
PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

Security policies for peace

Another security is possible
and necessary



PEACE AND DISARMAMENT

3

Security policies for peace

Another security
is possible and necessary

Authors

Jordi Calvo Rufanges (coord.)

Maria de Lluç Bagur

Xavier Bohigas

Pere Brunet

Blanca Camps-Febrer

Teresa de Fortuny

Jorge Guardiola

Josep Maria Julià

Eduardo Melero

Chloé Meulewaeter

Anna Montull Garcia

Arcadi Oliveres

Albert Orta

Pere Ortega

Arés Perceval

José María Perceval

Alejandro Pozo

José Ángel Ruiz

Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto

Camino Simarro

Olivia Viader

Centre Delàs d'Estudis per la Pau
Universitat Internacional de la Pau



Carrer Erasme de Janer 8, entresol, despatx 9 · 08001 Barcelona
T. 93 441 19 47 · www.centredelas.org · info@centredelas.org

Collection «Peace and Disarmament», n. 3

Coordinators: Joaquim Lleixà and Pere Ortega

Authors: Jordi Calvo Rufanges (coord.), Maria de Lluç Bagur, Xavier Bohigas, Pere Brunet, Blanca Camps-Febrer, Jorge Guardiola, Josep Maria Julià, Eduardo Melero, Chloé Meulewaeter, Anna Montull Garcia, Teresa de Fortuny, Arcadi Oliveres, Albert Orta, Pere Ortega, Arés Perceval, José María Perceval, Alejandro Pozo, José Ángel Ruiz, Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, Camino Simarro, Olívia Viader

Special thanks to: Gerard Vallès

This publication, a joint project of the Delàs Center for Peace Studies and the International University of Peace, has been made possible with support of the Diputació de Barcelona within the framework of the programme “Another security is possible: Let’s build security policy within the local context from the culture of peace and human security”; as well as support from “Another security is possible: constructing policies from human security and a gender perspective to ensure the right to peace and a life free from violence”, financed by the Catalan Agency for Development Cooperation (ACCD).

Barcelona. Januray 2019



Graphic design: Esteva&Estêvão

D.L.: B-6497-2016

Index

Introduction: another security is both necessary and possible <i>Jordi Calvo</i>	7
---	---

FIRST PART. DISARMING AND DEMILITARIZING SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICIES

I. National security: whose peace? · <i>Eduardo Melero</i>	23
II. Culture of peace vs culture of defence · <i>Maria de Lluc Bagur</i>	31
III. Scientific resistance for disarmament · <i>Pere Brunet</i>	41
IV. Measures for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction · <i>Teresa de Fortuny i Xavier Bohigas</i>	51
V. Conversion of the arms industry · <i>Pere Ortega</i>	63
VI. Reducing military spending to avert the possibility of war <i>Chloé Meulewaeter</i>	69
VII. Rethinking foreign military operations. The case of Spain <i>Alejandro Pozo</i>	77
VIII. Promoting peace processes and conflict resolution <i>José Ángel Ruiz</i>	91
IX. Avoiding war · <i>Anna Montull Garcia</i>	101

PART TWO. POLICIES FOR PEACE AND HUMAN SECURITY

I. Introduction: policies for peace-building · <i>Arcadi Oliveres</i>	113
II. Introduction to human security · <i>Josep Maria Julià</i>	119
III. Human security and the environment · <i>Albert Orta</i>	131
IV. A nonviolent economy · <i>Jorge Guardiola i Jordi Calvo</i>	139
V. Feminist policies for peace · <i>Blanca Camps-Febres</i>	151
VI. Policies for diversity and tolerance · <i>Ares Perceval</i>	163
VII. Demilitarising public space · <i>Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto</i>	171
VIII. Education for peace and nonviolence <i>Olivia Viader i Camino Simarro</i>	183
IX. Living without fear · <i>José María Perceval</i>	195

Introduction: another security is both necessary and possible

Jordi Calvo Rufanges

Security, defense, and peace are central elements in the policies of any government. States, multilateral, regional, local and global organizations devote substantial resources to ensuring greater security. Practically every state justifies the existence of their ministries and departments of defense and security on this basis. It is exactly for this reason that there is a wide acceptance for the maintenance and arming of military forces, and their training and deployment when deemed necessary.

It is an approach that takes for granted that there is sufficient justification for participation in armed conflicts by means of military operations abroad, and that there is a need to defend oneself from external aggressors by military means. Given this perspective, we see a similar implementation and development of defense policies in almost every state, regardless of the political slant of the government, and is rarely questioned on anything more than a very superficial level by politicians, the media, or the civil society. As well, defense policies are set by the definitions of national objectives, and by the military and diplomatic means that a state has at its disposal to fulfil a self-assigned role on the international stage (Charles-Philippe, 2008).¹ The hegemonic concept of security which is widely accepted and rarely if ever questioned is that of a world seen through the eyes of mistrust, chaos, risks, threats, and above all, fear. Such that even the slightest possibility of an attack calls for a show of defensive power. This mainstream paradigm of security appeals to deterrence as the principal means to avoid being attacked, say, by

1. David, Charles-Philippe (2008): *La guerra y la paz. Enfoque contemporáneo sobre la seguridad y la estrategia* [War and Peace. Contemporary Approaches on Security and Strategy], Icaria, Barcelona.

showing more strength than your adversary, or at least, to intimidate them with the possibility of vengeance. The hope is to cause fear in the other in order not to be afraid oneself.

And that is how the cultural concept of national security is developed, as the “grouping of knowledge, norms, values, goals, attitudes and socially shared practices directed at protecting and guaranteeing national interests” (De la Corte and Blanco, 2014).² The traditional military and political understanding of security is that in the military sector, the referent object is the state, whereas in the political sector, existential threats are identified as those which affect the constituting principles of the state and its sovereignty (Buzan and others, 1998).³

On security threats

In the end, the final justification for the existence of military organizations and other institutions created for defense and security is that they are considered to be the best way of responding to the fears of that society and of the threats to its security.

To better understand the most relevant risk factors and threats to security, we can study those identified by the defense strategies of the EU, NATO, Spain and the US. To do so, we will restrict ourselves to the latest doctrines of security and defense.

All of them identify the following threats to security: terrorism and violent extremism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cybersecurity, energy security, organized crime, maritime security – and in the case of the US this extends to air and outer space –, climate change, irregular migratory flows – and in the case of the EU, the management of external borders, and economic crises – which NATO specifies as financial. The US adds economic slowdowns as security threats. Finally, an element all of them seem to have in common in the analysis of risks or threats are armed conflict and the so-called weak or failed states.

It is, however, important to mention some other security concerns iden-

-
2. De la Corte, L. and Blanco, JM (2014): *Seguridad nacional, amenazas y respuestas* [National Security, threats and responses], LID, Madrid, p. 37.
 3. Buzan, B, Wæver, O. and Wilde J. (1998): *Security. A new framework of analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p. 21, 22. <https://books.google.com/books?hl=es&id=j4BGr-Elsp8C>

tified in these four doctrines that are relevant. The EU also mentions the threats and risks to security posed by pandemics and epidemics, poverty and inequality, human rights violations, and the dual threat of changes in the equilibrium of economic powers and globalization and the interdependence it brings. As for NATO, they also include demographic changes that could be worsened by global problems like poverty, hunger, pandemic disease, as well as the previously mentioned dual threat of globalism and interdependence. As well, the US has expanded their identification of threats and security risks to include what it calls global outbreaks of infectious disease, with the possibility of a catastrophic attack on American soil or basic infrastructure; attacks on its citizens on foreign soil or against its allies, to which has been added extreme poverty, genocide, or what have been termed *mass atrocities*, as well as the impact of globalization and interdependence or changes in economic power. The Spanish government has also identified several threats to security: the vulnerability of critical infrastructures and essential services, protection against emergencies and catastrophes, espionage and counterintelligence, security in the aeronautical and railroad sectors and globalization.

In addition to the aforementioned threats and risks, it is worth adding countries or regions identified in the studied doctrines as a potential security threat. All of them consider Russia to be a country of special concern, and in practically all of them with more or less emphasis you find the Middle East, Africa and specifically the north of Africa, Maghreb and the Sahel, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, and the Arctic. In greater detail, the EU mentions the western Balkans and Turkey, while the US pays particular attention to China. Spain also gives a special mention to the British colony of Gibraltar.

The previous analysis of threats and risks to security places us into a scenario in which military response isn't the most useful option, indeed, it would seem a marginal resource of doubtful utility in terms of confronting contemporary security threats. In fact, much of what makes up the basis for national security policy are existing tools, which far from being only military or police, have more to do with diplomacy and foreign policy, and include international cooperation for development, the economy, health, education, justice, social services, civil protection, intelligence, etc. (De la Corte and Blanco, 2014).⁴

4. De la Corte, L. and Blanco, JM (2014): *Seguridad nacional, amenazas y respuestas*. [National Security, threats and responses], LID, Madrid, p. 36.

The construction of a critical vision of security.

If it's true that an analysis of security has been defined as the study of threats, use and control of military force, from a state-centric and militarist viewpoint, revitalized since the Global War on Terror (Walt, 1991:212)⁵, authors critical of the traditional concept of security, such as Barry Buzan in his *People, States and Fear* (1983), Rothschild (1995) and Baldwin (1997) ask questions which are central to a critical revision of traditional military security: What are the threats to security?, Whose security is being discussed?, What means should be used to ensure security?, And how should security be studied? An epistemological approach is necessary, as security analysis is not neutral (Pérez de Armiño and Mendia, 2013). In fact, it is nothing new that security can be dealt with in an objective manner, when there is a real threat, or in a subjective manner when the threat is perceived (Wolfers, 1962: 151).⁶

In regards to this, Roland Dannreuther (2013)⁷ considered the need for awareness within the role of a security analyst. If the goal is to be an objective scientist, as in the famous *Dr. Strangelove* of Stanley Kubrick, then we need to go beyond a focus on national security and move towards international security as internationalists. All the while, we must remain aware of inevitably subjective judgments and cultural limitations. If we are to take an ethical approach to security analysis, then they have to take a moral position in regards to those in power and those who are marginalized. As David Mutimer (2007: 131)⁸ points out, security is not a given, objective and unquestionable dimension, but rather it is susceptible to any number of interpretations, and as a result, analysis on the topic is not neutral from a moral or political viewpoint.

In other words, following Buzan, Waever and Wilde (1998: 8)⁹, military strategists analyse systems in terms that emphasize offensive and defensive capabilities and base their calculations on opportunistic coercive advantage.

5. in Pérez de Armiño, Karlos and Mendia Azkue, Irantzu (2013): *Seguridad humana. Aportes críticos al debate teórico y político*, [Human Security. Critical contributions to the theoretical and political debate], Madrid. Visiones críticas.

6. Buzan, B, Waever, O. and Wilde J. (1998): *Security. A new framework of analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p. 23.

7. Roland Dannreuther (2013): *International Security. The contemporary agenda*, Polity Press, Cambridge.

8. in Pérez de Armiño, Karlos. and Mendia Azkue, Irantzu (2013): *Seguridad humana. Aportes críticos al debate teórico y político* [Human Security. Critical contributions to the theoretical and political debate], Tecnos, Madrid.

9. Buzan, B, Waever, O. and Wilde J. (1998): *Security. A new framework of analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, p 8.

The economist looks at human systems in terms that highlight wealth and development, justified by the motivation of the desire to maximize utility. The social analyst looks at the system in terms of patterns of identity and the desire to maintain cultural independence (identity security). The environmentalist looks at systems in terms of ecological parameters and the need to achieve sustainable development. For the authors, securitization is inherently subjective, in which the meanings of threat, vulnerability, or (in)security are socially constructed, and thus objectively do not exist or cease to exist. By defining security with individuals at the centre is to make them members of a transcendent human community with common global concerns, and paradoxically, the focus on human security also brings with it a commitment to global threats (Krause and Williams, 1997)¹⁰.

In this way, we situate ourselves within the framework of critical security studies, that is to say, a vision based on the Frankfurt School, inspired by the works of Booth and Wyn Jones, in which the individual is the defining standard of security, and which considers states as unreliable providers of security. (Booth, 1991: 319-320).¹¹ Also included are the visions of critical security from the Copenhagen School and a Feminism which calls for a grassroots bottom-up analysis rather than a top-down state-centric one. Thus, people's own experience of security and insecurity can underpin and develop the human security approach, one that drives to inspire the advocacy of alternative security policies not based in militarism, force of arms, and fear. This is reflected in Article 26 of the Charter of the United Nations which recognizes the need to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion of human and economic resources for the arms race. Weapons are inherently ambiguous in a political and strategic sense, since their real strength is based on the generation of mistrust (Booth and Wheeler, 2008).¹²

10. from Chapter (pg 33-60) *From strategy to security: foundations of critical security studies*. Krause, Keith and Williams, Michael C. (Eds) (1997): *Critical security studies, concept and cases*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

11. In Buzan, Barry and Hansen, Lene (2015): *The evolution of international security studies*, Cambridge University Press.

12. Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler (2008:42) *The security dilemma. Fear, cooperation and trust in world politics*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.

The need to build a pacifist security

The following theoretical analysis identifies two fundamental aspects which give meaning to this publication. First, that traditional security is not the best response to the challenges faced by our modern, global, interdependent and diverse society. Second, that both theoretical foundations and practical approaches point toward the possibility and necessity of building a theory and practice of security based on different parameters, alternative to and even opposed to the hegemonic security of a country, a people, or a community until now.

As such, the first section of this publication will identify some of the most relevant elements of current policies of security and defense, question the need for defense as we know it, and asking ourselves: If we have to defend ourselves, from what, and from whom? The arms race, militarism, and the increasing militarization of society, the economy, and international relations will all be called into question.

In the second section, we will set out to propose alternative policies and political measures, diverging from traditional security, and based on a culture of peace. We will analyse a series of proposals which aim to inspire, proposals that are different but compatible among themselves, a starting point for many possibilities, which governments both at a local and global level can implement to construct conditions of sustainable, inclusive, and nonviolent security and peace.

Within the framework of a joint project between the **Delàs Center for Peace Studies** and of the **International University of Peace**, eighteen chapters written by twenty-two authors are committed to working for the construction of an alternative security, and to escape from the spiral of violence, weapons build-up, and militarism in which the world is once again trapped, far from the hopes heralded by the fall of the Berlin Wall. The authors were given complete creative freedom, thus these articles come from different perspectives within a common framework and vision. The culture of peace is a viewpoint that rejects any violent means of achieving political goals, no matter how dignified or legitimate they might be. A second framework, which is not limiting but instead inspirational, reappears in every chapter: human security, a plausible, real, and unfortunately forgotten alternative to armed, violent, or military security.

Each of the chapters which make up this volume propose an approach to security policy based on a culture of peace and human security. This vision of

security is consciously limited and incomplete, but necessary. It is a vision of a security which is possible, as is shown by many examples and experiences which are already a reality.

In *National security, whose peace?* Melero analyses the Spanish national security strategy, as well as the strategic concept of NATO, concluding that it is a broad concept of security, which leads to military action being taken not only in response to armed attacks, but also in response to security threats. This military predominance is a result of national interests being defined from a military viewpoint. In fact, armies are even being proposed for matters of energy and economics. The author proposes changing from a strategy of national security to one of human security, which inevitably implies a reduction of the military component in all of the aspects related to security.

Culture of peace vs. culture of defense complements the first chapter, arguing that if security is misinterpreted as militarized security, the citizenry must be instilled with military values and an obligation to defend the state. This is achieved through a culture of defense, whose goal is the creation of a awareness for the need for defense in a given society. As such, one must not confuse the culture of defense with the culture of peace, the latter understood as a reduction and elimination of violence in all of its forms and appearances. The author adds that the culture of defense seeks to convince the public of the need for an armed defense and armies and accept the public expenditure involved. Bagur concludes that there is no other alternative to achieve greater security than to promote the culture of peace and leave behind the culture of defense that has been practised and promoted in Spain.

The chapter *Scientific Resistance for disarmament* takes as a starting point that the challenges of human security are achievable at our current level of technology. Of course, it is necessary to pay special attention to technological advances which have a dual-use nature (civilian and military) and require guidelines for an ethical use of the technology. In this sense, the development of robotic military systems and autonomous weapons has generated ethical debate regarding human participation in the decision-making chain. Especially serious is the situation which is generated by lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs). As Brunet concludes, it is false to assume that the new military robotic systems contribute to security, and that there is no other ethical alternative than to stop the development of new robotic weapons.

On the necessity to reduce arsenals, dismantle arms systems and control the proliferation of military material, the chapter by Fortuny and Bohigas analyses the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. These are either banned or in the process of being banned for violation of international humanitarian law. The authors put special emphasis on the problem of nuclear weapons, both out of the difficulty in their effective prohibition and elimination, as well as for the practical impossibility of their use and development without security risks. Accidents are commonplace in the handling and maintenance of nuclear arsenals and the examples shown are both as alarming as they are numerous. The authors warn that the NPT is not achieving an effective control on nuclear proliferation and that NATO is an obstacle for nuclear disarmament. However, advances are being made, and good practices are being adopted which promise a more encouraging future. Nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the push on the part of some signatory states toward the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are examples of necessary work that states can undertake to lead to responsible policies for peace and world security.

In *Conversion of the arms industry*, Ortega deals with some of the keys to approaching questions of the militarization of security, emphasizing the importance of arguments for a reduction in arms production. These include the prevention of arms races, the militarization of the government and a consequent ease of the military branches to enter armed conflict, together with arguments of an economic nature which question whether weapons are productive goods. The question of conversion is addressed through the KONVER programme set up by the EEC in 1993 after the reunification of Germany in the 15-country community. Lastly, the author highlights some successes and failures in the application of the European programme for the transformation of the European military industry on Spanish soil, showing the importance of a political will to ensure the conversion of the arms industry into civilian manufacturing.

Making an essential link to alternatives to the military industry, Meulewae ter proposes a reduction in the military budget not only to reduce the arms build-up and the militarization of international relations, but also to reduce armed conflicts and violence. To that end, the author explains current military spending in detail, as well as how it is calculated, the concept of cost of opportunity in relation to the public military budgets, as a basic element of economic choice in a context of national budget scarcity. The author concludes that

military spending produces violence and hinders the construction of peace, by diverting resources from the civilian realm (that of human security) to the military realm (that of national security).

If military spending is the first stage of the military economic cycle, the final stage is military operations and the deployment of troops to scenarios of armed conflict. In the chapter on control, reduction, and elimination of military operations, Pozo analyses the Spanish context in nine sections addressing the reasons behind Spanish military interventions, which have in some cases led to international rights violations, a lack of accountability following some of the operations, the disagreement between the deployments and Spanish public opinion, the poor representation of public opinion in the parliament, the prioritization of NATO and EU missions to the detriment of the UN, the misrepresentation of military interventions as “humanitarian”, the lack of transparency in public spending, and the tendency for a militarist handling of political crises.

Once we have an analysis of some of the main questions relating to demilitarization and disarmament such as state strategies, the end of the first section is composed of two chapters to show options to achieve security either before a conflict has started or once it has already broken out, without a need for arms or militarization. In the first of these, *Promoting peace processes and conflict resolution*, the author explains via examples the difficulty of bringing peace processes to a good close, as they inevitably require a process of justice and reparation. Unfortunately, this is not always done, despite that this is known and demonstrated in the literature on peace processes. Ruiz Jiménez insists that a successful peace process must include a nonviolent reconciliation together with measures for economic and social development which help rebuild the necessary conditions for peace in a war-torn society.

Furthermore, in the phases leading up to armed conflict, there are many preventive measures which can be taken to avoid not only that greatest of ills – war – but also any trends of violence or instability that can lead to that end. Montull explains two of the most successful options for avoiding war within a foreign policy, which unfortunately are rarely mentioned in the mass media. They are the policies of neutrality and preventive diplomacy. Without being over-confident, the author shows pros and cons, successful experiences and failed processes in each of the aspects mentioned, and recommends that we opt for the promotion of anti-belligerent policies as a precondition, albeit incomplete, for a paradigm change in security.

The second block is dedicated to pacifist policy proposals which are within the logic of the human security paradigm for implementation at a local, regional or national level. In the introductory chapter, in an effort to bring peace down to a everyday level, Oliveres reminds us first of the importance of the mass media and of public access to information. Second, the author proposes three key measures for peaceful coexistence: ensuring that the entire population has enough income; an open door migration policy, allowing for movement of the population with full security; and the development of preventive policies towards crime and natural disasters, in contrast with mainstream policies which do not go to the root, but only react once violence has developed.

Following this, Julià gives us a clear and concise introduction to the concept of human security, which is at the centre of many of the alternative proposals for peace and security in this publication. As is put forth in other chapters, he proposes a transition from a national security of identifying enemies to a globalizing concept of human security. Among the many concrete suggestions that could be made in this regard, for each of the branches of human security he chooses proposals which are particularly appropriate. He proposes the following: in order to achieve economic security, he proposes basic income and a living wage as a central element; in order to move towards food security, he proposes limitations on the power of agrifood monopolies; along the same lines, there is a need for self-sufficiency in the pharmaceutical industry, as its impact upon health security is evident; in terms of environmental security, he calls for a change of lifestyle that will be crucial in the fight against climate change; the personal security of women is a priority, as they are the common victims of every kind of violence; as for community security, the issue of migrant peoples is at the centre of the proposal for change; while in terms of political security, he suggests putting an end to economic austerity measures.

Furthermore, in the chapter on security and the environment, there is the development of a complete proposal for alternative security policies in order to face not only climate change but also biodiversity loss and soil degradation. From a human security perspective, the author proposes leaving armies behind us as instruments for facing the challenges which an increasingly chaotic environment can bring. Among the proposals is a call for a break from the dichotomy of culture/nature. The classical focus on security considers nature as an entity separate from human beings. The author affirms that it is not an

issue of how to protect ourselves from nature by military force, but a question of establishing a sustainable relationship with nature, and of reducing people's vulnerability to environmental chaos. Military responses are not only inefficient in this sense, but can actually generate more environmental insecurity.

The economy is perhaps one of the areas with the greatest tendency for disruptions in security and peace, in the wide sense. For this reason, a chapter has been added to propose an alternative economic model to the current hegemony. Neoliberal capitalism generates violence of every kind, not just the direct violence affecting millions of people without adequate food due to market exclusion, but also the cultural violence which normalizes poverty and inequality; and structural economic violence which is exemplified by economic policies which destroy the local productive social fabric, aggravating unemployment or wage inequities between men and women. In this way, Guardiola and Calvo call for moving beyond the capitalist paradigm in which people are just human resources or nature nothing more than natural resources with the mere purpose of maximizing profits for companies. The call is for a nonviolent economic paradigm in which economic sustainability replaces maximum profit and human needs and respect for nature become the goals of our economy.

Another much-needed proposal for the implementation of policies based on peace and human security comes from feminism, Camps-Febrer's chapter on feminist and decolonial options, alternatives to the racist, warmongering and exploitative patriarchal structures. In order to get there, the feminist theory of security not only replaces state security with human security, but goes beyond it on the relationships and the interdependence of the global ecosystem. The author adds that a politics of feminist security should go deeper, to the root of the causes, and gives the example of migration. Especially interesting is her assessment of the feminist foreign policy recently developed by the Swedish government.

Another existing proposal which is essential for the creation of conditions of peace and coexistence in a given society is the policies for diversity and tolerance. Ares Perceval points out a series of preliminary questions to take into account when implementing diversity policy. The first is to recognize how the identity of the other is defined in a given society. Given that the existence of difference is impossible to negate, a politics of diversity requires that we accept and value the presence as a something positive, with rights, first among them the right to be different.

Next, Ainhua Ruiz questions whether urban space is undergoing a destructive or democratizing process in cities that are reconfigured as a setting for war. In order to find out, she analyses the effects of threats to global security in the cities and metropolises. One of the main threats is the impact that transnational terrorism has had on the expansion of securitization of daily life in the cities. Tied to this, at large sporting events, militarising and policing processes have in many cases led to high levels of violence. The author shows the relevance of the struggle for public space, for example between those who want to use it to promote consumerism and who work to make it a space of collective construction of democracy and community security.

One proposal which could not be overlooked is that of education for peace and nonviolence. It is an essential option for moving towards a culture of peace and achieving new forms of security, by becoming both peaceful people as well as pacifists. In the chapter, the authors explain a series of practices and experiences of education for peace in the Spanish state. Through institutions and local governments, they show how to make these proposals to promote and develop education for peace a reality. Education for peace is a local goal, but it also has a global impact, and has been included in goals 4 and 16 of the Agenda 2030 for sustainable development, approved by the UN in August 2015.

Final thoughts come from Perceval, who incorporates a primordial component of the undertaking of alternative policies for peace and security. Given that it is impossible to live without risk, humans have a need to manage uncertainty and instability, which the author identifies as the basis for fear. The author places responsibility upon the alarmist and sensationalist mass-media, which promotes fear in order to attract audiences, and the Hobbesian trap: a fear spiral leading to an arms race which in turn leads to more fear. The call is for policies that promote life without fear, which doesn't mean living without risk, nor does it mean promoting or encouraging it. At the very least, a politics of peace and security should avoid the temptation of using humanity's fears as a means of control and manipulation, or to consolidate power.

