armed conflicts which occurred in countries with high or very high levels of gender discrimination: Iraq, India (Assam), India (Jammu and Kashmir), India (CPI-M), Pakistan, Pakistan (Balochistan), and Nigeria were also among the top importers of weapons produced in EU member countries.
- Three armed conflicts which were the setting for sexual violence related to armed conflict - as reported by the Secretary General of the UN - occurred in countries which were among the top 50 importers of EU weapons.

5. ANNEX II

DEFINITIONS

Conventional arms

Arms that are not biological, chemical or nuclear.

Heavy conventional arms

Weapons of large size that cannot be transported by one person or a group of people, for example, planes, ships, submarines, tanks, vehicles, artillery, cannons, machine guns, etc.

Small arms and light weapons¹

Small arms or handguns:

Small arms are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by individual members of armed or security forces. They include revolvers and automatic pistols; rifles and carbines; sub-machine guns; assault rifles; and light machine guns.

Light weapons:

Light weapons are broadly categorized as those weapons intended for use by several members of armed or security forces acting as a group. They include heavy machine guns; hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers; portable anti-aircraft guns; portable anti-tank guns; recoilless rifles; portable launchers of anti-tank missile and rocket systems; portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems; and mortars of calibres less than 100 mm

MATERIAL OF DEFENCE²

All EU member nations use the same classification of material destined for military use. Weaponry is classified into 23 distinct categories:

Category 1: Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre less than 20 mm

Rifles, carbines, revolvers, pistols, machine pistols, machine guns, silencers, special gun-mountings, clips, weapons sights and flash suppressers for arms

Category 2: Weaponry with a smooth-bored barrel and caliber equal to or greater than 20 mm

Guns, howitzers, cannon, mortars, anti-tank weapons, projectile launchers, military flame throwers, rifles, recoilless rifles, smooth-bore weapons and signature reduction devices, military smoke, gas and pyrotechnic projectors or generators, weapons sights.

Category 3: Ammunition and fuse setting devices

Ammunition for weapons specified by Cat. 1, 3 or 12. Fuse setting devices, anvils, bullet cups, cartridge links, rotating bands and munitions metal parts, safing and arming devices, fuses, sensors and initiation devices, power supplies, submunitions.

Category 4: Bombs, torpedoes, rockets, missiles

Bombs, torpedoes, grenades, smoke cans, rockets, mines, missiles, depth charges, demolition charges, pyrotechnic products, cartridges and simulators, smoke grenades, fire bombs, missile rocket nozzles and nose cones for re-entry vehicles.

Category 5: Systems for aiming and direction of fire

Weapon control panels, computer guidance systems for bombing, gun aiming devices, weapon control systems and data acquisition systems for surveillance, tracking, recognition and identification equipment.

Category 6: All terrain vehicles

Vehicles designed especially or modified for military use, cars or other military armed vehicles or equipment for laying mines, armoured vehicles, amphibious vehicles, bulletproof tires.

Category 7: Chemical agents and biological toxins

Biological agents and radioactive materials, nerve agents, blistering agents, tear gas, riot control agents.

Category 8: Volatile materials and related substances

Explosives, propellants, pyrotechnic products, combustibles and related substances, perchlorates, chlorides and cromides, oxides, chemical binders, additives and chemical precursors.

Category 9: Warships

Warships and surface or underwater vessels, navigation equipment, diesel motors designed specifically for submarines, electric motors designed specifically for submarines, underwater detection apparatus, anti-submarine nets and anti-torpedoes.

¹ This definition of small arms and light weapons is that commonly used by the OSCE; see the document on small arms and light weapons from 2000: <http://www.osce.org/fsc/20783>

² Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment

Category 10: Aircraft

Combat aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV's), aircraft engines, fuel suppliers, pressurized breathing equipment, parachutes, and autopilot systems.

Category 11: Electronic equipment

Electronic countermeasure and counter-countermeasure systems, underwater acoustic material, data security equipment, encryption equipment, guiding, navigation and transmission equipment.

Category 12: Kinetic energy weapon systems

Kinetic energy weapon systems, facilities for testing and evaluating test models, propulsion systems, homing systems, guidance and derived propulsion systems for projectiles.

Category 13: Armoured equipment and constructions

Armoured plating, metallic and non-metallic construction materials, military helmets, clothing and protection pieces.

Category 14: Equipment for military training and simulation

Combat simulators for flight training, radar target training, anti-submarine warfare training, missile launch training, and equipment for image generation.