Ultimately, this publication seeks to contribute to the political, academic, and social debate around security, from the modesty and humility of who we are, a diverse and multidisciplinary group, made up of people of different academic backgrounds, and with a large dose of activism and personal commitment. It is a group with diverse personal and collective experience,

shared with a wider sector of people, institutions and organizations dedicated to peace and nonviolence, which have undoubtedly inspired this imperfect and unfinished compendium of proposals to develop security policies for peace and pacifism, as necessary as they are possible.

FIRST PART

**DISARMING
AND DEMILITARIZING
SECURITY AND
DEFENSE POLICIES**

I. National security: whose peace?

Eduardo Melero Alonso¹

National security must be defined first and foremost on the basis of national defense, bearing in mind that it is not simply a question of terminology. Different concepts of security ultimately imply the application of different policies. In this way, Javier de Lucas has pointed out “the radical question of all reflection on peace is why and what we should defend ourselves from, or rather, why and what it is necessary for us to be defended from, why and what defense policy defends us from” (1985: 79). These same questions also need to be raised in relation to security policies, since, as we shall see, defense is one of the fundamental elements of national security.

Who are we being defended by and who is doing the defending? The Spanish case

The traditional concept of national defense implies the protection of the population, the land, and the sovereignty of a state against attacks from other nations. With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of globalization, states have adopted a wider approach, changing the perspective from national defense to national security (Ballesteros, 2016: 14-15). Defense has thus become an important element of security, but not the only one.

1. Professor of administrative law in the Autonomous University of Madrid. Among his lines of research is Spanish legislation regarding military operations abroad. He is the author of several works, including *European Union Countries' Policy on Arms Exports to Africa (2002-2010). Special consideration given to Spanish exports* (ICIP, 2012)

This broader perspective is manifested in the *Spanish National Security Strategy 2017*. The document defines the cornerstone of national security as:

State policy and public service whose purpose is to protect citizens' freedom, rights and well-being; to guarantee the defense of Spain and the principles and values enshrined in its Constitution; and to contribute to international security in collaboration with partners and allies. (2017: 23)

Or in the definition proposed by Miguel Ángel Ballesteros Martín:

National Security is that situation in which the normal development of life in a nation is protected from risks, dangers or external or internal threats and in which the country is able to defend its national interests, fulfil its international obligations, and contribute to international peace and stability. (2016: 63)

Another similar definition of national defense is that proposed by Óscar Jaime, Luis de la Corte Ibáñez and José María Blanco:

An ideal situation arising from the effective and joint action of the state and other actors where the freedom and well-being of its citizens, the defense and integrity of its territory and its constitutional principles and values, together with international security, would be fully guaranteed and protected. (2014: 33)

These definitions are quite vague and ambiguous. Not to mention the numerous interpretations of security: international security, collective security, integral security, human security, democratic security, common security, cooperative security, sustainable security, and multidimensional security. (Ballesteros, 2016: 96-132). In any case, the clear tendency is for a concept of national security which presupposes an expansion of defense activities to include the welfare of citizens, national interests, and the international dimension. National security refers to both internal security and external security. As is indicated by the *National Security Strategy 2017*, the basic components of national security are “*national defense, public security, and external action*”. (2017: 16). We should also keep in mind that the national security policy is not only carried out by the military and the police, but also by the practices of diplomacy, foreign policy, economy, etc. (Jaime, De la Corte and Blanco, 2014:36).

The expanse of national defense via the concept of national security is also evident in the definition of national security interests. The Spanish strategic document in which those interests are laid out in greatest detail is the *Strategic Defense Review* of 2002. According to this document, national security interests are “*those national interests which, due to their particular importance, are worthy of a defensive effort should the need arise.*” (2003: 129-135). These interests are classified into those of vital importance, strategic importance, and other interests.

The vital interests are those interests which are essential to the survival of Spain as a nation. They are “*the formative elements of the State which must be preserved intact against any aggression.*” (Ministry of Defence, 2003: 129-135). These interests are: 1) the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Spain and the Constitution order; 2) life, liberty, and prosperity of the Spanish people.

Strategic interests make a decisive contribution to the safeguarding of vital interests. They are: 1) the contribution to future stability via NATO and the EU; 2) free trade; 3) freedom of communications; 4) Security of the supplies of basic resources; 5) the elimination of terrorism; 6) the restoration over sovereignty of Gibraltar.

Other interests to security are “*not directly related to the security of Spain*” (Ministry of Defence, 2003: 129-135). Although they are not a priority for the armed forces, they can occasionally require their deployment. These other security interests include the achievement, in solidarity, of a stable international order, peace, security and respect for human rights. While explicitly recognizing that “*missions of humanitarian aid and participation in certain peace operations in remote regions can respond to those interests.*” (Ministry of Defence, 2003: 129-135).

One interesting matter is who determines what the national security interests are. The definition of national security interests in the *Strategic Defense Review* of 2002 was carried out by a working group made up solely of officers of the Armed Forces (2003: 363). Given this, it is easy to understand that national security has a predominantly military component, as it is the military who decides why, how, and from whom we need to be defended. In the debate defining what national security interests should be, the lack of inclusion of the public is notable. It exemplifies the lack of democracy endemic to matters of security and defense.

Another area in which the expansion of the concept of national security is evident is in the definition of threats and risks. The strategic documents

of the US, the European Union, and NATO identify the following security threats: terrorism and violent extremism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyberattacks, organized crime, climate change, irregular migratory flows, economic crisis, and the presence of armed conflict, or weak or failed states.

According to the Spanish “*National Security Strategy 2017*”, threats are those which “*compromise or undermine national security*” (2017: 59-64); and the following examples are given: armed conflict, terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and espionage. By contrast, challenges differ from threats in that “*they lack the magnitude of a threat, but arouse vulnerability, provoke unstable situations or can favour the emergence of new threats*” (2017: 72-78); and the following are mentioned: financial and economic instability, energy vulnerability, irregular migratory movements, emergencies and catastrophes, epidemics and pandemics, and climate change.

While in fact that there is no clear line of distinction between security and defense, it has been suggested that defense face dangers or threats, and when risks to security arise, to maintain a more preventive stance (Ballesteros, 2016: 50-52).

Despite this distinction between threats and risks or challenges, in some official strategic documents the use of military force has been suggested to face different challenges. The *Strategic Defense Review* of 2002 explicitly states that “the Armed Forces can contribute to a reduction in the risk of interruption of supplies, as has already occurred in the past, through interventions that assure the continuity of basic supplies” (2003: 148). Even more clearly, in the “Defence White Paper 2000” it is pointed out that:

A nation like Spain, constituted as an advanced democracy and with an economy highly dependent on foreign energy resources and raw materials, has a set of interests that, to a large extent, go beyond the defense of territory and sovereignty. Spain needs to have a secure supply of basic resources to maintain the well-being and promote the prosperity of the Spanish people. Any act of force that endangered that supply with the risk of collapse for our economy would constitute a threat that would need to be countered. (2000: 70)

Thus, this broad concept of security implies that not only must we act militarily to face armed attack, but also even to threats. This matter is exemplified in the strategic concept statement of NATO from 2010, called

“Active Engagement, Modern Defense”. NATO’s Strategic Concept clearly points out that crises and conflicts beyond NATO borders can be a threat to security. And for this reason, NATO can decide to get involved wherever and whenever necessary, to prevent a crisis.

In this way, it is clear that NATO does not dismiss the possibility of military intervention beyond its borders and beyond the region of Europe and North America defined in article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In short, the concept of national security defended by governments is aimed at protecting national interests, adopting a perspective which is predominantly statist. One of the criticisms levelled at the concept of national security is that it doesn’t take into account that the state itself is a source of threats, such as civil wars and intra-state conflicts (Mack, 2005: 13).

The main alternative that has been proposed to this approach of national security is that of human security. This idea was developed by the United Nations Development programme in its “Human Development Report of 1994”. According to the report:

Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. (1994: 26)

The concept of human security proposes two urgent and basic changes in the concept of security: “From an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security.” (UNDP, 1994: 28) and “From security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.” (UNDP, 1994: 28) Threats to human security can be grouped into seven categories: Economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. This concept of the UN General Assembly Resolution 66/290 from 10th of September 2012, recognizes the interrelationship between peace, development and human rights.

The concept of human security takes the person to be central to an approach to security rather than the state. (UNDP, 1994:25; Mack, 2005: 12-13). Human security is “a concern with human life and dignity.” (UNDP, 1994: 25). It implies that people have the ability to satisfy their basic needs (Font and Ortega, 2012:162). From the perspective of human security, the

main threats come from the lack of human development in education, health, the existence of economic inequalities, and the lack of respect for human rights (Font and Ortega, 2012: 170). The idea of human security must be further developed, and its usefulness as a tool for analysing reality and as a criterion for developing new policy proposals.

Conclusions

At present, the predominant approach is that of national security. It is an approach that includes elements of the concept of human security, such as economic stability or a recognition of the importance of environmental issues. Despite this, there is a certain preponderance of the military within national security. As has already been pointed out, national security interests are defined from an eminently military viewpoint, by no means excluding the use of the army to guarantee access to energy supplies and economic resources.

Adopting a human security perspective will require a change in security policies, which should focus on ensuring that people can meet their basic needs. Policies need to be implemented against poverty, programs of empowerment for groups most at risk, that promote human rights, etc (Pérez de Armiño and AAreizaga 2000). This approach should be present in the strategic documents. It could even take the form of a Human Security Strategy.

As well, significant reductions should be made to the military component of state budgets. In fact, Resolution 66/290 (2012) of the UN General Assembly points out that human security does not entail the threats or use of force, or coercive measures. The progressive reduction of the military component, both in troops and in armaments, would make it possible to allocate those economic resources to policies aimed at meeting people's basic needs. In addition, the military dimension should no longer have a preponderance in the definition of security policies.

The transition from a national security approach towards the adoption of a human security approach should be done both on a national as well as an international level. In the latter, international organizations such as NATO should re-evaluate their goals. And the UN should also be reformed, eliminating the veto power of the Security Council.

Bibliography

- BALLESTEROS MARTÍN, Miguel Ángel (2016): *En busca de una Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional* [In search of a National Security Strategy], Ministry of Defence, Madrid.
- Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional 2017* (2017). *Un proyecto compartido de todos y para todos* [National Security Strategy, a shared project for all], Prime Minister's Office, Spain.
- FONT, Tica and ORTEGA, Pere (2012): "Seguridad nacional, seguridad multidimensional, seguridad humana" [National security, multidimensional security, human security] – in *Papeles de relaciones ecosociales y cambio global*, nº119, p. 161-172.
- JAIME, Óscar, Luis DE LA CORTE IBÁÑEZ and José María BLANCO NAVARRO (2014): "Aproximación a la seguridad nacional" [An approach to national security], in de la Corte Ibáñez, Luis y José María Blanco Navarro: *Seguridad nacional, amenazas y respuestas*, LID, Madrid, p. 23-38.
- LUCAS, Javier de (1985): "La noción de defensa y la crisis de legitimidad. ¿Qué significa defensa?" [The idea of Defense and the crisis of legitimacy] – in *Anuario de Filosofía del Derecho 1985*, p. 77-95. Defense White Paper 2000 (2000), Ministry of Defence.
- MACK, Andrew (2005): "El concepto de seguridad humana" [The concept of human security], in *Papeles de cuestiones internacionales*, nº 90, p. 11-18.
- PÉREZ DE ARMIÑO, Karlos and Marta AREIZAGA (2000): *Diccionario de Acción Humanitaria y Cooperación al Desarrollo* [Dictionary of Humanitarian action and Cooperation for Development], entry on *seguridad humana* [human security] (<http://www.dicc.hegoa.ehu.es/listar/mostrar/204>).
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1994): *Human development 1994*, Oxford University Press, London
- Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa* [Strategic Defence Review] (2003), Ministry of Defence. <http://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/defensadocs/revision-estrategica.pdf>

II. Culture of peace vs culture of defence

Maria de Lluc Bagur¹

The choices for political action depend, to a large extent, on the objectives being pursued. This would explain why the Ministry of Defence has policies for a culture of defense, policies which “consists of promoting military values and state nationalism among the citizenry, with both a both a personal and collective commitment to the defense of the state by military means” (Bagur, 2016: 54). Authors more loyal to militarism would term this, “the knowledge that citizens have of the risks and threats to their security, and of the instruments that the states uses to protect them” (Casas, 2015: 227) to which could also be added the feelings or the desire to fight to defend the homeland (Laguna, 2014: 7).

Other authors broaden the definition, assuring us that ‘the strength of a country’s “security” depends on its capabilities and on the degree of awareness and identification by the citizenry with the defense of the system of values and interests that make up the society’ (Marsal, 2015: 11). In other words, the culture of defense is conceived as a tool of primary importance so that governments can achieve the goal of guaranteeing their military capabilities with the approval, and even the active participation, of the citizenry.

For a number of years now, military studies have accepted the concept of “security and defense culture” as an extension of the concept of “defense culture” following the directives of the political line which seeks to assimilate defense and security as part of the same thing. In this chapter, we will contin-

1. Political Scientist and Social Worker, with a Master in World History. Member of the Delàs Centre where she researches the armed forces, the culture of defense, and gender and militarism.

ue to use the strict concept of “defense culture” because we understand that it must be differentiated from security, a concept concerned with another area of competence.

Strangely, the culture of defense claims to pursue the same objectives as the culture of peace, never doubting that its methodology is more realistic and effective, as though the culture of peace were in the realm of utopia and fantasy.

We should then ask ourselves, what is the culture of peace. In words of the Foundation Culture of Peace:

A set of values, attitudes, and conduct that reflects a respect for life, for human beings and for their dignity and which prioritizes human rights, a rejection of violence in all of its forms, and adherence to the principles of liberty, justice, solidarity, and tolerance, as well as understanding between peoples, groups, and individuals. (Foundation Culture of Peace, 2008: 2)

Nothing to do with the definition of defense culture. Another widely recognized definition is that of Boulding, who states:

Put in the simplest possible terms, a peace culture is a culture that promotes peaceableness. Such a culture would include lifestyles, patterns of belief, value and behaviour that foster peace-building and accompanying institutional arrangements that promote well-being, equality, stewardship and equitable sharing of the earth’s resources, security for humankind whether as individuals, families, identity groups or nation states, without the need to resort to violence. (Boulding, 1992: 107)

In this chapter we will attempt to disprove the supposed coincidence in goals, as well, we will show that only the culture of peace is capable of offering a security based on the well-being of people and the planet.

Culture of defense and culture of peace, common goals?

As the introduction to the chapter has shown, defense culture and peace culture are defined very differently, but even so, defense culture theorists insist that both systems of values coincide in their ultimate goal: the attainment of peace.

This affirmation is going to require some clarification, especially with regard to the concept of peace, and for which we must refer to the work of Johan Galtung. For this author, there are two concepts of peace that must be differentiated, namely, positive peace and negative peace. Basically, they differ in that the former takes peace to mean the absence of structural violence, whereas negative peace simply refers to the absence of conflict.

When the Ministry of Defence assures us that its goal is to pursue peace, it is referring to the concept of negative peace, that is, a scenario without war or direct violence. Bueno expresses this very clearly (2015: 28), underlining that “the meaning of the word peace expresses a situation of the mutual relation of those who are not at war, but these are categorically opposed concepts”. It is a concept of peace that does not concern itself with people’s well-being, human rights, or the sustainability of life. It goes without saying that none of these are assured by the lack of warfare.

Much more ambitious is the idea of positive peace upon which peace culture is based, which does indeed consider the need for a scenario of equality and social justice to really consider that peace has been attained. As Lederach confirms, peace cannot exist if there are relationships of domination, inequality and non-reciprocity, even if there is no open conflict (Lederach, 2000).

Some authors in favour of militarist postures go even further, assuring that there are even common values between the two cultures, such as nonviolence, tolerance, solidarity and justice. Through the previous analysis of the concepts of peace from the two views, militarist and pacifist, we can expect that each of these concepts have different meanings for each of these two cultures. This will have to be left for future study. That said, some authors, such as Casas (2015) argue that in order to defend life and human rights, it is essential to intervene with military force. It is undisputed that the use of military means – armed violence – isn’t envisioned as an acceptable method within peace culture, as the use of killing and suffering are presumed incompatible with the generation of peace.

Another imagined correlation between peace culture and the defense culture is that they both address human security. It is extensively discussed in this book, so we will refrain from defining it from the point of view of the culture of peace, but it is important to remember that as far as the culture of defense is understood, human security is the simple, limited concept that the object of security is not merely the military defense of the territory but also the people within it. (López, 2011).

What security are we offered?

Given that defense culture and peace culture have different goals, it is no surprise that each of them result in a distinct type of security. And that these security models depend on the method which is employed to achieve the goals which are sought.

In the case of the culture of peace, the methods used to arrive at the goal of positive peace, that is to say, human security, are:

An educational task, which ceases to educate in and for conflict, unmasks cultural violence and patriarchy, and encourages dissidence, nonconformity, disarmament, responsibility, mobilization of the populace, the transformation of conflict, in bringing about a cultural disarmament, promoting a global ethic and seeking a fundamental consensus around conciliatory human convictions, among other things. (Fisas, 2011: 4)

However, and as noted above, defense culture takes institutional armed violence, that is to say, the use of an army, as a valid means to achieve the objective of (negative) peace. It tries to resort to a demonstration of force to dissuade, or even the use of force to defeat enemies. All of this makes sense only from the perspective of National Security, a policy devised by the Ministry of Defence to outline the risks and threats our society faces.

It is essential to pause a moment and analyse the content of this national security policy, given that it is the document which justifies the existence of the armed forces, military expenditures, and armed interventions inside and outside the borders of the state. In this sense, it is important to qualify that the ultimate goal of this policy is to defend citizens from the risks and threats that the policy itself identifies, and that the only means given to achieve this goal is the use of military force.

At this point, one might think that, given that risks and threats to our security exist, it makes sense to listen to the national security policy proposals. First of all, though, it is essential to see what these supposed risks and threats are. According to the latest national security document released by the government, the *National Security Strategy 2017*, the threats and challenges (in previous documents presented as risks and threats) which are identified are armed conflict, terrorism, organized crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, espionage, cyber threats, threats to critical infrastructures,

economic and financial instability, energy vulnerability, irregular migratory flows, emergencies and catastrophes, epidemics and pandemics, and effects of climate change. There is little mention of the areas of interest which are central to human security such as food security, or health, environmental or community security, etc.

On the other hand, surveys carried out year after year by the Centre for Sociological Investigations (CIS) to find out the main issues that concern citizens, reveal year after year that questions central to national security policy have little to do with citizen's concerns. That is to say, citizens show much more concern for problems of unemployment than they do for international terrorism.

It is clear then, that the security pursued by defense culture has nothing in common with the security that is sought by peace culture. It is a security which prioritizes territorial integrity, political stability and profits for large economic and social powers, above the well-being of citizens and the environment, social justice, or equality between people.

Experiences and policies for promoting a culture of peace

One of the main tasks of defense culture is to convince the public of the need for armed defense (Yturriaga, 2015), including the importance of public expenditure on defense as a generator of technology and innovation (Bernal, 2011). In order to achieve this, the Spanish government has drawn up a plan for a culture of security and defense in which it proposes different strategies designed to transmit the message to the public.

These proposals cover a wide range, from the normalization of the presence of armed forces in civil life, through the participation of uniformed military in firefighting and rescue tasks, or with military parades, and even directly meddling with educational programs in mandatory schooling. The promotion of military history in museums and historical heritage, or the production by the Secretary General of Defence Policies (SEGENPOL) of a basic guide to communications, explaining how to reach the public with the militarist message, are other examples of the strategies being practised within the culture of defense.

One of the most notorious examples of defense culture was a publication which came out recently, titled "*Familiarization with Security and Defence in the*

educational centres - Curricular material - Elementary Education”, a shared project of the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport and the Ministry of Defence. The goal of this project is “to familiarize and make school children aware of issues related to peace, security and defense”, although the word *peace* doesn’t even appear in the title of the document. Some of the more notable parts are descriptions of the tasks of the armed forces, defense as an assurance of peace, national symbols and international interventions to *impose* peace.

Since the document was made public in early 2018, numerous social movements and critical media have published communiqués condemning of this drift towards militarism in mandatory public schooling. The Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) even presented a motion in Congress to press the immediate withdrawal of the inter-ministerial project. The motion was struck down by the People’s Party (PP) and the Citizens (Cs) party and the abstention of the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE).

On the other hand, several centres of peace studies in Spain have, over the years, been working on proposals for the promotion of peace culture on different levels, in communities, in schools, at the municipal level, etc. It would be pretentious to try to review them all in this chapter, so let us just briefly explain some examples.

The campaign “Demilitarise Education”, which brings together more than 80 organizations connected to the promotion of peace and education, is a very good example of the work which is being done to separate militarism from education. Among other things, this campaign struggles to prevent the army from having a stand at the fairs where young people come to inform themselves about academic and professional opportunities. Another interesting campaign worthy of note for its global scope is the Global Campaign on Military Spending (GCOMS). The goal of this campaign is to pressure governmental institutions to reduce military spending and redirect those funds to investment in social spending. Each year since 2011, in the framework of this campaign, the International Peace Bureau has organized a Global Day of Action on Military Spending (GDAMS) to raise public, media, and political attention of the costs of military spending and the necessity to invest in new priorities leading to the construction of a culture of peace.

There are also a number of projects with committed institutions, such as the Cities Defending Human Rights, a joint project of City Council of Sant Boi de Llobregat, the Catalan Commission of Aid to Refugees, the Human Rights Institute of Catalonia, and the International Catalan Institute

for Peace, with the participation of many other municipalities and Catalan institutions which hope to extend awareness of the work being done by human rights supporters.

Lastly, it is essential to highlight the importance of the struggles involving the personal dedication of citizens in actions of civil disobedience. In the past, the movement of conscientious objectors refusing the draft pioneered the struggle, with both individuals and collectives resisting the military indoctrination. Once compulsory military servitude was abolished, a new step began in the same direction: war tax resisters, refusing to contribute financially to war or the arms race. And so, the campaign of tax resistance to military spending hopes to be a criticism of the state budgeting by refusing to pay the portion of taxes which corresponds to military spending, and instead spend it on social programs.

In Conclusion

As has been seen in this chapter, the culture of defense and the culture of peace are value systems that differ completely both in terms of their goals as in their methodology, and of course, in terms of outcome. Possible confusions, whether they are wilful or not, are most likely due to different interpretations of the concept of peace by each of these two cultures. As a result, it is no surprise that the scenarios reached from defense culture have nothing to do with those aspired to by peace culture.

For a society to be free, respectful, egalitarian, and just, there is no room for defense culture, and there is an urgent need to promote peace culture.

Bibliography

- BAGUR, Maria de Lluç (2016): “Militarización a través de la cultura de defensa” [Militarization via the Culture of Defense], in Calvo Rufanges, Jordi (coord.), *Mentes militarizadas. Cómo nos educan para asumir la guerra y la violencia*, Barcelona, Icaria, p. 54-66.
- BERNAL GUTIÉRREZ, Pedro (2011): “La cultura de seguridad y defensa en España. Sus orígenes y evolución” [The culture of security and defense in Spain. Origins and development], in López Blazquez, Manuel

- (coord.): *Cuadernos de Estrategia 155. La cultura de Seguridad y Defensa. Un proyecto en marcha*, Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Ministry of Defence, p. 23-63.
- BOULDING, Elise (1992): “The concept of peace culture”, p. 107-133 in UNESCO, *Peace and conflict issues after the Cold War*, Paris, United Nations.
- BUENO CAMPOS, Eduardo (2015): “Cultura de seguridad y defensa en la perspectiva del gobierno del conocimiento” [A culture of security and defense in the perspective of knowledge of governance], in Marsal Muntalà, Jordi (coord.), *Cuadernos de estrategia 172. Cultura de Seguridad y Defensa: fundamentos y perspectiva de mejora*, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, p. 21-58
- CASAS ÁLVAREZ, Federico Javier (2015): “La política de fomento de la cultura y conciencia de seguridad y defensa, y su coordinación en el ámbito del Ministerio de Defensa” [Policies for promoting security and defense culture and awareness within the Ministry of Defence], in Marsal Muntalà, Jordi (coord.), *Cuadernos de estrategia 172. Cultura de Seguridad y Defensa: fundamentos y perspectiva de mejora*, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, p. 225-261.
- Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (2015): *Percepción de los principales problemas de España* [Perceptions of the main problems in Spain], available at: http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.html, Date consulted 13-10-18.
- School for a Culture of Peace: (2008): “La Cultura de Pau a les ciutats, Idees per a construir la Pau” [Peace culture in municipalities, Ideas for building peace], in *Diplomàcia municipal i altres iniciatives dels governs locals per construir la pau*, n°2, p. 2-7.
- FISAS, Vicenç (2011): “Educar para una Cultura de Paz” [Educating for a Culture of Peace], in *Quaderns de construcció de Pau*, n°20, Barcelona, School for a Culture of Peace.
- LAGUNA SANQUIRICO, Francisco (2014): *Documento de Opinión 132/2014. Reflexiones sobre el problema de la cultura de defensa* [Opinion Paper 132/2014. Reflections on the problem of culture of defense], Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence.

- LEDERACH, John Paul (2000): *El abecé de la paz y los conflictos: Educación para la paz* [An ABC of Peace and conflicts: Education for peace], Madrid, Catarata.
- LÓPEZ BLAZQUEZ, Manuel (2011): “Introducción”, in López Blazquez, Manuel (coord.): *Cuadernos de Estrategia 155. La cultura de Seguridad y Defensa. Un proyecto en marcha*, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, p. 10-22.
- MARSAL MUNTALÁ, Jordi (2015): “Introducción”, in Marsal Muntalà, Jordi (coord.) *Cuadernos de estrategia 172. Cultura de Seguridad y Defensa: fundamentos y perspectiva de mejora*, Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence, p. 11-19.
- Ministry of Education, Culture and Sport, & Ministry of Defence (2018): *Proyecto Conocimiento de la Seguridad y la Defensa en los centros educativos. Materiales curriculares. Educación primaria* [Project for the familiarization of security and defense in the educational centres. Curricular material. Elementary Education], *Spanish Government*.
- Prime Minister’s Office (2017): *Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional. Un proyecto compartido de todos y para todos* [National Security Strategy, a shared project for all], Madrid, Government of Spain.
- YTURRIAGA BARBERÁN, José A. (2015): *Documento de Opinión 01/2015, La defensa que viene* [Opinion Paper 01/2015, The defense of the future], Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, Ministry of Defence.

III. Scientific resistance for disarmament

Pere Brunet¹

In a century in which we can expect a large increase in inequality and conflict, security-related issues (Calvo Rufanges, 2015) are increasingly relevant. The topic is complex, because there are two different and opposing approaches. The militarized security approach takes advantage of the subjective perception of risk to propose solutions which mainly serve the small minority in power (usually white men) with the goal of preserving their security and power. By contrast, approaches based on human security and global justice aim to reduce the objective risks to all people on the planet (above all those in countries in the global South) by addressing their needs and promoting human development. In each case, the challenges to human security at the global level can be undertaken and reached with our current technology (Dowling 2016). Therefore, it is not so much a technical question as much as a problem of global political will. It should not be a source of conflict, but of global cooperation.

The current debate focuses on the contrast between these two visions: that of human security, which places human beings at the centre of the analysis, and militarized security, centred on the military defense of the territorial integrity of the state and its power structures. A militarized security that,

1. Doctor and retired professor of the Polytechnic University of Catalonia. An science communicator, he is specifically interested in the social and ethical implications of science and engineering and in the applications of science in the field of peacemaking and the connection between militarism and climate change. As a researcher for the Delàs Centre, he has participated in the coordination of the GCOMS campaigns 2017-8, and has been the co-author of books such as *Mentes militarizadas* [Militarized Minds] (Icaria 2016).

at a national level (homeland security) or international level, presumes to guarantee the protection of a certain group or community, maintaining their privileges by using calls to arms to generate violent actions upon “the other”. It is a brutal system that constantly increases insecurity and global injustice, because it relies on the arms build-up and military spending, which, at the global level, is completely disproportionate. It is a big business (for a few) of a militarized security superstructure that promotes the manufacture and trade of weapons, fostering conflicts in many unfortunate areas of the planet while building walls and closing borders to the most vulnerable. In this context, and as we shall see below, the necessary transition from a militarized security to a scenario based on global human security requires action at many levels, ranging from actions of disobedience to international campaigns to stop the development and implementation of new weapons which are emerging.

Scientific/technological resistance to military R&D

There is a common belief, poorly grounded in fact, that the fields of science and technology are full of dangers due to advances being easily exploited by the military industry. The evidence points in quite the opposite direction. Science is essentially universal and open. Advances and new discoveries are published, after anonymous review, in journals and conferences open to every person on the planet, with a clear desire to contribute to global knowledge. There is no such thing as military science, as by its very nature military investigation needs to be restricted, secret, and closed. The supposed concept of military science is in and of itself an oxymoron, and if someone believes they are working in this field, it is simply that they are not a scientist. Scientific discovery, by contrast, can and should be used to further human security for all people. We should recognize, however, that the use of new systems and technological advances raises a number of ethical issues. Because in technology and in general, the majority of tools we develop have more than one application, their use (and not the mere existence of these devices and systems) generates ethical debate. As individuals, it is essential to limit our tool use for consciously chosen, specific ends, and to limit their use over time, to prevent getting addicted or becoming controlled by the tools themselves and those who control them. All of this is particularly relevant in the case of everything related to information, communications, and the Internet.

If we don't want to lose our freedom, and wind up becoming commodified, we must use technology ethically and consciously. On the other hand, and on a social level, the ethical use of technology can be supported to a great extent precisely by science (as well as the philosophy), by shedding light on its ethical use. Because science tells us that the primary goal of new tools must be the care and development of our entire species, here and now (Shermer, 2018).

Many scientists have been opposed to militarization, and have rebelled and insisted upon an ethical approach to current and future methods of conflict resolution. One of many examples comes from Freeman Dyson (2010) when he explains that war is inherently immoral, and that all of those who participate in war will do things that in normal circumstances would be considered crimes, and the war against terrorism only ends up creating new terrorists. Dyson argues that we must push for a reduction in the nuclear arms race, with three overall goals: the withdrawal and destruction of nuclear weapons worldwide, a complete moratorium on nuclear testing, and the creation of an open scenario where all of the nuclear activities of every country are transparent. He says that the abolition of war is a good example of an ethical problem which science is impotent to solve, because you cannot just make nuclear weapons disappear. But he insists that the international scientific community should contribute to the abolition of war, giving the example of practical cooperation in the world, cooperation which goes beyond the barriers of nationality, language, and culture.

There are a number of acts of resistance to the application of technological developments to military R&D. Without attempting to list them all, we can mention INES (International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility),² or the campaigns of Science for Peace³ or the campaign Stop Killer Robots.⁴ There are also specific cases of disobedience on an industrial level, as with Ryan Gariepy, the CEO of Clearpath Robotics (Bogdon, 2017). Another case was when four thousand engineers and employees of Google published a letter against project *Maven* which demanded that the company adopt a clear policy establishing that neither Google nor their subcontractors would ever work in "war technologies". Or the declaration of more than 200 technological companies and 2,600 artificial intelligence research-

2. International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility: <http://inesglobal.net/>.

3. Science for Peace: <http://scienceforpeace.ca/>.

4. Stop Killer Robots: <https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/>.

ers in July of 2018 in Stockholm, pledging refusal to participate or support the development, manufacture, sale, or use of lethal autonomous weapons (Sample, 2017). In fact, both Google as well as its parent company Alphabet have begun to address ethical issues related to the development of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning, and their possible military applications.

Unfortunately, in general, it is neither scientists nor technologists who make the decisions about the use of new technologies. But they can play a big role in breaking the global militarist cycle and its supposed security based on a disregard for human rights. By actively refusing scientific or technological cooperation in any research which can wind up helping the construction of weapons and militarized technological systems. These are concrete and local actions that can contribute to global change, and all kinds of people, companies, and civil society entities can take part. Actions that, within the context of new non-conventional weapons,⁵ are more urgent and necessary than ever.

The development of robotic military systems and autonomous arms

Robots are programmable or self-controlled machines that can perform complex tasks automatically, typically by using sensors that analyse their surroundings. The concept of military robotic systems arose when these kinds of robots began to be used in the military context in the case of, for example, unmanned military systems that began to act both in war zones and in tasks supporting militarized security. However, it is still a poorly defined area, with blurred boundaries between areas. In an initial attempt at classification, we could divide them into unarmed systems (unmanned surveillance systems, monitoring and inspection vehicles and drones, people recognition systems, and even internet data collection bots) and robotic weapons (armed drones, robotic sentry weapons, self-driving armed military vehicles, and loitering arms and munitions). (Gettinger and Holand, 2017). Among the robotic weapons, we could speak of the terrestrial (for example those that perform

5. For example, have a look at the works on the Lethal Autonomous weapons from the CCW committee of the UNOG: [https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument](https://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/8FA3C2562A60FF81C1257CE600393DF6?OpenDocument).

surveillance on the borders) and those that are for air raids (drones, UAV or missiles). In any case, Boulanin (2017) proposes an interesting classification based on the level of human intervention, which divides robotic weapons into those that require human input at some stage of decision-making (“human in the loop”), those that have human oversight (“human on the loop”) and those that are fully autonomous, not requiring any sort of human intervention as in the case of LAWS (Boulanin, 2017). The robotic weapons that require a person to be in the decision-making process are the most common. They include remote-controlled drones such as the Terminator from Lockheed Martin (USA), the Sky Striker from Elbit Systems (Israel), the Warmate from WB Electronics (Poland), the XQ-06 Fi from Karal defense (Turkey), the CH-901 from China and many others. Some of these are already used in surveillance, inspection, and attack in border areas, such as the Super aEgis II in the demilitarized zone between South and North Korea (Parkin, 2015). Their use in surveillance roles in walls and borders is growing (Delàs Centre, 2018) In any case, there is an important debate currently happening around these kinds of systems that require a person to be in the decision-making process. While some authors defend the opportunity to use these technologies, others such as Medea Benjamin argue that when military operations happen through the filter of a distant video camera, the possibility for visual contact with the enemy disappears, thus reducing the perception of a human cost of such an attack (Benjamin, 2013). In addition, Markus Wagner argues that the disconnection and distance make for an environment in which it is easier to commit atrocities (2014: 1380). In any case, as Philip Alston points out, “Outside the context of armed conflict the use of drones for targeted killing is almost never likely to be legal” (Alston, 2017: 1378).

Lethal autonomous weapons (LAWs) are those that raise the largest number of legal concerns, and there are global campaigns (such as *Stop Killer Robots*⁶) calling for their prohibition. Fortunately, there is no evidence as of yet that they are being used in the scope of militarized security or war settings. The robots and drones which include some mechanism of human supervision (“human on the loop”), however, are being deployed, for example, in border surveillance. For example, we can mention the Samsung robot SGR-A, (Prigg, 2014), which is in use on the border between South and North Korea. It is a system which detects and “decides” which persons to attack, although it

6. The international campaign Stop Killer Robots: <https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/>.

offers the possibility that a remote operator could stop the action. The ethical debate in this case, is around the biases that machine-made decisions generate in human decision-making processes. Because, as Noel Sharkey clearly explains, these systems generate a phenomenon called “automation bias”, in which human operators are prepared to accept robotic and AI recommendations, ignoring or not seeking any other evidence.

New robotic military systems are supposed to be known for their high precision. However, it is well known that they generate “collateral damage” a euphemism for the deaths of innocent civilians. As David Hookes explains quite well, the most conservative estimates suggest that at least a third of the deaths in attacks by drones in Pakistan were non-combatants (Hookes, 2017). The case of Sonia Khediri, a 21-year-old Italian woman, is revealing (Garcia, 2018), and is only one of many. She married a Tunisian, and after being wooed by the Islamic state, they went to Syria, where after a few months, they got disillusioned. Her husband decided not to fight for the Islamic State, deserted, and wound up being murdered by a drone. But it was not an ISIS drone that killed him, it was one from the international coalition. Sonia Khediri’s husband died because he forgot to disconnect the WiFi at night, and was attacked by a robotic system that associated the existence of a WiFi signal with the presence of alleged combatants of the Islamic State. In Raqqa, where supposedly only combatants of Islamic State have WiFi, the “intelligent” algorithms of certain drones decide their targets based on internet use.

Conclusion: There is no security without disarmament

As we have argued, the claim that new robotic military systems will contribute to security is a fallacy. These systems are supposedly designed to guarantee our security with military means, but neither do they guarantee them, nor are they secure. According to a study by the Peace Science Digest which analysed the military responses of Boko Haram, in Nigeria and Al-Shabaab in Kenya (Hiller, 2018), the military responses to terrorist threats are quite ineffective, and show numerous examples of failed missions. As well the use of remote controlled systems, whether they are autonomous or not, is controversial, and their ethicality is contested. Because, as in the words of Alex Leveringhaus:

From the ethical perspective, the intentional or unintentional use of distance to obscure responsibility in armed conflict signals a deeper disrespect for individual rights, and by extension the moral standing of the individual as a being who is owed equal moral concern and respect. (2017)

Robotic military systems are not the way forward. People's security can not be achieved by military methods. They constantly violate those very human rights of those very people they purport to protect, and they have been shown to be counterproductive time and again. Medea Benjamin (Benjamin, 2013) explains that names of drones such as the "Predator" or the "Reaper" are not by chance, they show exactly what they are: killing machines. Without judges or trials, they eliminate the lives of anyone believed to be a terrorist, together with any others who accidentally or incidentally happen to cross their path. The aspirations to solve threats and security problems with the use of violence and militarized systems are clearly the simplistic and naïvely utopian. So why do we continue down this path?

We can find the answer to this question when we ask who benefits. We must not forget that militarized security is a huge business. A business that enriches military industries, financial entities, and large corporations while worsening the security situation of the majority of the world's peoples.

In this context, and as Tony Jenkins, Kent Shifferd and others defend in the 2018-2019 report *World Beyond War* (2018), the prohibition of all militarized drones by all of the nations or groups will mean a great step toward a demilitarized security. And in fact, it's ever more urgent to make a transition from the current concept of militarized security to one of human security with a feminist perspective that cares for all people. Because in the current context of climate change, the fortresses and walls being built in the countries of the global north are simply unsustainable. In the words of Michael Tomasello (Tomasello, 2016), on our planet, it is ever more difficult to differentiate the "we" from the "them" – those who are outside of our tribe. If we are to face our largest challenges as a species, challenges which threaten every human society on the planet, we must begin to think of all humanity as a "we". Indeed, if there is no "other", military security solutions collapse under their own weight. The future, here and now, calls for the a halt to the development of new robotic weapons which violate the rights of people and society, and to actively work for get more scientists to refuse work in the fields of military R&D, and to promote campaigns in favour of a reduction of military spending and the arms trade.

Bibliography

- ALSTON, Phillip (2010): *U.N. Doc. No. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6*, May 28, in Markus Wagner, Op. Cit., 1378 – Also in David Hookes (2017): <https://www.globalresearch.ca/armed-drones-how-remote-controlled-high-tech-weapons-are-used-against-the-poor/5582984>
- BENJAMIN, Medea (2013): *Drone Warfare: Killing by Remote Control*, Londres, available at: [https://slowrotation.memoryoftheworld.org/Medea%20Benjamin/Drone%20Warfare_%20Killing%20by%20Remote%20C%20\(28681\)/Drone%20Warfare_%20Killing%20by%20Remot%20-%20Medea%20Benjamin.epub](https://slowrotation.memoryoftheworld.org/Medea%20Benjamin/Drone%20Warfare_%20Killing%20by%20Remote%20C%20(28681)/Drone%20Warfare_%20Killing%20by%20Remot%20-%20Medea%20Benjamin.epub)
- BOULANIN, Vincent and Maaïke verBruggen (2017): *Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon Systems*, Stockholm, SIPRI. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_systems_1117_1.pdf
- BOGDON, Chris (2017): “Clearpath founder signs open letter to UN for ban on autonomous weapons”, in *Clearpath Robotics*, Press Release: <https://www.clearpathrobotics.com/2017/08/clearpath-founder-signs-open-letter-un-ban-autonomous-weapons/>.
- CALVO RUFANGES, Jordi and Alejandro POZO (2015): *Diccionario de la guerra, la paz y el desarme* [Dictionary of war, peace, and disarmament], Barcelona, Icaria. Entries on “Seguridad” and “Seguridad humana”.
- Centro Delàs (2018): *Building Walls. Policies of fear and securitization in the European Union* <http://www.centredelas.org/en/buildingwalls>
- DOWLING, Dame Ann (2016): “Engineering our way to a sustainable future for all”, in *Engineering a Better World*, London, Royal Academy of Engineering, 5: <https://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/other/engineering-a-better-world-brochure>
- DYSON, Freeman (2010): *El científico rebelde* [The Rebel Scientist], Madrid, Debolsillo.
- GARCIA, Ricard (2018): “Las mujeres europeas del estado islámico” [European women of the Islamic State], *Diari Ara*, July 23 https://www.ara.cat/internacional/dones-europees-Islamic_0_2057194272.html.
- GETTINGER, Dan and Arthur HOLLAND (2017): “Loitering Munitions”, *Center for the Study of the Drone*, US, Bard College.

- HILLER, Patrick T. et al. (2018): “Counterproductive Effects of Military Counterterrorism Strategies”, *Peace Science Digest* <https://peacesciencedigest.org/counterproductive-effects-military-counterterrorism-strategies/>
- HOOKES, David (2017): “Armed Drones: How Remote-Controlled, High-Tech Weapons Are Used Against The Poor”, *Global Research*, April 2017: <https://www.globalresearch.ca/armed-drones-how-remote-controlled-high-tech-weapons-are-used-against-the-poor/5582984>
- JENKINS, Tony, Kent SHIFFERD, Patrick HILLER and David SWANSON (2018): “A Global Security System: An Alternative to War”, *World beyond War*, 59: <https://worldbeyondwar.org/alternative/>
- LEVERINGHAUS, Alex (2017): “Autonomous weapons mini-series: Distance, weapons technology and humanity in armed conflict”, *Humanitarian Law & Policy*, October 6: <http://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/10/06/distance-weapons-technology-and-humanity-in-armed-conflict/>
- PARKIN, Simon (2015): “Killer robots: The soldiers that never sleep”, *BBC*, July 16
- PRIGG, Mark (2014): “Who goes there? Samsung unveils robot sentry that can kill from two miles away”, *Mailonline*, September 15, <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2756847/Who-goes-Samsung-reveals-robot-sentry-set-eye-North-Korea.html> – technical details are available at: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SGR-A1>
- SAMPLE, Ian (2018): “Thousands of leading AI researchers sign pledge against killer robots”, *The Guardian*, May 1.
- SHARKEY, Noel (2014): “Towards a principle for the human supervisory control of robot weapons”, University of Sheffield, United Kingdom [https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/\(httpAssets\)/2002471923EBF52AC1257CCC0047C791/\\$file/Article_Sharkey_PrincipleforHumanSupervisory.pdf](https://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/2002471923EBF52AC1257CCC0047C791/$file/Article_Sharkey_PrincipleforHumanSupervisory.pdf).
- SHERMER, Michael, (2018): “Alvy’s error and the meaning of life”, *Scientific American*, Feb 2018: <https://michaelshermer.com/2018/02/science-reveals-our-deepest-purpose/>.
- TOMASELLO, Michael (2016): *A Natural History of Human Morality*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.

- (2018): “The origins of morality”, *Scientific American*: <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-origins-of-human-morality/>.
- WAGNER, Markus (2014): “The Dehumanization of International Humanitarian Law: Legal, Ethical and Political Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems”, *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 47, 1380.

IV. Measures for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction

Teresa de Fortuny and Xavier Bohigas¹

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are weapons designed to cause a large number of victims, without discriminating between civilians and combatants. They have the capacity to destroy far more than conventional arms. They can kill thousands of people in a single attack. Their effects can spread over extensive areas and in the case of nuclear weapons, these effects can be long-lasting. There are three categories weapons of mass destruction: nuclear, chemical and biological.

Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous. They have devastating effects on living things, infrastructures and the environment. Just one bomb can destroy an entire city, killing hundreds of thousands of people and have terrible effects on the environment. It also puts future generations at risk, as the effects can be passed from one generation to the next and extend over time. (A report from the Japanese Red Cross noted that their hospitals continue to treat thousands of survivors and thousands of descendants

1. Teresa de Fortuny has a degree in Physics and is a researcher for the Delàs Center for Peace Studies in the field of the nuclear arsenal and the companies of the military industry. She is a co-author and co-editor of the book "*OTAN, una amenaça global*" NATO, A global threat (2010), as well as the co-author of the book *Trenta preguntes sobre l'OTAN, 30 anys després del referèndum* [30 questions about NATO, 30 years after the referendum] (2016).

Xavier Bohigas has a PhD in Physics and is a professor emeritus in the Department of Physics of the Polytechnic University of Catalonia. A member of the Delàs Centre, he focuses his research on the fields of nuclear weapons, military spending, Military R&D, and films of the military industry. He is author of various articles and reports in this field. He is the co-author of the books *OTAN, una amenaça global* (NATO, A global threat) (2010), *Riesgos y amenazas del arsenal nuclear* [Risks and threats of the nuclear arsenal] (2014) and coordinator and co-author of *Trenta preguntes sobre l'OTAN, 30 anys després del referèndum* [30 questions about NATO, 30 years after the referendum] (2016).

of the survivors more than 70 years after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.) Biological and chemical weapons also act indiscriminately upon a population, are simple and cheap to produce, and are easier to transport than nuclear weapons.

In this chapter we will try and explain how the international community has dealt with the threat of each kind of WMD and how agreements have been reached for their prohibition. For an international agreement to be truly effective it should have a large number of signatories. This has been possible with biological and chemical weapons, but not with nuclear weapons. The states possessing nuclear weapons do not endorse the prohibition of this kind of weapon. At the end of the chapter, we will propose the appropriate postures that states can take in order to work towards an effective implementation of an agreement for the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

International treaties for the prohibition of WMD

All three kinds of WMDs violate International Humanitarian Law.² For many years the international community has worked for the prohibition of these kinds of weapons. As a result, three international agreements have been reached:

- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. This Convention stipulates that each state which forms part agrees to neither develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents or toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. It also establishes that each State Party to this Convention must undertake to destroy, not later than nine months after entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery. The goal of the Convention is not only to avert an immediate danger, but

2. IHL prohibits, among other things, the use of any methods or means of warfare which do not distinguish between combatants and persons who are not taking part in the combat; those that cause excessive damage or unnecessary suffering; or those which cause serious or lasting damage to the environment.

also to eliminate the possibility of future scientific and technological advances that can be used to produce these weapons (Goldblat, 1997).

- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. This convention stipulates that each state party agrees never to develop, produce, acquire, stockpile, or transfer these weapons; or to use chemical arms; to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control or that it abandoned on the territory of another State Party; to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control. It establishes means of verifying and international auditing by State Parties. When the Convention came into effect, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was founded, with the mandate to forever eradicate chemical weapons and to verify their destruction. The OPCW also carried out tasks of assistance and protection.
- The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) The Treaty obliges Party States to agree to never develop, test, manufacture, acquire, possess, transfer, stockpile, use, or threaten to use nuclear weapons. It also obliges the elimination of nuclear programs, the immediate deactivation of nuclear weapons, to destroy them as soon as possible, in a way that is verifiable and irreversible, and to provide assistance both to the victims as well as to any States Parties affected by the use of nuclear weapons; and to assist to restore the environment. It sets up a series of policies and deadlines for compliance.

In the process of debate, approval and consequent adhesion to the Biological Weapons³ and Chemical Weapons⁴ Conventions, there were no obstacles that could not be overcome. There was a wide consensus by the international community that considered them loathsome weapons that should be prohibited and eliminated. The proof of this consensus on the part of the international community is that as soon as the period of ratification began,

3. As of July 2018, there were 180 State Parties to the Convention on Biological Weapons. As of then, Israel had still not signed and Syria had signed, but not ratified. The convention opened for signatures on the 10th of April 1972 and entered into force on the 26th of March 1975.

4. As of July 2018, there were 193 State Parties to the Convention on Chemical Weapons. As of that date, North Korea had not signed and Israel had signed, but not ratified. The Convention opened for signatures on the 13th of January 1993 and entered into force on the 29th of April 1997.

the majority of United Nations member states signed both of them in a remarkably short period of time. The Biological Weapons Convention came into effect (once ratified by the minimum number of countries stipulated in its articles) little under three years of opening for signatures. The Chemical Weapons Convention came into force a little after four years after opening for signatures.

By contrast, the equivalent process of elaboration, debate, and approval of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons⁵ has been characterized by a firm opposition on the part of certain states. Although a year has passed since it has opened for signatures, only 58 states have signed, and of these, only 10 have gone on to ratify the treaty. Precisely because the prohibition of this type of weapon is hotly contested and unresolved, in this chapter we will dedicate more attention to nuclear arms and the dangers associated. It should be pointed out the nine nuclear states, the members of NATO and those who have agreements of protection with the US have not signed the Treaty.

The current state of nuclear arsenals: a description and possible consequences

According to data from SIPRI (2018: 235-302), at the beginning of 2018, the global nuclear arsenal included more than 14,465 nuclear weapons. Russia and the United States and Russia have historically been the holders of more than 90% of the world total of nuclear weapons. Russia has 6,850, the US 6,450, France 300, China 280, the United Kingdom 215, India and Pakistan, around 140 weapons each, and Israel 80. Each of these countries have modernization programmes for their nuclear arsenals (the US stands out, budgeting an astronomical sum of money) (Bohigas and Fortuny, 2016). And North Korea is estimated to have enough material for the construction of between 10 and 20 bombs, although reliable data is lacking. The future of the nuclear programme in North Korea, an agreement was signed on the 12th of June 2018 with the US, for a denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Of the 14,465 nuclear weapons, 3,750 are operational, 5,555 are in storage,

5. As of the 12th of July 2018, there were 59 Signatory states to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. 11 nations had ratified the Treaty. It opened for signatures the 20th of September 2017. The majority of the signatories nations were from South America and Africa. The only European states who have signed the Treaty are Austria, Ireland, and Liechtenstein.

and 5,160 are retired, and waiting to be dismantled. Very worrisome is that some 1,800 of the 3,750 operational weapons are on maximum alert, ready to be used at any time. (Kristensen and Norris, 2017).