Category 15: Countermeasure and imaging equipment

Recorders and image processing equipment, cameras, photographic equipment, image intensification equipment, thermal imaging and infrared forming equipment, radar image sensor equipment.

Category 16: Forgings (metallurgy)

Forged products, casting molds, half finished products, specially designed for articles in cat 1, 4, 6, 9, 10, 12, or 19.

Category 17: Miscellaneous equipment, materials and libraries

Autonomous subaquatic apparatus, robots, close and semi-closed circuit apparatus, ferries.

Category 18: Production equipment and components

Environmental test facilities, continuous nitrators, equipment and apparatus for centrifuge testing, screw extruders.

Category 19: Directed energy weapon systems

Lasers, radio frequency particle beams, particle accelerators.

Category 20: Cryogenic and superconducting equipment

Equipment specifically designed or configured to be installed in vehicles for military applications on land, sea, air and space; superconducting electrical equipment.

Category 21: Software

Modelling software, software for simulation and evaluation of military weapon systems or the simulation of military operations scenarios, communications, control and intelligence software.

Category 22: Technology

Technology for the development, production or use of controlled materials and substances.

OTHER MILITARY AND DEFENSE EQUIPMENT

a. Firearms defined in article 3 resolution 55/255 of the United Nations general assembly for which the protocol is approved against the illegal manufacture and trafficking of firearms, their parts, components and ammunition, that aren't included in Annex I.1, articles 1, 2 and 3 in relation to military goods.

b. telescopic/light or image intensifying scopes and sights for firearms.

c. Generating devices, projectors, smoke machines, gases, "riot control agents" or incapacitating substances.

d. Launchers of the elements described in the previous paragraph c.

e. Sound and light riot control stun devices.

f. Riot control vehicles with some of the following features:

1. Systems to produce electric shocks
2. Systems to dispense incapacitating substances
3. Systems to dispense riot control agents
4. Water canons

g. Normal restraints and handcuffs

DUAL PURPOSE MATERIALS³

Dual purpose technology and products, classified by all EU countries into 10 categories:

³ The categories of dual-purpose materials are covered in the (UE) decree 388/2012, from 19 April (in annex I); Regulations published in the Official Journal of the EU 16 May 2012.

Category 0: Nuclear installations, materials and equipment

Nuclear reactors, separation plants for natural uranium isotopes, depleted uranium and fissionable materials, gas centrifuge equipment, mass spectrometers and graphite electrodes.

Category 1: Materials, chemical substances, “microorganisms” and “toxins”

Gas masks, armour, personal dosimeters, prepregs, tools, dies, molds, continuous mixers, filament winding machines, lubricating fluids and substances, fluorides, sulphurs, cyanides and halogenated derivatives.

Category 2: Treatment of materials

Bearings, crucibles, machine tools, isostatic presses, measuring instruments, robots, motion simulators and mechanized facilities.

Category 3: Electronics

Electrical components, integrated circuits, microprocessor microcircuits, programmable gate sets, microwave components, electrically operated mixers, converters and explosive detonators.

Category 4: Computers

Electronic, hybrid, digital, analogue, systolic, neuronal and optical assembly computers.

Category 5: Telecommunications and “data protection”

Transmission equipment and systems for telecommunications, subaquatic communications systems, radio equipment, fibre optic cables, telemetry and remote control equipment, security systems.

Category 6: Sensors and lasers

Acoustics, image intensifier tubes, optic sensors, instrumentation cameras, optics, lasers, gravimeters and gravity gradiometers and radar systems.

Category 7: Navigation y avionics

Inertial navigation accelerometers, gyroscopes, GPS and GNSS, hydraulic flight control systems, mechanical control systems, electro-optical and electromechanical control systems including those for electrical signals (fly by wire).

Category 8: Marine technology

Submersible vehicles or surface ships, hydrofoils, underwater vision systems, underwater diving and swimming equipment.

Category 9: Propulsion systems, space vehicles and related equipment

Aeronautic or marine gas turbine engines, space shuttles and space vehicles, solid or liquid fuelled rocket propulsion systems, ramjet engines, turbojet and turboprop engines, sounding rocket (research rocket), hybrid rocket engines, launch support equipment, environmental and anechoic chambers, re-entry vehicles.