Alongside the bombs which have already been manufactured, one should also be aware that the nuclear states also have large stockpiles of fissionable material for producing more. We are referring to enriched uranium (between 90-93%) or enriched plutonium⁶. According to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, by the end of 2016, global stockpiles of enriched uranium had reached 1,340 tons. And that of plutonium, 230 tons. Just as the arsenals themselves, the major part was in the hands of the US and Russia.

Risks and threats of nuclear weapons

The mere existence of nuclear weapons is already a danger. Despite the secrecy which surrounds nuclear weapons programmes, we know that there have been a large number of accidents involving nuclear weapons, some of them quite serious. The causes have been diverse: weather conditions, technical errors, operator error... In many of these accidents there have been leaks of radioactivity. Some examples include: planes and submarines loaded with nuclear warheads which have sunk into the ocean and have never been recovered; planes with nuclear weapons which have crashed into the ground, and burned; trucks which have turned over while transporting nuclear warheads, etc. As an example, between 1950 and 2009, there was an average of one serious accident every 6 months. These accidents did not only occur in countries with nuclear weapons, they can happen almost any place. One of these cases has directly affected us in Spain: an accident in 1966 in Palomares (Almería), in which four thermonuclear bombs fell from a US warplane which was flying over the region. Two of the bombs fell on land and two fell into the sea, and though they were all recovered, the area continues to be contaminated. There are many other episodes in which bombs have fallen into international waters or into the territorial waters of countries that are not armed with nuclear weapons. In addition to these accidents, another danger associated with nuclear weapons is their custody. Just a couple pieces

6. As a comparison: nuclear power plants use enriched uranium at between 3% and 5% for the production of energy.

of meaningful information: in the period from 1975 to 1990 the Pentagon removed tens of thousands of soldiers from their nuclear responsibilities due to alcohol and drug abuse. An audit in 2014 by the US Department of Energy concluded that decades of deficient supervision and security could negatively affect the security and reliability of the nuclear weapons in the country. To all of this, one must also add numerous errors in the detection of alleged attacks, false alarms, and erroneous interpretation of data which has almost lead to the intentional or accidental detonation of nuclear weapons. All of these risks have been silenced. The probability that there is an accidental nuclear explosion is small, but not non-existent. (Bohigas and Fortuny, 2014).

As several scientific studies have recently shown, the detonation of under one percent of the global nuclear arsenal would cause (aside from immediate human victims and material destruction) a considerable change to the global climate, affecting everyone living on the planet. The enormous amount of smoke and dust produced by such explosions in urban and populous areas would reduce the solar radiation reaching the Earth's surface, and would also reduce evaporation. The temperature would plummet, as well as rainfall, and as a consequence, worldwide agricultural production would be reduced, creating food shortages that could affect more than 2 billion people.

Production and use of depleted uranium

In the process of enrichment of uranium (U-235) for the production of nuclear weapons, one of the by-products is depleted uranium (U-238) in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF_6). It is estimated that there are some 700,000 tons of UF_6 stored in the US. Each year, another 30,000 tons are added to this stockpile.

For quite a while, the military industry has incorporated the depleted uranium in certain conventional weapons (specifically in munitions, anti-tank shells, and aviation projectiles), taking advantage of its physical and chemical properties. Uranium is a very dense element, and as such, slugs made from uranium alloys are very penetrating and can pierce the steel of armoured vehicles. As well, depleted uranium is pyrophoric: it ignites spontaneously in contact with air, releasing heat and toxic and radioactive particles which can travel large distances and be inhaled by people. The radioactive contamination and toxicity of these particles is added to the already destructive

effects of conventional weapons. The US has used these weapons in armed conflict, for example in former Yugoslavia, in the Gulf War in Iraq in 1991 (300 tons of depleted uranium) and in the Iraq war in 2003 (2000 tons more). It is an deplorable way to “recycle” a waste product of the global process of the production of nuclear weapons.

A path towards a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

The bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945 alerted the public of the danger of nuclear weapons. This concern grew as nuclear weapons tests were carried out starting in the 1950s, as the consequences of radiation on human health and the environment became evident. And there was an outpouring of protest in the civil society, with campaigns calling for the prohibition of nuclear weapon use and for their elimination. These campaigns were reactivated at the beginning of the 21st century, and civil society has had an important role in the process towards achieving a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. In 2007 the International Campaign for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), a coalition of some 400 organizations, which has contributed in a significant way to achieve a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. ICAN was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2017.

A few years ago a number of international conferences were organized (Oslo 2013, Mexico in early 2014, and Vienna in December 2014) to thoroughly evaluate the humanitarian effects of a nuclear explosion. These conferences contributed to the visibility of the problem and the need to urgently raise awareness for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. It was concluded that the use of nuclear weapons would have disastrous and lasting consequences on human health, the environment, the climate, and economic development, and that at the international level there is still no effective and workable means of treating with the high number of survivors that could result from a nuclear explosion. The conference in Vienna also led to the Humanitarian Pledge, an agreement to promote effective means of resolving the legal vacuum around the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and to cooperate with every party involved in order to achieve this objective.

Thanks to this initiative by ICAN and other organizations and the drive by the signatory states of the Humanitarian Pledge, on the 27th of October the UN General Assembly approved a resolution to begin negotiations in 2017 with the objective of achieving a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The resolution passed with 123 votes in favour, 38 against, (Spain was one of these) and 16 abstentions.

Finally on the 7th of July 2017, the UN General Assembly approved the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Arms, with 122 votes in favour, 1 abstention (Singapore), and one vote against (the Netherlands). The nine nuclear-armed states, NATO member states (with the exception of the Netherlands) and countries with agreements for nuclear protection with the US (Japan, South Korea, Australia, etc.) did not even attend the vote of the Treaty.

Opposition to the Treaty for the Prohibition of nuclear weapons

Some states opposed to the Treaty (Great Britain, France, the US, and some of their allies) claim that there are already mechanisms in place for the limitation of nuclear arms, such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). This is a patently false, as the NPT has not shown itself capable of blocking the proliferation of nuclear arms. It was passed in 1968 (at that moment there were five nuclear-armed states, and since then the number of states with nuclear weapons has been on the rise (today there are nine). The NPT has not prevented this increase. One must take into account that the treaties for the reduction of nuclear weapons have been signed as bilateral agreements, (mainly between the US and the Soviet Union or Russia), and not within the framework of the NPT. The international treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing and the geographic limitation of their use were also signed within the framework of the General assembly, and not within the NPT.

At the heart of the NPT, since its creation, two classes of members have been institutionalized: on the one hand, those who have permissions to possess nuclear weapons (China, Great Britain, France, the US, and Russia, that is to say the permanent members of the UN Security Council) and those who are not allowed – that is to say – everyone else. The NPT has consolidated the

status of privilege of these five nuclear states. The other four nuclear states (Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea) are evidently, outside of the NPT.

In spite of Article VI of the NPT which affirms that each signatory must work for nuclear disarmament, some initiatives for disarmament presented within the framework of the NPT have been boycotted by some of the nuclear states. For example:

- The 2010 meeting of the NPT. 116 states presented a project to eliminate nuclear weapons, which would reach a complete elimination in 2025. The US, Russia, Great Britain, and France all rejected the plan and it was not carried out.
- The 2015 meeting of the NPT. High hopes were raised. There was a draft of a Final Document, which proposed, on the one hand, the celebration of a conference, before March 2016, to construct a nuclear-weapon-free-zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East, and on the other hand (a bit ambitious, it may be said) nuclear disarmament. The US, Great Britain, and Canada refused to set a date for the conference in 2016. It seems quite clear that the US and its allies acted in defense of the interests of Israel, which has always been opposed to the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

NATO pressure against the Treaty

NATO, led by the US, has become an obstacle for nuclear disarmament. In the process of the proposal, debate, drafting, and approval of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the US, with the loyal support of its allies in the North Atlantic Alliance, repeatedly attempted to stop the achievement. As we have said above, the 27th of October, 2016, the UN General Assembly approved a resolution which stipulated the celebration of a conference in 2017 to begin negotiations for the elimination and prohibition of nuclear weapons. There were 123 votes in favour, 38 opposed, and 16 abstentions. The majority of negative votes corresponded to members of the NATO. In fact, all of the member states of the Alliance voted against the resolution, except for the Netherlands, which abstained. Other states voting against the resolution included Russia, Israel, and those states with aspirations to join NATO. After the fact, a declassified document helped to understand those votes. The document in question was a note of the US dele-

gation to NATO, dated the 17th of October and sent to the rest of the member states, urging with resolve that member states vote against the resolution and not merely abstain. It even asked them that if negotiations were to begin, to refuse to participate. The note confirmed that a Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons goes against the nuclear deterrent, one of the pillars of the global policies of the North Atlantic Alliance. Indeed, NATO, in its summit in 2010, reconfirmed that its nuclear capability was one of the pillars of its defense strategy. Exactly the same as the defense strategy of the US. Other nuclear states – China, India, Pakistan, North Korea – were not opposed to the resolution; the first three abstained and North Korea voted in favour.

Recommendations and good practices

We've seen some of the postures that states have adopted regarding the benefits a Treaty which prohibits nuclear weapons could bring. The most notorious example is the United States, a country which attempted to boycott the process and which, even once it was approved, has tried to prevent the Treaty from being ratified, and in this way, keep it from coming into force. We know, for example, that the US Secretary of Defense sent, at the end of August 2017, a letter to the Swedish Minister of Defense, which advised that if Sweden signed the Treaty, that it would be harmful to defense cooperation between the two countries.

With a very different attitude, certain states have taken on a very active role in the process which has led to a prohibition Treaty. In the last years, several countries have proposed the benefits of a Treaty of this kind and have pushed the process towards achievement. Specifically, in September 2016, Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria, and South Africa lead an initiative to propose that the UN General Assembly approve a resolution to begin negotiations intended to achieve a Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. A wide majority of African and Latin American nations showed themselves to be in favour of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Another excellent example of good practices in the arena of nuclear disarmament are the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ). These are regions of the world where the nations which form part have decided to ban nuclear weapons. They are established through voluntary agreements between the countries in a region. There are currently five of these zones. They include

116 states, and cover almost the entire Southern hemisphere, but only a few parts of the Northern hemisphere (Central Asia and Mongolia). For many years the Arab states of the Middle East has asked this region to be free from nuclear weapons, arguing that it will be an important factor for creating peace in the region. But Israel has systematically refused participation.

In the same way, that a majority of the world's nations at one time signed and ratified the Conventions on the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, the same should occur with nuclear weapons. The ratification of the international treaty by a specific number of countries is the condition for it entering into force. And so, the goal could be achieved – the last weapons of mass destruction could be banned by international law. In 2008, 76% of the global population was in favour of the treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. A survey by ICAN in June of 2018, almost a year after the Treaty was approved, carried out by citizens from four countries of the EU which store US nuclear weapons (Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, and Italy) concluded that 66-72% of those surveyed were in favour that their respective countries sign the Treaty. Governments should bow down to the will of the people. A strong campaign by civil society and the states who have already signed the Treaty will serve to pressure those states who resist ratifying the Treaty.

It will not be easy to disarm the nuclear states, but there are some precedents. For example, South Africa felt itself threatened in a particular geopolitical context and decided to arm itself with nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence. Later, when the context changed, it opted unilaterally to get rid of its nuclear arsenal. Global nuclear disarmament will be more feasible in a situation of mutual trust between states. Diplomacy must work to this end.

As long as states continue to keep weapons of mass destruction in their arsenals, there will be a risk of their use, either on purpose or by accident. To remove this risk, they must be prohibited and completely eliminated.

In conclusion, any government which wants to bring about policies of peace and security has to work for global disarmament, which, of course, includes the elimination of WMD. There are many potential ways to contribute, from signing international treaties for disarmament, or by active participation in the international movement for disarmament, and even pressure on those entities that finance the arms industry.

Bibliography

- BOHIGAS, Xavier and Teresa DE FORTUNY (2014): *Riesgos y amenazas del arsenal nuclear* (Risks and threats of the nuclear arsenal), Barcelona, Icaria.
- BOHIGAS, Xavier and Teresa DE FORTUNY (2016): “Modernización del armamento nuclear mundial” (Modernization of the world’s nuclear weapons), *Revista Mientras Tanto-e*, nº 142. <http://www.mientrastanto.org/boletin-142/notas/modernizacion-del-armamento-nuclear-mundial>
- GOLDBLAT, Josef (1997): “Convención sobre las armas biológicas –Consideraciones generales” (Convention on biological weapons – General considerations), *Revista Internacional de la Cruz Roja*. <https://www.icrc.org/spa/resources/documents/misc/5tdlbp.htm>
- KRISTENSEN, Hans M. and Robert S. NORRIS (2017): “Worldwide deployments of nuclear weapons, 2017”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, vol. 73, no. 5, p. 289-297.
- Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2018): “SIPRI Yearbook 2018: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security”. Chapter 6, *World nuclear forces*, p. 235-302.

V. Conversion of the arms industry

Pere Ortega¹

Economic conversion, or arms conversion, refers to the process of redirecting human resources, capital, and technological skills from arms manufacturing towards production of civilian goods, and the associated reorganization of teams and infrastructure. In Spain, the concept of conversion, or *reconversión*, as it was called, has a pejorative connotation, as it is associated with the closure of industry and the loss of jobs (Ortega, 2000). There was considerable public outcry in Spain after the processes of *reconversión* in 1981 led by the Democratic Centre (UCD) government and continued in 1983 by the socialist PSOE government. In these years there were big processes of arms conversion in sectors that were considered economically unproductive. These businesses, particularly the metals and mining industries, were suffering significant losses. These *reconversiones* were described as *salvajes* [savage] by the unions, as they left many workers without a job and on the dole. And so, in general, arms conversion is associated with lay-offs and recessions affecting entire cities and regions.

From the disdain in the Spanish context for the term *reconversión*, the term *conversión* is being proposed in its place, the term widely used in the English speaking world, with a different meaning and connotation. Though it is synonym, the term conversion refers to a positive process of transformation

-
1. Researcher in disarmament, peace, nonviolence and security; President of the Delàs Center for Peace Studies; visiting professor of Conflictology at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. He maintains the blog *Crónicas Insumisas* [Annals of a Draft Objector]; author of various books: *Economía (de guerra)* [Economics (of War)] (2018), *El Lobby industrial militar de España* [The Military Industrial Lobby in Spain] (2016), *Las violencias en América Latina* [Violence in Latin America] (2014), *La sociedad noviolenta* [The nonviolent society] (2012), co-author of many books, including: *OTAN, una amenaza global* [NATO, A global threat] (2010), *Deconstruir la guerra* [Deconstructing War] (2008), *El militarismo en España* [Militarism in Spain] (2007), *Noviolencia y transformación social* [Nonviolence and social transformation] (2005), *El ciclo armamentista en España* [The weapons cycle in Spain] (2000).

and renewal, and it is this *conversión* that we are referring to when we speak of arms conversion.

The arms industry has transformed itself many times in the past. At the end of every war – with a large part of the productive economy monopolized by the state’s war efforts – when the war is over, an extra effort needs to be made to convert and reorganize the arms industry towards the manufacture of goods of a civilian nature.

There are many, well-studied cases of arms conversion after contemporary wars. Examples include the arms conversions following the two World Wars of the 20th century, when the countries involved had to dedicate a big effort to the “war economy putting all of the productive means of the country at the service of the battle being fought. After the wars were finished, governments had to continue putting an effort into the conversion of facilities, infrastructures, and the productive apparatus toward the manufacture of goods for civil use and consumption.

The same occurred after the end of the Cold War in 1989. It should be remembered that two opposing superpowers, the US and other NATO members of Europe, and the Soviet Union and those of the Warsaw Pact, were facing off in a “war theatre”, not only with conventional weapons, but also with nuclear weapons, which were intended for use on European soil. A Europe divided in two by a large and impassable border of barbed wire and walls dividing the European continent from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean. A dividing line that, in some areas of the zone separating East from West Germany, had a width of up to several kilometres, depending on the area. These barren territories’ only purpose was to create an impassible border, a separation with military infrastructure of every kind: watchtowers, barbed wire, barracks, and mine fields to prevent the movement of people.

This conflict between the Western Bloc and the Eastern Bloc entailed a huge military production, an arms race that was fuelled on both sides. Many of these industries were on European soil in order to provide to the respective armies stationed on either side of this dividing line. Once the confrontation between the two Europes ended in 1989/1990, another great effort had to be made to dismantle and reconvert the territories and infrastructures located on both sides of the border. An additional effort was also needed for the conversion of the arms manufacturing industries.

Among these European countries, it was Germany that suffered the most in its territories from the effects of the confrontation between the two war-

ring blocs. Following the reunification of the two Germanies, starting in 1992, major conversion programmes for industry and military installations had to be implemented. Industries that were obsolete, for the most part, within the German Democratic Republic. It is understandable, that what was then the European Economic Community (EEC), what is now the European Union, beginning in 1990, studied plans for arms conversion. The goal was to avoid suffering the depressive effects that the disappearance of military industries and infrastructures can have on the local economy and the inhabitants of those regions and districts.

For these reasons, in 1992 the EEC started the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), aid for the regional cohesion of the countries, and part of this went to the KONVER programs, which paid out €1.6 billion in defense conversion. 50% of the programs was paid for with EEC aid, and the other 50% came from the states themselves. Fifteen countries received aid from the KONVER programs, first and foremost, Germany, with €457 million in aid, followed by the UK with €183 million, France €124 million, Italy €90 million, and Greece €34 million. Spain was in 7th place with €30 million, followed by other countries who received smaller amounts of aid.

Aside from the pragmatic issue of converting of an unneeded arms manufacturing infrastructure which has ceased to be profitable, there is also an ethical issue affecting arms production. The only use of weapons is to destroy human lives, and besides, in their manufacture and export to other countries, this encourages third parties to arm their nations to protect themselves from potential aggressions. This, in turn leads to arms races, downward spirals which, in turn, leads to the militarization of the state, or worse yet, favours the emergence of armed conflict between rival countries.

There is another argument for conversion of the arms industry, and it is that of economic efficiency. And that is that the enormous amounts of resources which are needed for the development of weapons could be allocated to civilian goods which contribute to the social and human development of the community, which would result in more security for the population. This assertion has been backed by many analysts who have arrived at the conclusion that arms are not productive goods, but on the contrary, that they destroy wealth (Melman, 1991; Ortega, 2000).

Once the reasons behind the conversion of the arms industry have been established, two key elements are needed for an effective strategy: the political horizon needs to be cleared of doubts about the desired goal; and the

planning, promotion, and organization of the project must allow the goal of arms conversion to be achieved.

To achieve the goal of conversion, there needs to be a great deal of coordination between different actors. There must be an all-encompassing approach, including local, regional and national authorities, as well as the local social fabric, starting with the trade unions and the workers, who should themselves be the driving force, as it is their livelihood that is directly at stake. The collaboration of professional associations, especially engineering associations, is indispensable, so that invaluable technical expertise can be called upon to study the conversion of the military industry.

Of course, it is not a simple undertaking, and many times, despite the best of intentions, achieving conversion will not be possible, and the closure of the arms industry will be unavoidable. It is for this reason that a conversion project needs to count on the implication of as many different actors as possible, to ensure that the development plan in a given area affected by the close of the arms industry develops a business strategy for the launch of industries and services that allow the productive fabric of the region to recover. This planning should take into account all of the affected region's dimensions and possibilities for development.

A strategy that is often used, and belies a potential error, is the idea of diversification. Diversifying, in the industrial business world, refers to the transformation of product manufacture, with the hope of entering into new markets, and distribute the risk across more than a single class of products. By ensuring a supply that reaches different areas of industrial demand the risks are lower. In this process, businesses look to better overcome times of crisis of certain products, with the introduction of novelties that can give them a foothold into new markets.

The term economic conversion refers to the complete refitting of a factory to another kind of production. Diversification, by contrast, doesn't necessarily refer to a radical change in the business strategy in terms of production, but instead, simply refers to a tactical change, taking on the production of new lines of products. These can either be made on new assembly lines or adapting part of the existing lines towards other kinds of products, but without abandoning the main production, which in this case is arms production. Occasionally, this can happen inside the same factory, in the case of small or medium companies, but in large business groups this usually occurs in separate factories. For this reason, economic diversification of a military industry can mean a simple

manoeuvre to combine military and civilian production, and in this way find a balance between both sectors, and minimize the risks of the arms sector.

Lastly, in military production, there is a final risk, the manufacture of components and materials that have many connections between military and civil sectors, especially in fields such as new technologies, electronics, aeronautics, and space. These are fields in which products can be strongly intertwined, and it can be difficult to distinguish those for civilian use from those for military use. Therefore, what should be clear regarding arms conversion is that in each case, the conversion should include the total closure of the production of military material and components.

The Konver in Spain.

Spain proposed seventeen conversion programs. Of these, four never actually started and the aid was lost due to a lack of interest by the companies or the affected public administration. The rest was distributed: three were conversions of military barracks into educational centres; one went to adapt a territory which had been degraded by the Santa Bárbara industry in Trubia (Asturias) to prepare it for ecotourism; and nine were arms conversion projects for military industry. Among these nine programs, were the E.N. Bazán public shipyards (what is now Navantia) with 4 initiatives, another in Cartagena, with two initiatives, a one each in both San Fernando (Cádiz) and Murcia. Three programs were for Santa Bárbara Sistemas, one for the conversion of a factory in Trubia, another in Coruña and a third in Paracuellos del Jarama (Madrid). Two programs were for Indra, one in Torrejón de Ardoz and another in Aranjuez, Community of Madrid. And one for Expal in Navalморal de la Mata (Cáceres).

The final result was, to say the least, irregular. There was nothing objectionable about the three barracks converted into educational centres, nor about the area that was converted for ecotourism, in fact, these were excellent examples. Undoubtedly insufficient, as the Ministry of Defence possesses immense assets and infrastructures (firing ranges, manoeuvres areas, barracks, docks, housing...) most of which were in a deplorable state. The Konver programs were an unbeatable opportunity to convert these into civilian facilities. Since then, successive governments have allowed their sale, leaving in private hands a good part of the public land that was held by the Ministry of Defence.

As for the industrial conversion programmes, the results were also disappointing, as of the nine programmes, only four took the path of conversion, instead diversifying, and as pointed out above, diversification was a misleading strategy, a diversion towards civilian production, while the factory continued with other lines of military production. This was the case of three proposals of E.N. Bazán, two in Cartagena and another in San Fernando (Cádiz), all three in Santa Bárbara, two in La Coruña, and one in Trubia as well, as well as the two from Indra in Torrejón de Ardoz and Aranjuez in the Community of Madrid, and one in Expal in Navalmoral de la Mata, in Caceres. (Ortega, 2000).

The end result was discouraging, because it was an excellent opportunity for the conversion of some arms industries, in the case of Empresa Nacional Bazán and Santa Bárbara Sistemas, which had suffered considerable financial losses in the 1990s, and were maintained by public funds, as both were state-owned companies. The conversions were possible only because the EEC gave considerable aid, covering 50% of the costs, and could have prevented what went on to happen: both companies continued with financial losses, eventually leading to lay-offs and the closure of several factories.

Bibliography

- HUFFSCHMID, Jörg (1996): “Las consecuencias económicas del desarme” [The economic consequences of disarmament], Bilbao, *Cuadernos Bakeaz*, nº14.
- MELMAN, Seymour (1990): *The Economic Conversion Imperative: Eleven Propositions*, taken from http://economicreconstruction.org/sites/economicreconstruction.com/static/SeymourMelman/archive/ec/econ_conversion_imperative.pdf
- ORTEGA, Pere (2000): “La Conversión de la Industria Militar: el programa KONVER” [Conversion of Military Industry: The KONVER programme], in *El ciclo armamentista español. Una panorama crítica (1989-1999)*, Barcelona, Icaria.
- ORTEGA, Pere (2018): *Economía (de guerra)* [Economy (of War)], Barcelona, Icaria.
- RENNER, Michel (1990): *Swords into plowshares: converting to a peace economy*, WorldWatch Institute.

VI. Reducing military spending to avert the possibility of war

Chloé Meulewaeter¹

Military spending is often seen as a guarantee of peace and security. For example, some armed forces missions are called “peacekeeping missions”. The stated purpose of the army is to guarantee security of the citizens and protect national security, and a portion of the public spending goes towards it for that reason. From this point of view, military spending seems like a legitimate investment in peace. However, from an alternative point of view, this logic can be called into question.

In this chapter we will delve into some issues raised by military spending, and shed some light upon how its reduction could be a great opportunity for peace. We will answer the following four questions:

- How is military spending related to violence, whether it is cultural, structural, or direct violence?
- What factors compute the cost of military spending and what reach does it have on the global economy?
- How can reducing military spending be an opportunity to finance peace?
- How is human security a better alternative to military security?

1. Candidate in the Culture of Peace programme, a PhD programme of Social Sciences of the UGR, she has a Master in Peace Studies, Conflicts and Development (UJI), and a specialty in social sciences research techniques (UCL, Belgium). She investigates the relationship between military spending and armed conflict. Notable publications include: “Los dividendos de la paz: un estado de cuestión” [Dividends of peace: a state in question] in *Ámbitos: Revista de Ciencias Sociales*, 2016), *Reflexiones sobre las violencias ¿Contribuye el gasto militar a que haya violencia armada?* [A reflection on violence: Does military spending lead to armed violence?] (UJI, 2015). She collaborates with the Delas Center for Peace Studies investigating the relationship between military spending and armed conflict.

Military Spending, three dimensions of violence in the three spheres of the military economic cycle

Military spending is the initial stage of a cycle used to maintain growing resources for war preparation, known as the military economic cycle. (Calvo Rufanges, 2015). This cycle is a continuum that passes through several different stages (militarism, militarization, and armed conflicts) all of which are related to the three types of violence: direct, structural and cultural. It begins with the approval of the public budgets for military spending and continues with military R&D, the arms industry, the arms trade, and private investment. The military economic cycle is characterized by an inertia which leads to the approval, year after year, of public military budgets based on the political decisions of past mandates – it does not follow an evaluation of the real needs of the society for the maintenance of the armed forces. This is why military spending is considered the first stage of a cycle responsible for the ease with which armed violence is used as a response to security threats.

Militarism, the first stage of the military economic cycle, is a cultural dimension. Militarism is a form of cultural violence which legitimizes the need for the use of arms to guarantee security and justifies the role of the Armed Forces in conflict scenarios. It is the ideology which legitimizes and justifies the need for military spending to guarantee and promote security, and at the same time, delegitimizes ideas that are raised to challenge this.

Militarization is the structural dimension of the military economic cycle. It is a form of structural violence, since military spending – despite being responsible for the cycle in the first place – generates an significant opportunity cost. As economic resources are always scarce, opportunities are lost that could otherwise be used to satisfy needs directly related to people's lives, true guarantees of security and happiness for people.

Armed conflicts are the third dimension of the military economic cycle, and involve direct violence, armies, and war. The process of preparation and legitimization of war occurs in this scenario, at the same time that it renews the cycle, as the perception of security threats is increased.

Definitions, measures and the latest trends of military spending

There are several ways to define and calculate military spending according to different intergovernmental institutions, and research associations, despite the lack of a consensus around the calculation of the national defense budgets. Thus, for example, it is not possible to compare the budget of the US Department of Defense with that of the Spanish Ministry of Defence, because they do not include the same factors in their calculations. In order to make comparisons between national budgets, common criteria must be used.

This is why NATO asks its member states to calculate their military spending in terms of all of those factors related to defense, and for that reason considers the military spending to be all of the budgetary items that allow the Armed Forces to be operative. More specifically, the North Atlantic Alliance include the following expenditures:

- the Armed Forces;
- military or civilian personnel working for the Ministry of Defence;
- maintenance and finance of military programs including space programmes;
- paramilitary organizations;
- R&D and investment in weaponry, infrastructures, and military installations,
- pensions and the social security of civilian or military personnel of the Ministry of Defence;
- military aid and the participation in organizations or military missions abroad.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) also uses NATO criteria, while adding a few other relevant expenditures. SIPRI considers military spending to be the budgetary items related to:

- the Armed Forces and peacekeeping forces;
- the Ministry of Defence and projects related to defense from other Ministries;
- Paramilitary forces; and
- military activities in space.

Other sources focus in on the figures even more by considering other expenses that should be taken into account. The Delàs Center for Peace Studies stresses the need to have criteria which include an exhaustive calculation of

all public expenditures related to defense spending, in order to illustrate the common practice of burying military expenditures within other departmental budgets. Examples include: aid for military R&D within the Ministry of Industry, the Civil Guard within the Ministry of the Interior, or costs related to NATO within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, costs that must be included to determine the real cost of military spending in a country. And so, the Delàs Centre measures defense spending by adding the following criteria to those of NATO:

- interests on the public debt associated with Defence;
- the costs of the National Intelligence Centre (CNI) of Spain;
- the forecast of the deviation between the initial military expense calculations based on military budgets approved prior to budget implementation and the total military budget actually paid at the end of the period.

It is worth mentioning that since 2016, SIPRI has undertaken to include some of the criteria of the Delàs Center for Peace Studies, and included various defense costs belonging to other Ministries: the passive Defence costs, the ISFAS military mutual insurance company, aid for R&D to military projects, taking into account the difference between the initial budget of the Ministry of Defence and the amount actually spent at the end of the year (Ortega et al., 2017). Specifically, in 2017 Spanish military spending was estimated to at €8.72 billion according to the Ministry of Defence, and at €15.81 billion according to NATO, and at €18.78 billion according to the criteria of the Delàs Centre (final liquidated budget) (Delàs Centre, 2018).

Each year, SIPRI publishes a report on global military spending, which allows us to follow global and regional developments and trends of the political economic decisions made with regard to defense and security. In 2017, global military spending grew to US\$1.74 trillion. These last figures show that global military spending has risen considerably, nearly 1.1%. This seems to break with the previous trend: 4 years of relative stability (2012-2016), which followed on 13 years of constant increase (1999-2011) (SIPRI, 2018). The latest report from SIPRI also tells us that which nations had the highest military spending, in this order: the US, China, Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, France, the UK, Japan, Germany, and South Korea. It is worth mentioning that the five permanent members of the UN Security Council² are responsible

2. The US, Russia, China, France, and the UK.

for nearly 60% of global military spending, though the stated mission of the council is for the maintenance of international peace and security.

And so, funding for war has reached historic levels, around 2.2% of global GDP. Simultaneously, the latest data on official development assistance show it as barely reaching 0.3% of worldwide GDP (OECD, 2018). In Spain, according to the National Budget, the Ministry of Defence expenditures are around 178.24€ per capita while cooperation for development assistance are only 11.77€ per person (CIVIO, 2018) This data shows the contrast in the cost of opportunity of military spending, that is to say, the loss of potential civil use of those resources.

From protest to proposal: how reducing military spending can be an opportunity to finance peace.

Under the concept of opportunity cost, calls for reductions in military spending have been present in every expression of pacifist thinking throughout history. In economics, the concept of opportunity cost tends to refer to the duality of “guns or butter”, and refers to the idea that each euro spent on weapons could be used to spend on feeding people, and vice versa. Taken up by the peace movement, the opportunity cost of military spending refers to the idea that to guarantee and promote security, it is more efficient to invest in conflict prevention, that is to say, in the development and the satisfaction of human needs. The reduction of military spending could generate some peace dividends, and be a great opportunity to recover resources and reroute them to social policies. (Coulomb and Fontanel, 2003).

The idea of a peace dividend began to take form during the Cold War, based on criticisms of wasteful military spending. But in spite of the large opportunity to create dividends for peace, when military spending fell with the end of the arms race after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the historical reduction in military spending was not used for social purposes. That opportunity to create a peace dividends was lost in 1999, when world military spending began to rise once more (SIPRI, 2018).

However, civil society organizations continue to call for policies to ask for reductions in global defense budgets and their redirection into social policies, development, and peace. The Global Campaign on Military Spending (GCOMS) has taken up the idea within a campaign under the slogan “military

expenditures for social welfare”. The campaign calls for a 10% reduction in world military spending to be redirected to strategies for construction of peace, conflict transformation, and cooperation. Since 2011, and coinciding with the publication of an annual report from the SIPRI on global military expenditures, the International Peace Bureau organizes a Global Day of Action to raise awareness among the public, the media and among politicians around the costs of military spending and the need to invest in new priorities which lead to the construction of a culture of peace (GCOMS, 2018).

From military security toward human security

The military security paradigm bases its legitimacy on a series of values that are militaristic (the culture of force and of violence), patriarchal (masculinity is associated with strength and security), and national (the state is the central actor providing and receiving security), all of which generate cultural violence, as they justify structural violence and warfare. The paradigm of military security is merely based on the idea of negative peace, that is to say, security and defense of the state is merely the guarantee of the absence of war inside the national borders. However, this strategy is far from the promotion or guarantee of peace in all of its dimensions, because, as we have seen, ensuring the absence of war inside national borders implies the use of force outside of those same borders. Positive peace – the satisfaction of basic human needs – and the culture of peace – values related to the peaceful transformation of conflicts, human rights, and equality, are not, then relevant to military security.

By contrast, the proposal of human security is an idea that is based four pillars of the philosophy for peace: the pacifist values, mutual discussion, the relation between people in their environment, and overcoming patriarchal gender relations (Martínez, 2001). The first pillar of human security is the values. Compared to the violence which is generated by militarism, militarization and war, the human security that Guzmán proposes is a model in favour of peaceful means for the transformation of conflict. The second, central to the proposal of human security is the need for mutual understanding, dialogue of shared terms, so that people themselves have a central role in the construction of a more secure world. The third pillar is what this model considers the security of people in their interrelation with others, in

their community and in their natural environment. Security goes above and beyond national states, from a plurality of civic organizations. And lastly, the proposal is to move beyond patriarchal gender relations, since human security is a matter for each and every one of us, normal people who are vulnerable and loving, who care for each other, and recognize each other's capacity to make peace.

Conclusions and recommendations

Far from being a factor bringing peace and security, military spending, as we have seen, generates violence and hinders the construction of peace. By means of the military economic cycle, it leads to a single end: that most abject of all human phenomena, war. Military spending also represents an opportunity cost, as it wastes resources that could be better spent on the financing of policies for peace and development. Each euro that is spent in the arena of defense within the framework of military security is a euro that is lost to social welfare within the framework of human security.

The culture of peace thus justifies the need to change the idea of security to a model designed to transform conflicts by peaceful means. To become a reality, the change in paradigm from military security to human security implies the creation of peace dividends. A reduction in world military spending would on the one hand reduce the probability of the use of armed force in conflicts, and on the other hand the capacity to finance basic human needs related to human security, which is the true guarantor of peace in the world.

Likewise, there is a need to promote all the aspects of a culture that legitimize nonviolent means of conflict resolution, which in turn delegitimizes war, since the idea that military spending is an investment in peace and security must be replaced within the collective consciousness. Without a doubt, the creation of peace dividends is an investment in the construction of lasting peace.

Bibliography

- CALVO RUFANGES, Jordi (2015): “El ciclo económico militar” [the military economic cycle], in: Calvo Rufanges, J. and Pozo Marin, A. (Coords). *Diccionario de la paz, la guerra y el desarme*. Barcelona: Icaria.
- CIVIO (2018): *Politica exterior* [Foreign policy], available at: <https://dondevanmisimpuestos.es/politicas/14/politica-exterior#view=funcional&year=2018> [Accessed on 18-08-2018].
- COULOMB, F. and J. FONTANEL (2003): “Disarmament: A century of economic thought”, *Defence and Peace Economics*, 14, 193-208.
- Delàs Center for Peace Studies (2018): “Military spending in Spain”, available at: <http://www.centredelas.org/en/database/spain-s-military-budget/military-spending-in-spain> [Accessed on 18-08-2018].
- GCOMS (2018): *The facts*, available at: <http://demilitarize.org/the-facts> [Accessed on: 20-08-2018].
- MARTÍNEZ GUZMÁN, V. (2001): *Filosofía para hacer las paces* [A philosophy for making peace]. Barcelona: Icaria.
- OCDE (2018): *Net Official Development Assistance (Net ODA)*, available at: <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm> [Accessed on: 18-08-2018]
- SIPRI (2018): *Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2017*, available at: https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2018-04/sipri_fs_1805_milex_2017.pdf [Accessed on: 20-08-2018]

VII. Rethinking foreign military operations. The case of Spain

*Alejandro Pozo Marín*¹

Spain has been participating in foreign military operation for more than a quarter of a century. Although these millions only represented 5.6% of total military spending in 2017, they were the target of a large part of the news, images, and talk connected to the Armed Forces of Spain. They are, then, one of the pillars of the military, perhaps the most important from a point of view of communications. Since 1989, Spain has deployed tens of thousands of soldiers in dozens of interventions of all kinds, whether with NATO, the European Union (EU), the UN, as well as unilateral interventions. This article doesn't provide specific recommendations for Spanish foreign military actions, but rather, identifies some new and questionable practices. The proposal is to avoid these kinds of practices.

It's worth making a couple of clarifications before starting. Firstly, we will only consider in this point the parameters and general intentions of the military interventions, those of the government deciding the interventions, as well as the armies who carry them out, and not those of the soldiers themselves who participate. Undoubtedly there is a large majority with similar reasons for participating, but this will be covered in other parts of this publication. Secondly, it is worth pointing out that in the official web of the

1. A researcher in armed conflict, disarmament, and humanitarian action. PhD in peace and conflicts, and member of the Delàs Centre. He has worked as a humanitarian projects coordinator carrying out armed conflict analysis on the ground research in several countries in war situations. He is a researcher for Doctors Without Borders and an associate professor of Geopolitics and Studies of Peace and Security for the Degree in International Relations at Blanquerna (Ramon Llull University) and Armed Conflict in the Master's programme in International Peace, Conflict and Development Studies at Jaume I University.

Ministry of Defence, which describes Spanish foreign military operations in detail, we have found numerous errors and inaccuracies, contradictions between official documents, and oversights and omissions, some of which we take to be deliberate. This article will shine some light on some of these inconsistencies, although the goal of this article is not so much to criticize the faults of the communication practices of the Ministry, as much as to analyse the foreign missions, with the following nine concerns, each of which will be dealt with in its own section:

1. Confusion about the reasons for the interventions.
2. Violations of international law in some missions.
3. A lack of accountability for the results of some operations.
4. A disparity between decisions for deployment and Spanish public opinion.
5. Very poor representation of public opinion in Parliament.
6. A prioritization of the missions of NATO and the EU to the detriment of the UN.
7. A mis-justification of military interventions as “humanitarian”.
8. A lack of budgetary transparency.
9. A tendency to use militarism to deal with political crises.

Confusion about the reasons for the interventions

Each military operation deserves to be analysed separately, because of its individual nature. However, and with the risk of overgeneralization, one could say that a government decides to deploy troops when the political benefits of getting involved are high, and would prefer not to when the political costs of intervention outweigh the benefits. This same reasoning also applies to political opportunities. In terms of the political cost, internal as well as external political factors are considered. Among the reasons that may influence a country’s decision to embark on a foreign military mission are the direct or indirect threat of the country or region in question; geopolitical or geoeconomic interests which are directly at stake (here we take “geopolitical” to mean the competing interests and relations between different state, regional, and global actors in a strategic region); access to natural resources; support to fellow allied countries; the pressure of internal public opinion; an increase in international prestige; and a response to political crisis in the zone being deployed with the

intention of solving it (Pozo, 2012). Obviously, these are not independent motives, and in general, military operations can have more than one cause.

Consider the seven most significant military operations in which Spain has participated (in terms of length, budget, relevance, and troop deployment): Afghanistan, Bosnia, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon, Libya, and Somalia. Spain has undertaken various missions in many of these countries, but for the purposes of simplification, let's treat each as a single intervention. If we rule out, as did the Spanish Supreme Court, that there was any relation between those condemned for the 2004 Madrid train bombings and groups or leaders of Al-Qaeda or any other group which had been previously known, none of these operations were caused by a threat to Spain. As for a threat to the ambiguous concept of "global security", those who assert this idea show little concern for the insecurity in terms of survival or dignity of a large part of the world population. Not even direct interest would apply to any of these cases. As we can see, Spain does not intervene because it is under threat, or to protect "vital interests" ("sovereignty, independence, or the territorial integrity of Spain and the constitutional order", as sworn by the Strategic Defence Review of 2002). It makes sense, therefore, to find explanations in the so-called "strategic interests" or in "other security interests" (Secretary General of Defence Policies, 2002:127) The supply of basic resources (one of these strategic interests) does not seem to have, in the case of Spain, the stated importance, although it could have been a decisive factor in at least two cases: Somalia (tuna fish in the Indian Ocean) and Libya (the source of 9% of the fossil fuels consumed in Spain, according to Stratfor). Just two years before the military intervention of 2011, Repsol described relations with Muammar Gaddafi as "excellent" (Europa Press, 2009) and the ex-Prime Minister José María Aznar criticized the NATO operation in which the socialist government participated, calling the dictator a "friend", all the while receiving 1% from contracts awarded to the Spanish company Abengoa (Rodríguez and Verdugo, 2014). In the rest of the interventions, the motivation for natural resources is less evident, or unknown, although we must not dismiss a strong potential ambition in Iraqi petroleum concessions. It is very doubtful that the solution to the crisis has been one of the main factors for Spanish participation in the contexts highlighted here. Indeed, Spain has carried out self-styled "humanitarian" interventions in several places, but that was not the only nor the main motive. In any case, among the seven sets of missions highlighted here, only that of Iraq is defended on the web of the Ministry of Defence website as "humanitarian" (The "Sierra Juliet" mission, between April and June of

2003 – the invasion of the country happened on the 20th of March – within the operation “Assistance to Iraq”) (Ministry of Defence, 2018). Internal public opinion occasionally plays a role. In general, perceptions are not pluralistic or very clear around operations that are poorly explained. In the case of Somalia, the pressure of Basque and Galician political parties and some of the population of those places (where a good part of those working in the Indian Ocean come from) was significant (it is worth mentioning that the Government has a responsibility to solve this problem and find valid alternatives for those losing their jobs in the fishing industry). In general, though, with the exception of Iraq, Spanish public opinion has not positioned itself in favour or against military operations, so this factor’s influence must have been limited.

In general, Spanish interests in foreign military intervention are probably more related to aid to allies, indirect interests, and an increase in international prestige. The current National Defence Directive, in force since 2012, is clear in respect to this, when it states in the first point of “the general guidelines of Spanish Defence in this legislative period”:

Ensuring a strong Spain that can maintain the necessary international influence for contributing to stability in our direct area of interest and preserving our national interests throughout the world.” (Presidency of the Government, 2012: 5).

In effect, support for allies has been a constant in every operation, above all in Afghanistan and Iraq (for the USA), in Lebanon (for Israel), or in Mali and the Central African Republic (for France). The hopes of gaining international prestige and indirect compensation is made evident by Spanish participation in the most influential places on the global chessboard. In areas of high geopolitical and strategic interest (such as Afghanistan, the Middle East, and the Gulf of Aden), the play of influences becomes more relevant in which support for the main actors can translate into favours in other matters of international scope. Aznar summed this up fourteen years, speaking of a photo with UK and US leaders: “I never got a better portrait than in the Azores” (EFE, 2017).

Violation of international law in some missions

Spain has ventured on three acts of aggression that were contrary to international law: in Kosovo (1999, the operation “Allied Force”), Afghanistan

(2001, operation “Enduring Freedom”) and Iraq (2003). An operation which is “contrary to international law” or “act of aggression” (defined by resolution 3314 of the UN General Assembly, from December 14th, 1974, while not of a binding nature, still had overwhelming international agreement), is understood as that which does not complete any of the existing options for getting involved militarily in the internal affairs of a sovereign country; that which represents a right of legitimate defense (under the conditions regulated by Article 51 of the UN Charter); or for which there is an *Express* Authorization of the UN Security Council. In not a single one of the three mentioned cases were the criteria fulfilled. However, the website of the Ministry of Defence does not make any observations to this effect, although it is easy to verify that the dates of the resolutions which authorize these military operations are posterior to the deployment of Spanish troops. Furthermore, Spain also contributed to the overthrow of Gaddafi in the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, despite the fact that the UN resolution authorizing this operation did not include that option.

A lack of accountability for the outcome of some operations

Any appeal to armed violence on the part of a democratic state should also be accompanied by a corresponding accountability for the consequences of its actions. There are at least two factors to take into account: the new situation that is produced, and the damages inflicted upon civilians. In at least two of the seven aforementioned military operations, Libya and Iraq, Spain contributed to the military intervention made the countries worse places to live for their population. However, Spain has never been held accountable for its actions. In both countries, insecurity and social indicators are worsened today than before the respective wars, and the number of deaths among the civilian population has been horrifying, without no accountability for the suffering to which it has contributed. On its website, the Ministry of Defence justifies its intervention in Iraq in 2003 as “humanitarian”, while the operation in Libya isn’t even mentioned in their historical record of missions. And, it is worth recalling the words of Julián García Vargas, the Spanish Minister of Defence at the time, who reported that, although the mission of the UN in Bosnia was a failure, the outcome for Spain was positive (Ajangiz, 2003).

Dissonance between the decisions for deployments and Spanish public opinion

In general, apart from a few exceptions, such as the Iraq deployment, Spanish public opinion has not been strongly or unwaveringly in favour of Spanish foreign military operations. Surveys carried out by the Centre for Sociological Investigations (CIS) or the Elcano Royal Institute, in general and with a few passing exceptions, show that people surveyed fall into two more or less equal blocks (with a slight advantage in favour). All told, the barometer of CIS in February 2003 showed that 90.8% of people polled were strongly against Spanish participation in the Iraq war. Despite this, the government ignored the outcry. On other occasions, there had also been a majority against intervention, although less striking. Two examples stand out: first in April 1999, CIS surveys showed that only 39% of the public were in favour of military intervention in Kosovo (44% were opposed); secondly, in January 2018, though many of those interviewed by the Elcano Royal Institute showed that the antiterrorist struggle was important to them, nearly two-thirds (65%) were opposed to sending Spanish troops “to combat Jihadism” in Africa or Asia, compared to a third (35%) in favour. However, Spain is participating in the “international coalition against Jihadism” led by the United States (operation “Inherent Resolve”) against the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

Wars in general (the Balkans, Iran, Afghanistan, etc.) have not been identified by the CIS as a problem on multiple answer questions on the three main problems for Spain that are carried out monthly. In the last decade, in more than 60 surveys, the maximum amount of the population that felt war 0,3% (the highest was 37,3%, upon the invasion of Iraq in March 2003), and this was concurrent with the wars in Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. The perception of international terrorism was much higher (CIS, 2018).

A very poor representation of public opinion in Parliament

The Organic Law of National Defence 5/2005 proposed, for the first time that “to order foreign operation that are not directly related to the defense of Spain or national interest, the government will first hold a consultation and seek the authorization of the Congress.” The ambiguity of the expressions “defense of Spain” and “national interest” shows the political opportunism of the moment.

All told, in respect to the Spanish foreign military operations, the voting record of the Congress did not represent the majority of Spaniards. For example, in the session which led to the approval of an increase in Spanish troops in Afghanistan on May 11th, 2006, only 2 of the 350 deputies voted against. A survey by the Elcano Royal Institute, however, showed that only 51% of those questioned were in favour of Spanish troops in Afghanistan, compared with 45% against. As for Somalia, in the session on the 21st of January, 2009 which requested authorization to participate in Operation Atalanta, not a single deputy voted against (2 abstained), and in the session on the 22nd of April, 2010 to authorize EUTM-Somalia, there was not a single vote was against the mission (5 abstentions). In surveys from March and November 2009, only 48% and 55% of those surveyed held a positive opinion of troop participation in Atalanta. With the sole exception of Iraq (8 votes from Unidos Podemos and ERC were against, with 29 votes in favour), you could count the deputies opposed to foreign military missions on one hand, while opposing opinions in the Spanish society at large are much more common.

Prioritization of the NATO and EU missions to the detriment of the UN

Of the 14 ongoing military operations (excluding the political missions) of the UN as of August 2018, Spain was only participating in one (UNIFIL, in Lebanon). The rest of foreign military deployments were with NATO (7 missions), the EU (another seven) or in support for other interventions (two in collaboration with France in former colonies). In Lebanon, for example, 610 troops were deployed, making up only 23% of the roughly 2,600 foreign Spanish total.

This is not a new trend. For years, the tendency in Spain has been to marginalize UN missions in favour of the EU, and above all, NATO. Between 1989 and November 1994, Spain got involved in ten “significant” operations (involving more than 10 soldiers), and of these, eight of them (80%) were operations with the “blue helmets” (that is to say, UN soldiers). However, since November 1994, of the nearly 40 missions in which Spain’s troops participated, they only took part in two UN missions: Haiti (between October 2004 and March 2006) and Lebanon (since September 2006, the only one in which Spain continues to take part), both of these during the Government of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. That is to say, Spain has only undertaken

two missions of the UN (with the blue helmets) with military forces (not just observers) in nearly a quarter century, and not a single one in the last 12 years. It should also be kept in mind that UNIFIL includes Israel, which signed the first programme of Individual Cooperation with NATO in the final stages of its war with Lebanon in 2006. This coincided with the deployment of Spanish troops and troops from another seven NATO and EU countries (a total of 11 to UNIFIL, making up 70% of the blue helmets. This is the only example of a blue helmet operation with such a high representation (UN, 2006).

This reality reveals Spanish ambitions for global security: to prioritize its role in NATO and the EU over other regional organizations, and to minimize responsibilities within the UN. In fact, in fewer than 250 lines of the National Defence Directive of 2012, there are 14 mentions of NATO, an organization which is awarded more relevance than the EU, which is only mentioned on nine occasions. However, the UN is barely even mentioned, only to indicate the obligation of attending to its resolutions (Prime Minister's Office, 2012). NATO, the EU and the national armies are, in practice, but also in theory, more selective (due to the crisis) than the blue helmets. NATO, for example, only defends – or at least greatly prioritizes – the interests of its 28 member states (some more than others).

Justification of the military interventions as “humanitarian”

Of the footage in the widely publicized video “Ahora Más” from the 2004-2005 Ministry of Defence campaign, 100% showed self-proclaimed “humanitarian” interventions. However, the percentage of budget items identified as humanitarian by the same Ministry of that same year of 2004 was some 0,0006% (Pozo, 2007a:53). To defend the entirety of what the army does as humanitarian assistance was an exceptional stretch, but not out of character, as part of their legitimacy rests on that idea. In a survey by the Elcano Royal Institute in November 2005, the simple answer (that is to say, in which one can expect that the implied purpose will be the main answer), 58% of those given the question “What is the purpose of the Spanish troops in Afghanistan?” responded that it was for humanitarian aid. Another 18% replied that it was to support democracy and stability, 12% to rebuild the country, 8% to avoid civil war, 7% peacekeeping, 3% to fight terrorism, and 1% to improve conditions with the USA. The Elcano Royal Institute defended the military

operations in Afghanistan, Haiti, and the Balkans as “humanitarian” in their poll from March, 2006. José María Aznar christened the 2003 invasion of Iraq a humanitarian intervention, and it continues to be called that on the Ministry of Defence website. As “humanitarian” as Felipe González’s justification of the intervention in Bosnia ten years prior (54). Since 2010 (following the earthquake in Haiti) the website of the Ministry of Defence hasn’t described its other foreign military interventions as “humanitarian”.