Tariff Code (TARIC) 93⁴

9301. - Military weapons (except revolvers, pistols and hand-held weapons, knives, etc)

9301.11.00. – Pieces of artillery (e.g. canons, shells and mortars), self-propelled

9301.19.00. - Others

9301.20.00. - Rocket launchers; flamethrowers; grenade launchers; torpedo launchers and other similar launchers

9301.90.00. - Others

9302. - Revolvers and pistols (other those in article 9303 or 9304)

9303. - Other firearms and similar devices that utilize gunpowder combustion (e.g. hunting weapons, muzzle-loading firearms, Very pistols and other devices designed only for projecting signal flares, blank firing pistols and revolvers for firing blank ammunition, captive-bolt humane killers, line-throwing guns)

9303.10.00. - Muzzle-loading firearms

9303.20. - Other large sport and hunting weapons that have, at least, a smooth bored barrel

9303.20.10. - With a smooth bore barrel

9303.20.95. - Others

9303.30.00. - Other large sport and hunting weapons

9303.90.00. - Others

9304. - Other weapons [e.g. spring, compressed air or gas rifles and pistols, truncheons] (except those in the article 9307)

9305. - Parts and accessories for articles in sections 9301 to 9304

9305.10.00. - Of revolvers or pistols

9305.21.00. - Of shotguns and hunting rifles under heading 9303, smoothbore barrels

9305.29.00. - Others

9305.91.00. - Other, military weapons of heading 9301

9305.29.00. - Others

⁴ Foreign Trade Databases.

9305.91.00. - Other, military weapons of heading 9301

9305.99.00. - Others

9306. - Bombs, grenades, torpedoes, mines, missiles, cartridges and other ammunition and projectiles and parts thereof, including buckshot, shot and cartridge wads

9306.21.00. - "Cartridges for shotguns and guns with smooth-bore barrels and parts thereof; pellets for airguns", cartridges

9306.29. - Others

9306.29.40. - Pods

9306.29.70. - Others

9306.30. - Other cartridges and parts

9306.30.10. - For revolvers and pistols under heading 9302 and for machine pistols in part 9301

9306.30.30. - For military weapons

9306.30.91. - Centrefire cartridges

9306.30.93. - Rimfire cartridges

9306.30.97. - Others

9306.90. - Others

9306.90.10. - Of War

9306.90.90. - Others

9307. - Sabres, swords, bayonets, lances and similar bladed weapons, their parts and casings.

SCHOOL FOR A CULTURE OF PEACE (UAB)

The School for a Culture of Peace (Escola de Cultura de Pau - ECP) is an academic institution of investigation for peace located in the Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona (UAB). It was created in 1999 with the goal of promoting the culture of peace through activities of research, peace processes, parallel diplomacy, education, and informing the public. The main areas of investigation include conflict analysis, peace processes, gender, human rights and transitional justice, and peace education.

To meet these objectives the ECP focuses its work in the following areas:

- Research. The main areas of investigation of the ECP include armed conflict and sociopolitical crisis, peace processes, human rights and transitional justice, the gender dimension, and peace education.
- Parallel diplomacy. The ECP promotes dialogue and the transformation of conflict through initiatives of parallel diplomacy, including facilitation with armed actors.
- Consulting services. The ECP offers consulting service on conflict, peacebuilding and peace education for different types of local and international actors
- Education and training. The investigative personnel of the ECP offer graduate and post-graduate courses in Catalan universities, including a Diploma in the Culture of Peace, the postgraduate title that the ECP offers in the UAB. As well, they offer classes and workshops on specific topics, such as educating for peace and in conflict, and conflict awareness training.
- Awareness. The ECP promotes awareness through activities directed at Catalan and Spanish societies, as well as collaborations with the news media.

DELÀS CENTRE OF STUDIES FOR PEACE

The J.M. Delàs Centre of Studies for Peace (Centre d'Estudis per la Pau J.M. Delàs) is an independent organisation analysing peace, security, defence, and the arms trade. The Centre is dedicated to political and social research and action to strengthen the culture of peace and the construction of a disarmed society, making people aware of the negative effects of arms proliferation and militarism. The main areas of research are the arms trade, the financing of the arms industry, military expenditure, weapons research and development (R&D), and military operations abroad.

The Delàs Centre was born in 1999 in Justícia i Pau (Justice and Peace), as a continuation of work within the Campaign against the Arms Trade – C3A which started in 1988. Since February 2010 it is an independent research centre on issues related to disarmament and peace.

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