Insisting on justifying past foreign military operations as humanitarian can result in some really confusing situations, and the figures are telling. For example, during the military missions in Albania (Kosovar refugees, in 1999) Mozambique (floods, in 2000) and Southeast Asia (tsunami, in 2005) were justified as humanitarian operations. According to the data given by the government itself, in Mozambique, €4.47 million were spent to set up a hospital in a campaign that lasted a bit more than three weeks, while the NGO which was relocated to the hospital was financed with less than €219,000 for a 4 month operation. In Albania, €45.17 million were spent on the construction of a refugee camp for 2,250 people during two months, and in Banda Aceh (Indonesia) €2.5 were spent to attend to 2,506 people. This works out to the surprising result of €10,037 per month for every Kosovar refugee (with a similar sum, they could have stayed at the most expensive luxury hotel in Tirana), and €1,000 for each Indonesian patient who was attended to (Pozo, 2007a:75-77). No one financing an NGO would stand for such ratios. Of course, armies have more than enough capacity to help people for much smaller sums, but we must keep in mind that military operations aren’t efficient in humanitarian terms, but in political ones.

As well, the military’s abuse of the concept of humanitarianism can also have consequences for the security and the acceptance of humanitarian actors. With the distribution of aid, military groups hope to win the favour of locals, and in this way, improve their own security and take away legitimacy and support for an opponent. Armies are also known for insisting that the civil population declare their support for the army. Within this logic, those receiving aid can be perceived as taking sides, and themselves become targets as if they were combatants. This occurred, for example, in the Kosovar refugee camps in Macedonia and Albania in 1999 under control of NATO, one of the parties in the conflict. Humanitarian organizations condemned that both the camps as well as the people in them were targets for hostilities from the armed groups combating NATO forces. (Stobbaerts, 1999). Humanitarian groups must be clearly separate from the military to ensure the perception of

independence and operational neutrality from armed actors and the general population. This ensure the impartiality of assistance and avoids the use of aid as for political opportunism. As an example of the latter, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation (AECID), nine days before the invasion, called upon top NGOs to find out what their response would be to an intervention. Many considered the initiative to be a scandal (El Mundo, 2003), but many others offered to help with the military operation.

Lack of budgetary transparency

The initial annual budget which was allocated to foreign military operations between 1990 and 1999 was 0 euros; €60,10 million between 2000 and 2004; €18.36 million in 2005 and 2006; €17.36 million the next two years, and €14.36 million between 2009 and 2017, coming to a total in 28 years, of €501.18 million. The actual settled expenditure in the period in question, however, came to €12.4 billion, almost 25 times higher. In 2017, for example, the government budgeted €14.36 million and spent €1.06 billion, 74 times more, an enormous gap that is covered each year by the so-called “contingency funds” (Ortega, Bohigas and Mojal, 2018: 21). Although there are understandable deviations in the final cost for uncertainties that can be taken into account in contexts that are in and of themselves unstable, not even a complete withdrawal of all the troops from every foreign deployment would account for these predictions (the costs of the withdrawals themselves would amount to more). By presenting such ridiculous (and untruthful) predictions, it is easier for public opinion to accept military expenditures. Furthermore, there is little transparency: there is a clear omission of any reference to the costs of foreign military operations on the very detailed section of the official web of the Ministry of Defence dedicated to the missions. The only way to find out the true costs is through compulsory comparisons in the Congress of Deputies, and for answers given (also compulsory) to specific questions raised in Parliament.

The tendency for a militarist response to political crises

Given a foreign political crisis, a country can act in many different ways, and foreign military intervention is just one possible path among many. Other op-

tions are political, diplomatic, or economic cooperation, whether it comes from one's own initiative, or by participating in others' initiatives, or contributing so that the causal actors change their attitudes or foster more pacific relations. However, in a good part of the zones in which the armed forces have acted, Spain did not show clear indications of non-military participation. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, there was no political, diplomatic or economic involvement of any kind before the troops were deployed, and to this day, it is still negligible (compared to military involvement). More than 9 of every 10 euros of Spanish funds directed to Afghanistan have been strictly military, and the majority of the rest has also had a large military component – directed at bettering security and military activities through improved acceptance by the locals. The percentage attributable to political and diplomatic participation has been, in comparison to the military component, practically nonexistent. As well, between 2002 and 2005, the Ministry of Defence contributed (as part of the military logic) more than 40 million euros, which were calculated as Official Development Assistance (ODA), 77% of the total bilateral Spanish contribution (MAEC, 2004 and 2005). This practice goes against the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, and Spain ceased counting military activities as ODA in 2006 (MAEC, 2006: 8). Three fourths of Spanish involvement in the Somalia were purely military (Martin, Fortuny and Bohigas, 2009: 51). Furthermore, it is enormously worrying that Spain has been exporting “humanitarian aid” of double use – light arms – to the governments of the countries where troops have been deployed. In 2015, for example, €85 million in defense material for Iraq, there is another €52 million in 2016, and €33.3 million in 2017, the last of these was in munitions (González, 2018); more than €11 million in defense material for Libya in 2010 (one year prior to the military intervention) or nearly €2 million in light arms since the fall of Gaddafi; nearly €3 million in exports of defense material to Afghanistan between 2013 and 2015; €6.7 million in small arms to Lebanon since 2006; or €3.4 million in light arms to the Central African Republic between 2006 and 2013, the year of the start of the current armed conflict (Font and Melero, 2016: 23-42).

Conclusion

Given the sections above, we can get rid of any idea that Spanish foreign military operations can pride themselves of having honestly explained the

reasons and goals of the interventions; nor have they abided by international law; nor has there been accountability for the outcomes; nor has the plurality of public opinion been represented in the Parliament; nor has the UN or even the EU taken precedence over NATO; nor has there been clarity around the actors, logic or narrative of the humanitarian aid; nor has there been transparency around budgeting and results. Above all, as a response to political crises, military action has not been preceded by, subordinated to, or replaced by diplomatic alternatives to the use of force. It is an act of hypocrisy to defend the use of force as a last resort, if in the same countries to which troops have been deployed there has not been a similar amount of resources dedicated to solving political problems with diplomacy. Nor is it honest to appeal to individual security without considering the security of the human beings involved – and not one’s own national interests – as the main goal of the intervention. However, even if a military operation met each and every one of these criteria, it still wouldn’t necessarily legitimize the use of force or make it desirable or advisable, it still would require an analysis of each mission in its particular context. All told, it is worth critically questioning the manner in which geopolitics plays out within international relations, as well as the role of the armed forces in the competition between nations, who benefits from foreign intervention (and who is hurt) and what motives are behind them.

Bibliography

- AJANGIZ, Rafael (2003): “Intervenciones humanitarias y opinión pública: de la exigencia al desencanto” [Humanitarian interventions and public opinion: from , *Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals*, núm. 60, p. 23-42,
- CIS (2018): “Tres problemas principales que existen actualmente en España (Multirrespuesta %)” [The three biggest problems in Spain today (multiple choice %)], *Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas*, http://www.cis.es/cis/export/sites/default/-Archivos/Indicadores/documentos_html/TresProblemas.html
- EFE (2017): “Aznar: ‘Nunca he tenido mejor foto que la de las Azores’” [Aznar: I never got a better portrait than in the Azores’], *La Vanguardia*, 5th of April.

- El Mundo* (2003): “Intermón y Médicos Sin Fronteras rechazan la ayuda del Gobierno para financiar proyectos en Irak” [Intermon and Doctors Without Borders refuse Government help to finance projects in Iraq], March 11th.
- Europa Press (2009): “Repsol resta credibilidad a la posible nacionalización en Libia, donde tiene ‘excelentes’ relaciones” [Repsol denies a possible nationalization in Libya, where it has ‘excellent’ relations], January 22, <http://www.europapress.es/economia/noticia-economia-empresas-repsol-resta-credibilidad-posible-nacionalizacion-libia-donde-tiene-excelentes-relaciones-20090122130729.html>
- FONT, Tica and Eduardo MELERO (2016): *Spanish Arms Exports 2006-2015 Spanish weapons used in Middle East conflicts*, Delàs Centre, http://www.centredelas.org/images/INFORMES_i_altres_PDF/informe29_eng_web-B.pdf
- GONZÁLEZ, Miguel (2018): “España bate su récord de exportación de armamento con 4.346 millones” [Spain breaks records for weapons exports, at €4.35 billion], *El País*, May 15th.
- MARTIN, Loretta P., Teresa DE FORTUNY and Xavier BOHIGAS (2012): *Piracy in Somalia: An Excuse or a Geopolitical Opportunity?*, Delàs Centre, http://www.centredelas.org/images/stories/informes/informe13_eng_web.pdf
- MELERO, Eduardo (2012): *Las Operaciones Militares de España en el Exterior* [Spanish Foreign Military Operations], Instituto Catalán Internacional para la Paz, Barcelona, http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/documents_i_informes/projectes_de_recerca/recerca012012.pdf
- MAEC (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation) (multiple years): *Seguimiento del PACI* [Monitoring of the Annual Plan of International Cooperation], Madrid.
- Ministry of Defence (2018): “Misiones en el exterior” [Foreign Missions], http://www.defensa.gob.es/misiones/en_exterior/ [Accessed on: August 2018].
- UN (2006): “UN Mission’s Contributions by Country”, September 30th, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/sept06_5.pdf
- ORTEGA, Pere, Xavier BOHIGAS and Xavier MOJAL (2018): *Los despropósitos del gasto militar. Análisis del presupuesto de defensa de España de 2017*, Delàs Centre, http://www.centredelas.org/images/INFORMES_i_altres_PDF/informe34_cast_DEF.pdf

- POZO, Alejandro (2012): “Reflexiones sobre las operaciones militares españolas en el exterior” [Thoughts on Spanish Foreign Military Operations], 17 de December, <http://www.centredelas.org/es/conflictos-y-guerras/759-reflexiones-sobre-las-operaciones-militares-espanolas-en-el-exterior>
- POZO, Alejandro (2009): “Las operaciones militares españolas en el exterior” [Spanish Foreign Military Operations], in Calvo, Jordi and Alejandro Pozo (coords., 2009): *Atlas del Militarismo en España*, Barcelona, Icaria, p. 62-73.
- POZO, Alejandro (2008): *Afganistán 2001-2008: 10 razones para cuestionar (y repensar) la intervención extranjera* [Afghanistan 2001-2008: 10 reasons to questions (and rethink) foreign intervention], Delàs Centre, http://www.centredelas.org/images/stories/adjunts/442_INFORME-4cas.pdf
- POZO, Alejandro (2007a): “Los ejércitos ‘humanitarios’. Las operaciones españolas en el exterior 1999-2005” [‘Humanitarian’ armies. Spanish Foreign Operations 1999-2005], in Oliveres, Arcadi and Pere Ortega (eds.): *El Militarismo en España*, Barcelona, Icaria, p. 43-84.
- POZO, Alejandro (2007b): “Las actuaciones militares españolas de carácter humanitario” [Spanish military actions of a humanitarian nature], in Pozo, Alejandro and Sabina Puig (coords.): *Humanitarismo Militar, Militarismo Humanitario*, Barcelona, Delàs Centre, p. 98-114.
- Prime Minister’s Office (2012): *National Defence Directive 2012 For a Necessary and Responsible Defence*, Madrid, July, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167337/DGL-National-Defence-Directive-2012.pdf>
- RODRÍGUEZ, Jesús and Gregorio VERDUGO (2014): “Aznar pactó una comisión del 1% con Abengoa para conseguir adjudicaciones en la Libia de Gadafi” [Aznar was to receive a 1% commision for contracts awarded to Abengoa in Gadaffi’s Libya], *Eldiario.es*, 29 de October, https://www.eldiario.es/economia/Aznar-Abengoa-contratos-Libia-Gadafi_0_318469113.html
- Secretaría General de Política de Defensa (2002): *Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa* [Strategic Defence Review], <http://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/defensadocs/revision-estrategica.pdf>
- STOBBAERTS, Eric (1999): “No hay guerras humanitarias” [There are no humanitarian wars], *El Mundo*, April 23.

VIII. Promoting peace processes and conflict resolution

José Ángel Ruiz Jiménez¹

The implementation of a peace process is not an easy undertaking. Getting one started doesn't depend so much upon a conflict having ended, or that one should wait until it does, as much as something that one *cultivates* through a realistic analysis of the conflict, which can allow an accurate configuration of the required renewal and regeneration. Therefore one should take many variables into account, such as the motivations of the contenders, the cultural context, and the social mood.

A peace agreement is an opportunity to reconfigure the framework of power relations and alternatives for each of the implicated parties in an armed conflict. The agreements should not be seen as rigid contracts to be fulfilled, but rather as a first and imperfect stage which feeds the kind of peace capable of creating opportunities and incentives, transforming the armed groups into political entities. The quality of the peace depends in large part on the extent to which the agreements are implemented, the effective application of mechanisms of nonviolent conflict resolution and the social space occupied by civil and political actors. Often, the key lies in the internal evolution of the actors involved, and their capacity to create and apply truly effective combined policies, justice, reparation and well-being, which are the true tasks of peace (Ruiz and Esparza, 2008). We will dedicate the following pages to these issues.

1. Professor in the Department of Contemporary History and member of the Peace and Conflict Research Institute at the University of Granada. He has a degree in Geography and History, a Doctorate in History and a graduate degree in Advanced Peace Studies in Peace and Conflict (University of Granada), European Master in Human Rights (Universities of Padua and Essex) and a Master in Human Rights in the Contemporary World (International University of Andalucía).

The difficult art of the peace process

There are various factors which are both theoretically and empirically necessary for there to be a quality peace in a society in which the end of a conflict is being negotiated through a peace agreement. First, it is necessary to establish the conditions of the new order. In the political sphere, there should be a guarantee of security, a means of resolution of disputes over access to power and resources and the creation of mechanisms for government accountability to civil society. In the socioeconomic sphere, there should be the promotion of reconciliation, an opening of economic opportunities for the most vulnerable and marginalized segments of the population, and citizens should be provided with needed goods and services.

As Joshi and Wallensteen (2017) show, simply measuring the efficiency of the peace accords by the lack of new armed conflict in the years following is not enough, despite the promising prospect of stability that the signing of such an agreement would mean, if compared to a *complete victory* of one side or another. Even though some 75% of wars end in negotiated agreements, this high figure hides the fact that the statistic mixes very different levels of success, such as El Salvador, Rwanda, the Balkans, Cambodia, or Nepal (Joshi and Wallensteen, 2017: 6). As well, few post-civil war societies which have reached a peace accord have managed a real commitment to the stipulated provisions or have done so with limited success (Lee, Mac Ginty and Joshi, 2016). However, if we restrict it to the cases that do not wind up with a renewal of the armed conflict, with the existence of a shared sovereignty and that there are the minimum conditions for political participation, we find few successful cases of peacebuilding. In fact, Doyle and Sanbanis (2000) observed that only 31% wound up with positive outcomes after analysing the 121 civil wars between 1945 and 1999. The processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) also tends to happen very slowly. Besides, it isn't realistic to assume that these societies can become full democracies immediately after an armed conflict, given that these transitions usually follow authoritarian or semidemocratic regimes.

Greed and grievance seem to be the true causes underlying every conflict (Keen, 2000). However, to enable and legitimize the confrontation, both sides need to clearly distinguish themselves their adversaries, and assign them a new identity (ideological, religious, ethnic, etc.), which is much more visible and capable of mobilizing consciences than the true underlying causes. Even

though in 72% of the 125 cases studied by Joshi (2010: 841-842) between 1946 and 2005 there was a process of transition to democracy at the end of the armed conflict, this is often associated with a concept of liberal democracy and peacebuilding, which has meant a formal commitment to human rights, but little attention to social or economic factors. As well, the criteria that have been traditionally used to evaluate the success of peacebuilding experiences are appealing, but barely show to what extent people undergo significant change in their lives. They tend to focus on power-sharing and peacekeeping, rarely evaluating the extent to which both parties have lived up to the provisions of the peace accord. In this way, an important challenge is to go beyond the signing of an agreement that merely achieves a negative peace, and instead to make an effort for positive peace. This should include an understanding that a successful process of peacebuilding includes institutional reform to undo the causes of the structural and cultural violence which give rise to social injustice. Quality peace is not achieved by government action alone, but defining it is very difficult, even in societies that have not recently suffered armed conflict. As suggested by Darby and Mac Ginty (2008) and as reinforced by Joshi and Wallensteen (2017) the notion of a *successful peace process* should include all the relevant issues and actors involved, assessing the extent to which social, political and economic objectives have been respected once they have given up armed struggle. For example, in Cambodia, after the Paris Peace Accords of 1991, insecurity and political violence continued, leading to an atmosphere dominated by a single political party, which strengthened its own network of ownership; and where the independence of civil society was mostly safeguarded by outside actors; and where the Tribunal for National Reconciliation failed to meet even its most basic goals. Nevertheless, the economic growth of the country has been considerable, there have been important legal reforms, and the material reconstruction has been a success largely due to good policies on the part of donor countries. El Salvador, Northern Ireland or Mozambique have also had mixed results. The same is true of Colombia and the Balkans (Ruiz, 2002 and 2016; Morfakidis and Ruiz, 2017).

Truth, justice and reparation

Experience shows us that the desire for vengeance that can undermine peaceful coexistence is significantly calmed when there is universal access and

public recognition for the truth. Likewise, the concealment and restriction of access to the truth only increases the anger and hatred of victims and enormously complicates cohabitation. The lack of recognition for what has been unjustly suffered is very frustrating and if a common source of discontent and even of instability. Recovering the historical memory it is not just a matter of clearing up the truth, it is also a matter of recognizing the right of the victims and of the entire society to know what happened. Moreover, it is worth emphasising the fact, or at least the possibility, that testimony and evidence can serve as a basis for future judicial action, or whether sectors which have traditionally had impunity or been illegal can publicly acknowledge their participation and responsibility in human rights violations without recrimination.

Indeed, what we can learn from examples such as South Africa, Rwanda, the Balkans, and Argentina, is that it is important to go beyond the narrative imposed by any faction, but at the same time, it must not be unrealistically consensual. By recognising the different narratives, one can re-humanize, rather than de-humanize the former adversary (Lederach, 2002; Ruiz, 2012).

In a genuine peace process, it's necessary for some kind of justice, or perhaps better said, satisfaction, beyond the recognition for what victims have suffered and the public recognition of who were the aggressors and what they did. In many cases where democracies have substituted dictatorships, it has been impossible to take legal action calling for justice for crimes committed. For different reasons, there are compromises: victimizers often maintain some of their power, and without mutual concessions they start a new escalation of violence before giving up; they can have a significant portion of the society on their side; they can have armed groups or the army on their side, etc. On these occasions, there can be imaginative solutions, such as the creation of alternative penal structures adapted to the needs of each case, since the same rules cannot always be applied to each society or to each individual. To this one needs to add that there may be rigid state structures or strict political frameworks which can prevent some options, such as the wise combination of retributive and restorative justice. It is important to establish new relational formula which are characterized not so much by a confrontation just between the state and the aggressor, but which also include a human dimension, to make sure they understand the loss and damage suffered by their victims. Also it obliges the victimizer to do some kind of direct compensation to the victims – beyond a mere prison stay –,

and gives the victim the opportunity to take on an active role in the process and contribute testimony that goes beyond a mere account of what happened. These parameters of understanding and analysis are very different from those of penal justice. In this sense, there are very important proposals and experiences of restorative justice, held in public and within state institutions, but outside of ordinary courts (Britto, 2009). In this way, uncovering the truth, aside from making a historical memory possible, which in and of itself is a form of justice, helps to lay a foundation for mechanisms of direct reparation to victims. This is a highly recommended practice to help bring a good conclusion to a peace process and political transition when there are victimizers who have committed human rights violations. In a few cases this has been implemented, as it was – belatedly – in Chile and Argentina. Sadly, however, there are many more examples of impunity as in the case of Spain or Algeria. The International Criminal Court is an initiative to end the impunity that criminals in high political posts and their accomplices have long enjoyed, although the controversial results of the experiences in Rwanda and ex-Yugoslavia show that there is still a long way to go before these kinds of institutions are effective.

Reconciliation through nonviolence

Reconciliation is the creation or building of bridges; it is a wise form of providing the conditions needed to restore a sense of well-being and justice, away from violence, cruelty, hate or resentment. To ask people to pardon the victimizers for the good of a peace process is to ignore an essential step, compassion (which can be understood as a strong sense of empathy). To foster compassion, experiences such as the restorative meetings of Glencree, show the benefits of creating spaces where both parties, including victims and victimizers, can give and ask reasons for what they did and didn't do. Of course, these dialogues can neither justify actions nor exonerate guilt, but between parties who have fought, sometimes to the death, and vilified and demonized each other, if can help them begin to understand and see the human side of their former enemy. Exchanges of this kind can contribute powerfully to create a consciousness of one's own defects, as well as make it more probable that they can face and understand former adversaries. To ease this task, there should be the political will of the state and other institutions.

As well, the mass media can play an important role, especially through the educational work of making it socially acceptable to undergo a process which could otherwise face significant incomprehension and criticism. To progress to the needed reconciliation in a peace process, the victimizers should act in a way making them worthy of pardon, because this cannot come only from one of the side, but the victimizers must ask for it and the victims must grant it. Both parties must inspire confidence of the other, as it is the victimizers who must show the victims, and the entire nation, that they deserve to be pardoned for their crimes (López, 2000).

As well, it is essential to overcome the fears present in the society, because hate – an element present in many human rights violations – goes hand in hand with fear. Fear is at the root of uncountable conflicts and violence, because one does not hate those for which one is not afraid. For this reason, consistently acting nonviolently in a conflict over time can increase one's own security considerably, by creating the guarantee that one is not a threat to the other, and ensuring the possibility of a peace process. Notwithstanding, though nonviolence can raise security, by no means does it guarantee it. On this point, reality gives us many frustrating examples. Take, for example, the so-called Generation 88 in Myanmar, made up of university students who in 1988 saw how massive demonstrations suffered hundreds of deaths due to government repression. The aggressors continue in power some 30 years later, and the victims – survivors and family members – cannot but themselves feel completely hopeless and disoriented.

Given situations like that of Myanmar, self-indulgence and inaction are things that everyone practices to a greater or lesser degree, considering that there is nothing that can be done. However, history shows us that strength, just by being present, and sometimes in secrecy, can take hold of the situation when least expected, and it can bring the downfall even of regimes as monolithic and repressive as that of South African Apartheid, Marcos's Philippines or the communist dictators of the East of Europe in 1989 (Satha and True, 2002).

The local historical and cultural context is of great importance in these kinds of processes, regardless of whether or not international actors get involved. Each society has created, over time, forms, norms, and institutions which help to achieve this role, whether these are symbols, stories, procedures or organizations, among others, which can allow changes to occur to the existing order. A perfect example is South Africa, which, as in each

case we have seen, had many elements which were not exportable. One of the those most worthy of note, the importance of which Bishop Desmond Tutu always points out, was the concept of *ubuntu*, a sense of deep humanity and compassion, which – although it may not condone it – allows for understanding of many kinds of deviant behaviour. The origin of the idea is a Zulu term which calls for a communal responsibility to defend and maintain life, and takes as a given that we are all interdependent. Together with this concept is that of *simunye* (“all are one”). The South African process, which consisted of a transition from a racist and totalitarian state to one of democracy and political pluralism, was not only the result of negotiations and agreements between politicians, but also of an *ethos* of solidarity, from a commitment on the part of South Africans for a peaceful coexistence despite differences.

Solidarity and respect for human rights are ever more present in these societies, but with different manifestations, something which is recognizable in terms of a growth of NGOs, voluntary service, popular protest to wars and the governments who start them, etc. When all is said and done, never before have so many citizens dedicated time and resources to the causes of peace and human rights (Ruiz, 2009).

Well-being and social inclusion

Is it just a question of continuing to ask for patience from countries like the Balkans, the majority of African countries, and Columbia, immersed in an interminable march as *developing countries* towards the capitalist paradise which the *developed countries* represent, after carrying out a peace process? Although capitalism has multiplied the world GDP by 3.5 in the past 30 years, millions have risen out of poverty, and the inequality between countries has fallen, it is also true that inequality within countries has risen, even in the capitalist north.

The truth is that it is very hard to imagine some kind of spring, lever or mechanism by which the global economy will tend towards a more equitable balance. As corporations merge and concentrate power, the competition is dwindling. The gap widens. The social atmosphere indicates clearly that this kind of prosperity is not essential to peace. Experience shows us that peace is not obtained through the simple pursuit of material prosperity as a guide

of conduct, because the facts refute this idea: the poverty of the Balkans, Nicaragua, East Timor, or Liberia, among many other cases, shows that we must go beyond the mere implementation of neoliberal recipes. What's more, experience shows us that we need inclusive policies for the redistribution of wealth which allow us to correct social exclusion and the structural poverty so common to countries undergoing a peace process. There also needs to be accountability, for if there is no solution to problems of corruption, the constant plundering of the public coffers leaving a state of perpetual bankruptcy and leaving to a government that is structurally weak as it undermines legitimacy and confidence in the institutions. Policies for education and research in strategic sectors that are well-financed and well-directed are also important. (Paris, 2004). This last factor is what allowed a nation like South Korea, which was left devastated by the war with high levels of illiteracy and few resources in 1953, to go from well below the countries of Latin America to enjoy a level of well-being, productivity, and competitiveness on the level of the European Union in just a few decades. (Oppenheimer, 2010 and 2014; Friedman, 2018).

Consider that neither the Koreans nor the Germans, nor the Finns, for example, are more talented than the Balkans or the Latin Americans of Colombia, Nicaragua, or El Salvador. The economic stagnation and social divisiveness in these latter countries has resulted in large part from the decisions of elites, who have opted to hoard as much wealth as they can, at the cost of excluding the masses of poor people. In the case of Latin America, this means they have to protect themselves even from physical attack, as they cannot even walk down the street in many of these countries. In the case of South Korea, or of the European social democracies, the elites opted for a different model, one that redistributed wealth and offered opportunities so that the entire country would benefit from the available material resources. This allowed people to develop their potential and create environments of security and prosperity for all, rather than mere enclaves.

Bibliography

BRITTO, Diana (2009): *La justicia restaurativa. Comunidades que construyen paz*. [Restorative Justice. Communities which build peace]. Santiago de Chile, EUB.

- DARBY, John and MAC GINTY, Roger (eds.) (2008): *Contemporary peacemaking. Conflict, peace processes and post-war reconstruction*. Second Edition. London, Palgrave – Mcmillan.
- DOYLE, Michael and SAMBANIS, Nicholas (2000): “International Peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis”, *American Political Science Review*, 94 (4), 779-801.
- FRIEDLAND, Thomas (2018): “Crazy Poor Middle Easterners”, *The New York Times*, September 4th.
- JOSHI, Madhav, (2010): “Post-civil war democratization: Promotion of Democracy in post civil war states”, *Democratization*, 17 (5), p. 826-855.
- JOSHI, Madhav and Peter WALLENSTEEN (2017): *Understanding Quality Peace. Peacebuilding after Civil War*, Routledge, London and New York.
- KEEN, David (2000): “Incentives and disincentives for violence” in Berdal, Mats and David Malone: *Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars*. Boulder, Lynne Rienner.
- LEE, Sung Yong, Roger MAC GINTY and Madhav JOSHI (2016): “Social Peace vs Security Peace”, *Global Governance: A review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, 22 (4), p. 491-512.
- LEDERACH, Jean Paul (2002): *Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington, US Institute of Peace Press.
- LÓPEZ MARTÍNEZ, Mario (2000): “Transiciones y reconciliaciones. Cambios necesarios en el mundo actual” [Transitions and reconciliations. Changes needed in the world today], in Rodríguez, Francisco Javier (ed.) *Cultivar la paz. Perspectivas desde la Universidad de Granada*. Granada, Universidad de Granada.
- MORFAKIDIS, Dimitris and José Ángel RUIZ JIMÉNEZ (2017): “Balcanes, procesos históricos y desafíos actuales” [The Balkans, historical processes and current challenges] (ed) *Centre of Byzantine, Modern Greek and Cypriot Studies*, Granada.
- OPPENHEIMER, Andrés (2010): *¡Basta de Historias! La Obsesión Latinoamericana con el Pasado y las 12 Claves del Futuro*. [Stop Telling Stories! The Latin American Obsession with the past and 12 keys to the Future] Madrid, Debate.
- OPPENHEIMER, Andrés (2014): *Crear o morir. La esperanza de Latinoamérica y los cinco secretos de la innovación*. [Create or die. The hopes of Latin America and five secrets for innovation.] Madrid, Debate.

- PARIS, Roland (2004): *At war's end: building Peace after civil conflict*, Cambridge, CUP.
- RUIZ JIMÉNEZ, José Ángel (2002): "La diplomacia civil noviolenta como alternativa al laberinto de la violencia en Colombia" [Nonviolent civil diplomacy as an alternative to the labyrinth of violence in Colombia], *Nova et Vetera*. Bogotá (Colombia), 49, October-December, p. 86-99.
- RUIZ JIMÉNEZ, José Ángel and ESPARZA CALDERÓN, Marcia (2008): "Sin recetas mágicas: algunos fundamentos de las tareas de la paz en procesos de transición política" [There are no magic recipes: some foundations for peace work in processes of political transition], in *Processos de Pau*, Sant Cugat de Vallés, UNIPAU, 2008, p. 7-20.
- RUIZ JIMÉNEZ, José Ángel (2009): "El movimiento pacifista en el mundo contemporáneo. Historia y presente" [The pacifist movement in the contemporary world. History and Present], *Tiempo de paz*, 92, p. 12-20.
- (2010): *Balcanes, la herida abierta de Europa. Conflicto y reconstrucción de la convivencia*. [The Balkans, the open wound of Europe. Conflict and rebuilding conviviality] Madrid, Plaza y Valdés.
- (2012): "Las sombras de la barbarie. Confrontación de memorias colectivas en los países ex yugoslavos" [The shadows of barbarism. Confrontation of collective memories in the ex-Yugoslav countries], *Balkania*, 3, p. 126-151.
- RUIZ JIMÉNEZ, José Ángel (2016): *Y llegó la Barbarie. Nacionalismo y juegos de poder en la destrucción de Yugoslavia*. [Barbarism came soon after. Nationalism and power games in the destruction of Yugoslavia] . Barcelona, Ariel.
- SATHA ANNAD, Chaiwat and TRUE, Michael (eds.) (2002): *The Frontiers of Nonviolence*. Bangkok, IPRA.

IX. Avoiding war

Anna Montull Garcia¹

Carl von Clausewitz, theorist of modern military science, stated that “*war is the continuation of politics by other means.*” Indeed, it is difficult to deny that throughout ancient and modern history, war has been waged as a means for political ends. However, is it possible to practice politics while rejecting belligerence, or are we condemned to continue reproducing the same pattern?

To advocate for warfare is an option, not a precondition. Each state, by nature of its unwavering sovereignty is recognized by the international community, has a right to adopt an pacifist posture within the world, or at the very least, one that prioritizes non-aggression over armed resolution of conflicts.

Neutrality policies

One of the existing experiences which in conceptual and practical terms has been aligned with anti-militarism despite the controversy and debate which it has generated, is neutrality. This is defined as the situation that arises from the refusal of a state to any involvement in foreign wars, and the mainte-

1. Degree in Audiovisual Communication, postgraduate in Culture of Peace and Masters in International Relations, specializing in peace and security with the thesis “Las guerras y el cuarto poder. El control de la información en los medios como instrumento de la guerra de Irak de 2003” [War and the Fourth Estate. Information Control in the Media as an instrument of war in Iraq in 2003]. She works at the Universitat Internacional de la Pau (UNIPAU) and at UNESCO as a communicator and educator, and is a member of the Delàs Center for Peace Studies.

nance of an attitude of impartiality toward the two warring parties, as well as a recognition on the part of the warring parties of their abstention and impartiality (United Nations, 2018).

The neutrality of a state can be *de jure*, if it is regulated by International Law in terms of treaties, pacts, agreements, or joint declarations, or it can be *de facto*, if it is the result of the practice of neutrality by the given state even without being stipulated by any international agreement. The former of the two is a neutrality recognized by International Law, the best-known cases of which are Switzerland and Austria. As for the latter, it is a type of neutrality which is based on a political decision, as is the case of Sweden or Finland, which although they do not have the *de jure* status of a neutral country, they are characterized by practising a neutrality based on established political relations.

Every state whose neutral status has been recognized and accepted by the International Community practices permanent neutrality, which dictates the rights and obligations that they must follow according to the Hague Convention of 1907. There are several ways a nation can acquire such a status. A state can become a neutral party through a multilateral agreement between various states, as is the case of Sweden, or through a unilateral declaration of neutrality recognized after the fact by different states, as is the case of Austria.

Aside from the classic notion of perpetual neutrality which is regulated by international law and a *sine qua non* condition for a state being recognized as such, the different scenarios of the 21st Century have given rise to new examples of neutrality – formal and informal – which have become more flexible, re-articulating and expanding the praxis of the term. International Law itself has considered other kinds of neutrality such as *occasional neutrality*, in which a non-neutral state decides to undertake neutrality in a particular war between other states. In that case, these states should also undertake the legal obligations stipulated by the Hague Conventions. However a permanently neutral state is expected to be much more rigorous with the compliance of its obligations than a non-neutral state that adopts occasional neutrality (Novak, 1996).

For its part, *de facto* neutrality, i.e. that which is the result of political decisions, also comes in many forms. *Constitutional neutrality* refers to the situation in which states hope to remain neutral by means of an internal order (Borrás, 1975). In this way, a nation can ratify a policy of neutrality in the constitution despite not being recognized as permanently neutral by the international community. This is the case, for example, of Cambodia or

Japan – this last one until 2014, when it modified its constitution to change its neutrality status–. During the Second Spanish Republic, the Spanish state also took up a neutrality policy in the Constitution of 1931. In article 6, Spain renounced war as an instrument of national politics, and according to article 77, the President of the Republic was unable to sign a declaration of war without meeting the prescribed conditions in the Covenant of the League of Nations, and only when all other defensive and non-military means had been exhausted. This included judicial procedures, reconciliation, and arbitration established in the international conventions of which Spain formed part, registered in the League of Nations.

However, there are also countries whose neutrality is not constitutionally regulated, but whose diplomatic tradition has led them to be considered within the international community as states that practice *de facto* neutrality, such as Finland, Sweden, or Ireland. Among their many neutral policies, these three countries have decided out of conviction not to be members of NATO, the military alliance to which their neighbours have joined. However, it can be said to the detriment of this that the non-formal position of neutrality of Finland and Sweden has been strongly compromised by the participation of both countries in the Organization's military exercises, including interventions in Afghanistan or, in the case of Sweden, even participation in the 2011 air war in Libya (The Economist, 2014).

Challenges for neutrality policies

Many of the cases in which the practice of neutrality has been perceived as compromised are explained by collaboration with military and collective security alliances. A state that advocates non-belligerency is hardly compatible with this type of intergovernmental organization, whether they participate on a temporary basis or become a member. For its part, the member directly fosters – militarily or economically – a partial, military and offensive relationship with the world. Not all military alliances require the compulsory provision of military aid in the event of an attack on another member, but they do implicitly carry the expectation. Moreover, neutrality would be compromised not only by this consideration, but by the very concept of military alliance. In a world in which there is more than one such organization, being part of one of them necessarily implies a political position in favour of one

and, consequently, against the others. Each alliance designs its framework for action based on the collective interests of its members. Therefore, even if a member does not lend troops in regular operations and only contributes financially, the stance continues to exist by consenting and collaborating in the use of the military over other means of achieving their own interests, as well as the interests of other members of the alliance. As early as 1991, NATO had changed its strategic framework to extend its areas of military action despite these being outside of the original agreement. Today, the new era of the War on Terror and its hegemonic narrative nurtured by the notion of a permanent threat, has catalysed the consolidation of a suitable framework for the legitimization of any military action in the name of security. This is made apparent by the latest Strategic Concept of NATO adopted in 2010, which accepts that the Organization can intervene not only defensively in the face of attacks but also offensively in the face of possible threats, which in a framework of interpretation as broad as the current one, can legitimize any offensive action. Adding to this, NATO promotes an ever-increasing integration of militarism and politics. It is a realm totally dominated by arms lobbies whose interests are far removed from the peaceful management of conflicts. In the name of security, exceptional deployments have become legitimate and commonplace.

When the Spanish Government held the consultative Referendum asking for entry into NATO in 1986, three conditions were promised. First, that Spain's participation with the Alliance would not include its incorporation into the integrated military structure, second, that there would continue to be a prohibition on the installation, storage or introduction of nuclear weapons in Spanish territory, and finally, that that the United States' military presence in Spain would be progressively reduced (Delàs Centre, 2016). The first and third conditions have not been met. In 1997 the PP with the support of the PSO agreed to join the integrated military structure of NATO, and US military presence has continued to increase at the Rota and Morón de la Frontera bases. Regarding the second consideration, the 1988 Convention between Spain and the United States on Defence Cooperation included that US ships "shall be exempt from inspections, including customs and health inspections" (regulation 9.3 of Annex 3), making it difficult to prove the presence or non-presence of nuclear weapons. However, given that the United States has stockpiled nuclear weapons in a number of states without reporting it, it would be perfectly reasonable to assume that they may have done so. Given

this situation, if the political leaders of Spain wanted to modify the state's relationship with NATO, and with their warmongering position towards the world, a first step could be simply starting to abide by the initial conditions that were proposed more than three decades ago. A second step would be to respect the Organic Law on National Defence, according to which foreign operations not related to the defense of Spain or the national interest require the express authorization of the Congress of Deputies (Melero, 2009). Unfortunately, cases such as NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence operation show that the Spanish state has authorized foreign military actions before receiving approval by Congress.

Preventive Diplomacy

The non-belligerent position of individual states, while good on principle, is not a panacea. There also needs to be an international system that works for a progressive transition towards less aggressive policies and that tries to normalize the peaceful resolution of conflicts, with existing practices such as *preventive diplomacy*, among other perfectly viable options. Preventive diplomacy is the call for diplomatic action to avoid disputes between two or more parties, prevent existing disputes from escalating into armed conflict, or, if such a confrontation has already occurred, to preventing it from spreading (United Nations, 1992).

This exercise is not a contemporary invention, since every society has informally practised some form of it throughout history (Bedjaoui, 2000). However, preventive diplomatic action as we know it today – formalized at the international level – began to take shape with the creation of the League of Nations in 1919 and began its first steps with the birth of the United Nations in 1945. The then Secretary General Trygve Lie, began to assign emissaries to disputed areas to carry out monitoring on the ground and work diplomatically with the aim of containing crisis situations that aroused greater international concern. However, it was Secretary Dag Hammarskjöld who articulated the concept for the first time and established a set of guidelines for its implementation, including how to assess the usefulness of diplomatic intervention and mediation in crisis situations. Since then, the Secretary General of the UN has placed preventive diplomacy among its priorities, leading its inclusion and implementation in the international framework,

and updating strategies for its implementation in light of new contexts and challenges. Various reports published by the Secretariat since then, the most prominent being “An Agenda for Peace” (1992) – presented by Secretary Boutros Boutros-Ghali – and “Preventive Diplomacy: Delivering Results” (2011) – presented by his successor Ban Ki-Moon – have developed tools and roadmaps that have allowed the standardization and advancement of the field on the international level. The role of Secretary Kofi Annan in transforming the United Nations from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention (Ackermann, 2003) is also noteworthy in this regard. With regard to the creation of structures, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) founded the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery in 2001, and in 2006 the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) opened the Mediation Support Unit as a result of the 2005 World Summit request, which in turn called for the expansion of the UN’s conflict prevention and resolution capacity. The continuing creation of specific departments within the UN to promote preventive diplomacy as well as the adoption of resolutions such as resolution 65/283 on “Strengthening the role of mediation in the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and resolution” (2011), have laid the foundations for the standardization of preventive diplomacy as the ideal first formula for conflict deterrence.

Challenges for preventive diplomacy

Despite the efforts, preventive diplomacy still faces multiple obstacles that hinder its acceptance as a general policy at the international level and its effectiveness when it is practised.

Firstly, the nature of conflict is mobile and changing. The end of the Cold War created a new geopolitical environment and new types of conflicts (Lopez, 2000) that have made the work of early detection and warning and the standardization of intervention mechanisms difficult. Unlike traditional wars, in which two or more states fought each other, we are now faced with a paradigm shift towards internal wars which have international repercussions. These can be states warring with non-state actors or they can be a direct conflict between non-state actors. We are therefore faced with new scenarios that require flexibility and renewed forms of preventive diplomacy adapted to each geopolitical context or particular case.

Secondly, the emergence of new actors in preventive diplomacy has created new challenges related to coordination (Zyck and Muggah, 2012). Traditionally, the United Nations has been the leader and implementer of preventive diplomacy, but in recent decades more and more forums, diplomatic exchanges and legal advice have been developed for states and regional organizations in order to train them and progressively delegate the management of prevention and mediation. Although this change has led regional and local bodies to play increasingly proactive roles, the multiplicity of actors has also raised questions about leadership and which mechanisms within the diffuse normative framework to follow, which in turn has generated doubts about the ability to evaluate effectiveness or accountability. The participation in the Nigerian electoral process of 2015 is an example that shows the difficulty of determining the impact of UN preventive diplomacy in cases where many national and international actors were involved in a variety of conflict prevention activities (United Nations, 2018). In this case, the report drawn up by the UN delegate in the field revealed doubts as to whether the success had been due to the cumulative effect of all the prevention activities carried out by the various intervening organizations, some in particular, or none of them at all.

Thirdly, there are still uncertainties for the real political will of governments and states to prioritize preventive diplomacy as a tool for conflict prevention. In this sense, some studies argue that the biggest problem is not be the lack of early warning, but the fact that governments often ignore emerging crises or adopt a passive attitude towards them until it escalates into a major catastrophe (Lopez and Holl, 1997). The lack of immediate response to emerging crises has led many observers to speak of “missed opportunities” for preventive action (Jentleson, 1998). Therefore, early warning is no guarantee of successful preventive action unless there is a real willingness on the part of both governments and international organizations to resolve the conflict (Lopez and Holl, 1997).

Faced with this range of challenges, the future remains to be seen, but even so, the evidence increasingly suggests that preventive diplomacy is the best option. The vocation of early resolution is more preferable in terms of peace, security and even for the economy than the reactive action of international intervention without mediation and post-conflict reparation (United Nations, 2011). Furthermore, among the non-military measures, preventive diplomacy is often one of the few options available in the face of political ten-

sion or a growing crisis, since in the current context and with the emergence of new types of intra-state conflicts, a large part of the coercive strategies that the international community used during the Cold War have become obsolete (Lopez, 2000).

The benefits of conflict prevention are not only key in terms of human, social and cultural costs, but also in economic terms. The World Bank itself calculated that the average cost of a civil war to a medium-sized developing country is equivalent to more than 30 years of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (World Bank, 2011). The most severe civil wars incur cumulative costs of tens of billions of dollars, and the society's recovery takes an average of 14 years (World Bank, 2011). Prevention efforts, on the other hand, can be much less costly. For example, the United Nations Office for West Africa, which has played a major role in prevention efforts in Niger, Guinea and elsewhere in the region, has a regular budget of less than \$8 million per year. The Global Peace Index also warns of the economic impact of violence as a whole worldwide, which was \$14.76 trillion in 2017, in terms of constant purchasing power parity (PPP), of which \$5.5 trillion went to military spending. This is equivalent to 12.4% of the world's gross domestic product (GDP). The report also points out that the direct and indirect costs of violence on individuals and societies represent a major loss of incentive for economic agents and a consequent slowdown in the economy. Using the multiplier effect the report concludes that for every dollar saved in containing violence, there would be at least one additional dollar of economic activity created (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018).

Preventive diplomacy, far from being a utopian dream, is nevertheless presented as an optimal and realistic possibility for the gradual transformation of the international society towards better conflict prevention and management, which can save enormous and disastrous losses of human life, cultural heritage, and economic capital. It is therefore an interesting practice to be further developed in parallel and across the board together with other forms of conflict prevention.

A beginning to the end of wars

If wars continue to occur, it is because they are fuelled, both economically and politically. It is therefore objectively unacceptable for states and the

international community as a whole to continue to wash their hands of the worsening of tensions or the perpetuation of current armed conflicts when there are alternatives. If we want a world that discourages the normalization and perpetuation of violence as a way of resolving conflicts, this forces us to take a stand and implement political measures consistent with it, nationally and internationally; anti-belligerent policies that require efforts and that bring about a paradigm shift. All of this is possible.

Bibliography

- ACKERMANN, Alice (2003): "The Idea and Practice of Conflict Prevention". *Journal of Peace Research*, vol. 40, n°3, 2003, p. 339-347. London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- BEDJAOUI, Mohammed (2000): *The Fundamentals of Preventive Diplomacy*, en: Cahill, Kevin (1996) *Preventive Diplomacy. Stopping wars before they start*. New York: Routledge Books.
- BORRÁS RODRÍGUEZ, A. (1975): *La neutralización de Suiza y sus relaciones con la Comunidad Económica Europea*. [The neutralization of Switzerland and its relations with the European Economic Community] *Anuario de derecho internacional*. II, p. 303-323
- Delàs Center for Peace Studies (2016): *Treinta preguntas sobre la OTAN. Treinta años después del Referéndum*. [Thirty questions about NATO. Thirty years after the referendum] Colección "Eines de Pau, Seguretat i Justícia". Barcelona: Líniazero edicions.
- Institute for Economics and Peace (2018): *Global Peace Index 2018: Measuring Peace in a Complex World*. Sydney, Institute for Economics & Peace.
- JENTLESON, Bruce (2000): *Opportunities Missed, Opportunities Seized: Preventive Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
- LOPEZ, George A. and Jane E. HOLL (1997): *The Warning Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy*. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict
- LOPEZ, George A. (2000): *Strategies for Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution: Scholarship for Policymaking*. PS: Political Science & Politics, 33(1), 15-20. doi:10.2307/420771

- MELERO, Eduardo (2009): “¿Se han legalizado las “guerras de agresión” en España?” [Has Spain legalized wars of aggression?], *Revista Vasca de Administración Pública*, nº83-2009, p. 91-115.
- Naciones Unidas (2018): “Día Internacional de la Neutralidad”, available at: <http://www.un.org/es/events/neutralityday>. Accessed on: 1 June de 2018.
- NOVAK, Fabián (1997): “La Neutralidad en el Derecho Internacional Contemporáneo” [Neutrality in Contemporary International Law], *Revista Agenda Internacional*, Año III, nº 7, January 1997.
- The Economist (2018): “What price neutrality?” available at: <https://www.economist.com/europe/2014/06/21/what-price-neutrality>. Accessed on: 25 June 2018.
- United Nations (1992): *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, Report of the United Nations Secretary-General.
- United Nations (2011): *Preventive diplomacy: delivering results*. New York: United Nations.
- United Nations, University Centre for Policy Research (2018): *UN Preventive Diplomacy during the 2015 Nigerian Elections*. United Nations University
- World Bank (2011): *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*. Washington. Washington D.C: World Bank.
- ZYCK, S.A and MUGGAH, R. (2012): “Preventive Diplomacy and Conflict Prevention: Obstacles and Opportunities”. *Stability*, 1(1): p. 68-75. DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.ac>.

PART TWO

**POLICIES FOR PEACE
AND HUMAN SECURITY**

I. Introduction: policies for peace-building

Arcadi Oliveres Boadella¹

Fostering peace must always be thought of in positive terms. Aside from the logical absence of war and conflict – to which other chapters of this publication dedicate much-deserved attention – it is imperative that this analysis consider other aspects of peace that are often sidelined, but which are by no means unimportant. For this reason, we will discuss the roles of the media and information, three aspects of peaceful coexistence among the population – getting people’s needs met, freedom of movement and preventive policies – and finally, day-to-day advances of peace.

As these three purposes mix public, social and citizen responsibilities, we will reiterate the well-known phrase that “peace is everyone’s business”. This will be discussed in more detail below.

Access to the relevant information, a tool for peace

Any action, private or public, is motivated by prior information that, together with the values that we hold, determines our behaviour.

-
1. Economist, Doctor in Economic Sciences, and Professor Emeritus at the Department of Applied Economics at the Autonomous University of Barcelona. President of the University of Peace in Sant Cugat del Vallès. Specialist in North-South Relations, Foreign Debt and Defence Economics. He gives lectures in postgraduate and masters degrees at several universities. Author of diverse books, including: *Contra el hambre y la guerra* [Against hunger and war], *Quién debe a quién: deuda ecológica y deuda externa* [Who owes whom: ecological debt and foreign debt], “*En que mundo vivimos* [In what world do we live], *Detengamos la crisis* [Stop the crisis], *Ya basta* [Enough already] and *La força de canviar les coses* [The power to change things].

Given this assumption, we will first have to see what role the mass media plays in our attitudes and postures in favour of or against peace or violence. In general, the information of a good part of the media will be biased according to the economic and political interests of its owners, of its advertisers and of the public administration. In the case of matters around war, these pressures are accentuated. An example will serve to make this clearer. The most read newspaper in France, “Le Figaro” is owned by the Dassault family who, at the same time, is the largest shareholder of the company with the same name that manufactures fighter planes. What position will the newspaper have in the face of a war in which France intervenes, or simply results in the purchase of French weapons?

However, apart from such direct interests, the media also have a notable influence on peace policies, insofar as they paint the picture of the supposed threats to which the population is subjected. There are many different options: Instead of portraying terrorist phenomena, migratory events, or the scarcity of natural resources as risks and recommending an armed response, the portrayal of policies of prevention and negotiation, of welcome and free circulation, and sustainable use can be shown as a response to these issues. At the same time, the media should point out, and logically face, the real dangers: unacceptable living conditions, increasingly large income differentials – the latest Oxfam International report assures us that 8% of the total population has 86% of the planet’s resources – and difficulties for the survival of the planet for future generations, etc. While we are talking of information, let us in no case forget the role of social networks, which have facilitated the ease of communication but which are limited to strictly superficial relationships, and above all, in the case at hand, encourage the spread of gratuitous violence, copycat crimes, and the ease of harassment.

Peaceful coexistence

Harmonious coexistence must be the essential metric by which we judge whether policies for peace are effective. I would like to propose three basic elements: a living wage, open doors to immigration and refugees, and preventive action against crime and natural disasters. This is what UNDP in 1994 described as “human security.”

A living wage to cover basic needs

A society which covers people's basic needs is, by nature and by general rule, a society with less tendency for violence. Of course, an income is needed to cover living costs, and this – with the exception of those who enjoy inheritances or important holdings – comes in the form of remunerative work or from the welfare state. Decent wages, a fair distribution of work, the generalization of the cooperative system, and a prioritization to earnings derived from labour tasks over speculation, can easily lead to full employment and reasonable and balanced resource availabilities for most citizens. Even so, economic circumstances and individual situations do not always ensure a regular income. And, on the other hand, there are a good number of social services that have to be provided by public administrations. In this case, and assuming that the expenditure is reasonably incurred, the question of the adequacy of the income arises. If we refer specifically to the case of Spain, there are undoubtedly sufficient possibilities of increasing them: through an increase in the rates of wealth tax, also in the higher income tax bands, with the elimination of tax cuts for companies or the reintroduction of the luxury tax. However, there is no doubt that the eradication of fraud and tax havens could have a strong impact. In order to give us an idea, tax fraud each year in Spain is estimated to be equivalent to 80% of the cost of pensions. The other side of the budget to make the welfare state viable is to be reasonable in terms of public expenditure. And here, no doubt, we find some expenses of dubious nature such as bank bailouts, huge infrastructure projects, or military spending, to cite a few examples. Not to mention the abnormality of the payment of public debt, with abusive interest paid to creditors.

The current paths of economic and social life to advance towards these objectives do not seem in the least hopeful, if we take into account how the prevailing neoliberalism increasingly disregards any pretension to social protection for the sake of a free market philosophy but which is fully interventionist when it comes to rescuing the large private economic conglomerates. The worship of profit and endless growth in economics faculties and business schools, is certainly a bad omen. Perhaps in contrast to all of this, we could cite, as a small point of hope, the current expansion of the social and solidarity economy, which places people at the centre of its activities.

Open Doors

Any option for a peaceful society must recognize the fundamental right of free movement of persons. Migrations are as old as human history itself and have enabled many peoples to survive. Everyone must have the right to seek their welfare wherever it suits them best and, of course, we, the countries of the industrialized world, even more so, do not have the right to stop the arrival of people from villages, which we have often been impoverished by our commercial, industrial and financial activities.

The same applies to refugees, exiles and displaced persons. It is a simple question of justice, not to mention that their arrival often has to do with wars that we have provoked or, at the very least, armed.

The xenophobic tendencies, the notable increase of which has been detected in recent years and which in many countries in the global North has resulted in authoritarian, populist governments held by extreme right-wing parties, and represent a real risk of conflict. They are the result of an “us first” mentality, the transfer of responsibility for social unrest to newcomers when such responsibility falls, above all, on political, economic and financial powers, on a national and an international scale. In any case, the practices of these countries is a subtle but terrible form of violence, which entails a high cost in human lives.

Preventive Actions

In order to ensure peaceful collective life, educators, sociologists, anthropologists and other experts, have for years been indicating that preventive actions are enormously more effective than punitive ones. Whether we are talking about citizen security, the defense of the country or the fight against terrorism, it is obvious that the result of punishment, even if we speak of “success”, becomes harmful both to those who are supposedly under threat as to those who supposedly are the threat. And, in general terms and with regard to violence, it can be said that almost always the response to punishment is greater than the first attack, thus leading to a destructive spiral.

Whenever we discuss policies for promoting peace, when talking of prevention, it is worth remembering the case of the Basque city of Vitoria-Gasteiz which, during José Ángel Cuerda’s term as mayor. The prose-

cution and possible punishment of delinquents – which was carried out by the courts – was simultaneously paired with preventive actions carried out for the criminal and the local environment, in order to know the reasons – personal, family, social – for criminal attitudes, and naturally, to remedy them. Such actions made Vitoria-Gasteiz the population with the lowest crime rate in Spain.

Taken to a broader level, these actions make us think of diplomacy and at world level, the UN, which, due to a coincidence of interests of different states and real powers, it is bound hand and foot, both in its actions and in the budget needed to carry them out.

When talking about the prevention of violence, the concern for crime should be complemented by the concern derived from the traumatic situations that can originate with natural disasters. Many deaths are the result of this fact and are often neglected by public authorities. Fires, earthquakes, floods, droughts, and environmental disasters are very often preventable and should be treated as essential parts of preventive policies and the promotion of peace.

Moving towards peace in the day to day

Apart from governmental actions, which are already explained in other chapters, it is evident that organized citizens can make real advances towards policies for peace. In fact, it could be said that it they who forced governments to move forward.

A first element, with an important impact, is that of conscientious objection in its different forms. In the case of Spain, the exponential growth of objectors, accompanied in a second stage by insubordination and desertion, led to the awakening of pacifism, and later, the disappearance of compulsory military service. But also, the actions of tax resisters has had some effect on military expenditures, and, to a lesser extent, workplace resistance and scientific objection, that is to say, resistance to research for military purposes.

Very much in line with these attitudes is the establishment and progressive advance of ethical finance which, in its behaviour and dynamics, questions our responsibility when we have holdings in banks or participate in pension funds which are linked to investments in the arms sector or in the financing of wars. For the last twenty years, in Spain – more time in other

countries – we have seen the appearance of different proposals and institutions working in this direction, often in cooperation with initiatives of responsible consumption.

With the regular outbreak of armed conflict, the protest of “Stop the War” has expanded widely, with great impact. Although it has rarely been possible to stop the wars, it has been possible to create a civic conscience of rejection for war that, after the conflict, has sometimes allowed the creation of opinion tribunals that have issued judgments of ethical nature towards those responsible for such war actions.

Before closing the chapter it is worth mentioning the many campaigns that people around the world have undertaken against preparations for war and other violence. Military alliances, regional and local wars, nuclear weapons, the arms trade, anti-personnel mines, rubber bullets, etc., have continually been the subject of protests by a largely peaceful society. And protest, on many occasions, has led to success. Clearly, all of this has to be done simultaneously with projects for peace education, feminist struggle, research for disarmament, proposals for permanent interreligious dialogue, the involvement of municipalities, and the forming of international coalitions.

Bibliography:

CARRERA, Joan i Llorenç PUIG (2017): “Cap a una ecologia integral” [Towards an all-encompassing ecology], Quaderns de Cristianisme i Justícia. Barcelona.

IBAÑEZ, Josep and Constanza SÁNCHEZ (2015): “Mercados Ilegales y violencia armada” [Illegal markets and armed violence], Ed. Tecnos. Madrid. 2015

Fundación Seminario de Investigación para la Paz (2016): “El mundo que queremos” [The world we want]. Mira editores. Zaragoza. 2016.

Seminari Estat de Pau (2017): “Construir un Estat segur i em pau” [Building a state that is safe and peaceful] www.estat de pau.Cat. Edita ICIP. Barcelona. 2017.

TAIBO, Carlos (2017): “En defensa del decrecimiento” [In defense of degrowth] Catarata. Madrid.

II. Introduction to human security

Josep Julià¹

This chapter's goal is to introduce the concept of human security, and summarize the core ideas, presenting data which will allow a somewhat objective view of the state of affairs at this time. For this we have principally based this work on the publications of organizations related with the different offices of the United Nations. Finally, we will present a series of policy recommendations which can be followed to improve matters to some extent.

The concept of human security

Human security can be defined as:

Security of the persons in their everyday lives, which cannot be achieved by military defense on the borders of a country, but through the attainment of human development, that is to say, by guaranteeing the ability of each person to make a living, meet their basic needs, have a sense of self-worth and the participate in the community freely and securely (Perez and Areizaga, 2000).

This definition sums up what was initially expressed in the 1994 Human Development Report, which dedicates an entire chapter to what it calls “New dimensions of human security” from which the following paragraphs are selected.

1. Graduate in Chemistry, member of the International University of Peace. Currently, engaged as a consultant and teacher, focusing above all on sustainability and corporate social responsibility.

Report on human development of the UNDP (1994): New dimensions of human security

The concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust.

The idea of human security, though simple, is likely to revolutionize society in the 21st century. A consideration of the basic concept of human security must focus on four of its essential characteristics:

1. Human security is a universal concern. It is relevant to people everywhere, in rich nations and poor.
2. The components of human security are interdependent. When the security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, all nations are likely to get involved.
3. Human security is easier to ensure through early prevention than later intervention.
4. Human security is people-centred.

It is worth noting the difference between human security and human development. In this sense, the above mentioned 1994 UNDP report, emphasizes that human development is a wider concept which has been defined in previous UNDP reports as a process of widening the range of people's options. Human security doesn't so much made up of the possibilities on offer as much as that people can exercise their choices freely and safely, and that they can be confident that current opportunities will be around in the future. The report highlights the relation between human development and human security, and points out that limited or failed human development leads to deprivation, poverty, hunger, disease, and itself provokes insecurity and violence. The report warns: "When people perceive threats to their immediate security, they often become less tolerant, as the anti-foreigner feelings and violence in Europe show." (UNDP, 1994) Unfortunately, this paragraph, written some 25 years ago, is completely in tune with current events.

Since its very inception, the United Nations has recognized that human security has had two principal components: freedom from fear and freedom from want (UNDP, 1994). Historically, the emphasis has been placed on the first part of the previous statement, neglecting the second part. As such, the concept of security which was already dated at the time of the 1994 UNDP

report has largely prevailed to the present day. The call remains: “The concept of security must thus change urgently in two basic ways: 1) From an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people’s security. 2) From security through armaments to security through sustainable human development.” (UNDP, 1994).

According to the report, the most serious threats to security in the 21st century will be those which are the result of millions of people and not that of the aggressions of a small number of countries. Among the most probable threats are uncontrolled population growth, few economic opportunities, excessive international migration, deterioration of the environment, production and traffic of drugs, and international terrorism.

Although there are a number of possible threats to human security, the UNDP report categorizes human security into seven main categories. Most of these are still used today:

- Economic security
- Food security
- Health security
- Environmental security
- Personal security
- Community security
- Political security

Next, we will deepen upon the United Nations’ 1994 proposal, by making a detailed analysis of each of the categories which make up human security.

Economic Security

According to the UNDP Human Development Report 1994, economic security is the first category that was established within human security. Economic security requires a basic assured income, usually as a result of productive or paid work, or as a last resort, as a result of some social welfare system financed by public funds. At present, according to the United Nations (United Nations, 2018: 4), 11% of the world population were living in conditions of extreme poverty; by 2017, 9.2% of the world’s workers and their families lived on less than \$1.90 (USD) per day.

However, economic security is not just an issue for developing countries. It is well known that in developed countries unemployment is on the rise,

the welfare state is being cut, and poverty has made a strong resurgence, and even gainfully employed workers have trouble making it ends meet.

Likewise, although the changes in economic indicators in the last years have brought remarkable economic growth in every region (particularly in China, the country responsible for a large part of the improvements in the UN millennium goals), it is also a fact that there have been an significant increases in inequality (ILO 2018: 2; Piketty, 2014: 8). That is to say, the majority of the increase in wealth has served to benefit the social strata who were already well-off. Additionally, according to the ILO report cited above, there is significant gender inequality among each of the social strata. Finally, there is also a remarkable worldwide inequality on the basis of age: according to the OIT report, adults under the age of 25 are three times more likely to be unemployed than than older people of working age.

Another consideration worthy of note is the threat to job preservation in the workplace brought on by the growing development of machines and artificial intelligence systems. Researchers from Oxford University, Frey and Osborne (2013:38) have concluded that the fusion of robotics, IT technologies, and artificial intelligence could have a devastating effect on the labour market. According to the authors, 47% of existing jobs could be in danger of disappearance. Although the above-mentioned disciplines will themselves create new jobs, in no way will they compensate for the positions lost in the workplace.

Food security

Food security means that everyone, at all times, has access to basic foods, both in terms of affordability and physical availability. This means not only that there is a sufficient food supply for everyone, but also that anyone has immediate access, whether they grow it themselves, they buy it, or they have access to it some other way.

According to the latest report of the FAO (2018) after a prolonged decline, the trend has reversed, and hunger is once again on the rise in the world. In 2017, according to FAO estimates, the number of undernourished people reached 821 million, nearly one out of every 9 people in the world. Likewise, as we have seen before, economic inequality is on the rise: at the same time that malnutrition is on the rise, obesity among adults is also on the rise. One out of every 8 adults are obese. Food insecurity contributes to

weight problems and obesity, as well as undernourishment, and high rates of malnutrition of all these kinds coexist in many countries.

As we shall see below, in addition to conflicts, some of the main causes of serious food shortages are variations in climate and extreme weather conditions. They are among the key factors for the recent increase in hunger in the world. The cumulative effect of changes to the climate is undermining every aspect of food security – availability, access, utilization, and stability (FAO 2018). Furthermore, we must take into account that diet is extremely susceptible to climate change, and that it will be heavily affected, in terms of a deterioration in nutrient quality as well as dietary diversity, both in production and consumption. This will also lead to repercussions in water and sanitation, quality of health care and disease control, as well as changes in infant nutrition and breastfeeding.

Health Security

In developing countries, many of the main causes of death are infectious disease and parasites: respiratory disease, diarrhoea, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, asphyxia and trauma at birth. By contrast, in industrial nations, the illnesses that cause the most death are non-communicable diseases, such as ischaemic heart disease, stroke, Alzheimer, cancer, and others (WHO, 2018).

This produces big differences in the life expectancy in different countries: According to data from 2016, in the Sahel countries, life expectancy is less than 60 years: Central African Republic, 53 years; Mali, 58 years, while in those considered to be developed nations, the life expectancy is over 80 years: Japan, 84.2 years, Spain 83.1 years (WHO, 2018).

The biggest difference between countries in the North and South can be seen in maternal death rate. While the risk of maternal death is one in 37 in Africa, in Europe is 1 in 3,400 (WHO, 2015: 58). In this way, a miracle of life often becomes a nightmare of death, merely because society doesn't cover the minor cost of personal care in childbirth, the moment of greatest vulnerability and stress in a woman's life.

Another key aspect to health security is access to healthy conditions during recovery. In 2015, only 39% of the world population (2.9 billion people) used a safely managed drinking water and sanitation service, that is to say, where excreta are safely disposed of on-site or transported and treated

off-site, while some 2.3 billion people still lacked even basic sanitation services (WHO and UNICEF, 2017).

Environmental Security

One of the basic characteristics of our era, and one of the most basic problems on the planet, is environmental degradation. As we have seen and we will continue to see, it is closely intertwined with other aspects of human security. The threats to the environment encompass all of the three main components of our planet: land, water, and air; the combined effects of these threats is producing a clear factor worsening the situation: climate change.

In terms of land, each year there is a loss of nearly 20 million hectares of tree cover (Global Forest Watch, 2017) with the disastrous effect that this has on the climate, which in turn leads to conditions (known as “warming”) that favour the appearance of forest fires, disasters of enormous size that themselves are one of the main reasons behind the loss of tree cover. This loss, together with practices such as overgrazing, are causing the desertification of large regions, as is happening in the Sahel region. This desertification, obviously, has a grave impact on food security in the region.

Opposite to the desertification, another danger is coming from the water: rising sea levels due to climate change. It is estimated that the sea levels have risen 2.6 to 2.9 mm per year \pm 0.4 mm since 1993, a rise which has begun to accelerate in last years. Sea levels rises are putting large areas of the coast at risk on every continent.

One of the basic threats related to environmental security is access to safe drinking water. According to data from the WHO and UNICEF (2017), only 71% of the world population in 2015 had secure access to drinking water; that is to say, located on premises, available when needed and free from contamination. 844 million people did not even have basic drinking water services; 263 million people needed more than 30 minutes of travel to bring water from a potable source. 159 million people still took drinking water for direct consumption from untreated sources, without any kind of sanitary guarantee. Of these, 59% live in SubSaharan Africa.

Another aspect of environmental security related to water is the availability of water for irrigation, in a context of increasing demand and decreasing

availability due to climate change. In this sense, conflicts are beginning to arise over the use and control of water, in regions such as Palestine or even in Spain itself.

Environmental security is closely related to health security. One of the clearest examples is air pollution, which has a directly impact on the health of the population.

There are two different aspects of air pollution to be considered: the first, the increase of CO₂ concentration in the atmosphere, which is not toxic in and of itself, and therefore does not constitute a direct threat. However, it does cause global warming; which we will deal with below. The air pollution which is detrimental to health is mainly found in urban areas, – it is a direct consequence of human activity – and is mainly made up of contaminants such as particulate matter, oxides of nitrogen, ozone, and sulphur dioxide.

According to the WHO (2018) in 2016, 91% of the population lived in places which did not respect the WHO air quality guidelines. According to estimates, air pollution in cities and rural zones will produce 4.2 million premature deaths worldwide each year. 91% of these premature deaths will occur in countries with low or median income levels. The WHO registered the highest mortality rates in the Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific regions. In some regions, particularly in European cities and in China, efforts are being made to reverse the situation, restricting access of the most polluting internal combustion engines to the city centres, as well as the regulation of heating fuels and a reassessment of energy sources.

As we have seen above, phenomena resulting from climate change have a dire impact on food security and health security. But what we haven't yet mentioned is that extreme weather conditions, such as desertification, are behind another serious problem facing humanity in this first part of the 21st century: migration.

Personal security

To paraphrase the first document we consulted, the UNDP report of 1994, perhaps no other aspect of human security is so vital for people as their security from physical violence. In poor nations and rich, human life is increasingly threatened by sudden, unpredictable violence. Aside from the threats to per-

sonal security from the one-dimensional view of security (wars and conflicts in other countries), we can cite: the threat of torture and civil war, threats among diverse groups of the population (ethnic tension), street crime, threats against women and children, and threats to oneself (suicide, drug abuse). This leads to increasing levels of fear, such as xenophobia and aporophobia.

According to the latest global data which is both homogeneous and more or less reliable (UNODC, 2014), in 2012, nearly half a million people (437,000) lost their lives due to intentional homicide. More than a third of these deaths (36%) happened in the Americas, 31% in Africa, 28% in Asia, while there was only 5% in Europe and 0.3% in Oceania, the lowest rates of regional homicide. If the global average for homicides was 6.2 per 100,000 resident, Southern Africa and Central America showed averages four times higher (more than 24 victims per 100,000), making them the regions of with the highest levels of recorded homicide, followed by South America, Central Africa, and the Caribbean (between 16 and 23 homicides per 100,000 residents). For their part, with homicide rates five times lower than the global average, East Asia, Southern Europe and Western Europe were the regions with the lowest rates of homicide. There is a widening gap between those countries with high rates of homicide and those with low rates. There are also notable inequalities between regions or subregions. These inequalities suggest that actions of a local nature should be taken to improve these figures, and that the priority should vary depending on the region.

There is not only a polarization regarding where the violence occurs, there is also a polarization in the sex of the victims and the material authors of the crimes. Although 79% of the victims of homicide were men, in the context of family and couple relations, women were at a much higher risk than men. Consider that 95% of the killers on a global basis were men, a percentage more or less constant from country to country and by region, independent of the kind of homicide or weapon used. This brings us to the topic of violence towards women, which evidently includes other factors beyond homicide, such as sexual violence.

According to data from the latest study available from the WHO (2013), in which more than one out of three women on a global basis report having suffered some type of physical and/or sexual violence from a partner, or sexual violence from a third party, the evidence is indisputable: violence against women, globally and in every region, is a problem of public health of epidemic proportions.

Community Security

For most of the population, people derive security from membership in a group or community, whether it is a family, an organization, a racial, ethnic, or religious group that provides an identity and certain values. Given that sizeable ethnic populations coexist in many of the world's states, sometime overlapping, many of them are often subject to discrimination. The same occurs with immigration. Furthermore, some of these same groups, in a context of general impoverishment, may be competing for public resources, or feel wronged by the sharing out of such resources. As a result of situations of this type, most states have suffered episodes of conflict between different ethnic groups. Occasionally, these conflicts have turned into authentic civil wars, as in the case of the Sri Lankan Tamil conflict, events in Rwanda, or the conflict in former Yugoslavia. At this very moment, we are living a campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya people in Myanmar. On a lesser scale but also notable are the worsening of xenophobia, homophobia and racism in our own context.

Political Security

One of the most important aspects of human security, according to the UNDP, is that people should be able to live in a society that respects their basic human rights. These main violators of these rights are the states themselves. In the last years, in particular since the crisis of 2008, the majority of the states have imposed austerity measures. According to the latest report by Amnesty International (2018):

Austerity is a human rights issue. It affects people's access to education, health, housing, social security and other economic and social rights. It also leads to abuses of civil and political rights... All too often, governments dismiss these rights and make decisions that put the greatest burden on those living in poverty while threatening the welfare of society as a whole. In 2017, widespread austerity measures were applied in countries from every region, particularly restricting people's economic and social rights.

Conclusions

As we have put forth in detail above, surely the moment has come to make a transition beyond the narrow concept of national security, which is linked to protection against hypothetical enemies, and the globalizing concept of human security. In any case, given the diversity of facets which we have pointed out in the concept of human security, a wide range of policies will have to be implemented to achieve significant progress in each of these aspects.

There are many ways to support the struggle for economic security, which includes the growing call for a universal basic income, and the movement in favour of a living wage.

Regarding food security, increased efforts must be undertaken to reinforce the resilience and the adaptive capacity of food systems, as well as people's livelihoods and the nutrition in response to the changeability and extreme climate conditions. As well, we should reinforce the food autonomy of different regions, limiting the power of the agricultural and food industry monopolies that favour monoculture farming aimed at mass production for export.

It seems evident that, in both industrialized and poorer countries, threats to health security are on the rise in rural areas, as well as in the most disadvantaged sections of the population. This can be related to access to safe drinking water, sanitary services, or medical services, and if these are improved, the associated health indicators would improve remarkably. As well, we can recommend the involvement of the pharmaceutical industry in the production of medicines aimed at solving health problems in populations with low or very low purchasing power.

According to some authors, climate change is the greatest environmental threat facing humanity. Climate change is caused by human activity, and so at the very least it ought to be, if not reversible, at least preventable or avoidable. For that, as is well known, we should be able to brake the consumption of fossil fuels, which implies not only the adoption of cleaner energy sources, but also significant lifestyle changes in more developed countries.

As has already been shown, policies to improve personal security should be established locally, as a function of the concrete characteristics of the community in question. However, the prevalence of crimes against women overall should be taken into account. Surely, beyond protection in a classic sense, it is necessary to support efforts, led by the women themselves, for the equalization of rights and to raise awareness among different societies.

With regard to community security, we can see that states deal with the problem of immigration with a remarkable lack of sensitivity, whether it is economic or the result of armed conflict. For example the US President tried to impose a ban on the entrance of citizens from countries with a majority Muslim population; or the growing repression in Turkey or in the Uyghur Autonomous Region in Xinjiang, in China.

Likewise, to improve political security, states should cancel austerity measures, placing their obligations to the population above their obligations to financial institutions. In this respect, audits of external debts should also be carried out.

Bibliography

Amnesty International (2018): *Amnesty International Report 2017/18 – The State of the World’s Human Rights*. London.

FREY, Carl Benedikt and Michael A. OSBORNE (2013): “The future of employment” Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford, Oxford OX1 1PT, United Kingdom.

FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO (2017): *The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017. Building resilience for peace and food security*. FAO, Rome

GOLDMAN, Liz and Mikaela WEISSE (2017): “Global Tree Cover Loss Rose 51 Percent in 2016” Global Forest Watch, available at: <https://blog.globalforestwatch.org/data/la-perdida-de-cobertura-boscosa-mundial-ascendio-al-51-en-2016>, on 30/09/2018

International Labour Organization (2018): *World Employment and Social Outlook – Trends 2018*.

PEREZ DE ARMIÑO, Karlos and AREIZAGA, Marta (2000): *Diccionario de Acción Humanitaria y Cooperación al Desarrollo* [Dictionary for Humanitarian Action and Cooperation for Development] <http://www.dicc.hegoa.ehu.es/listar/mostrar/204>

PIKETTY, Thomas (2014): *Capital in the Twenty-First Century*, Harvard University Press.

United Nations (2018): *The Sustainable Development Goals Report 2018*.

UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1994): *Human Development Report 1994*, Oxford University Press, London.

- UNODC (2014): *Global Study on Homicide 2013* (United Nations publication, Sales No. 14.IV.1)
- World Health Organization (2018): *Estimates of Global health 2016: Mortality by cause, age, sex, country, and region. 2000-2016*. Geneva, WHO, (2018) available at: http://www.who.int/gho/mortality_burden_disease/life_tables/situation_trends/en/ on 28.09.2018.
- World Health Organization and United Nations Children's Fund – UNICEF (2017) *Progress on drinking water, sanitation and hygiene 2017 update and SDG baselines*, Ginebra.
- WHO (2018): Ambient (outdoor) air quality and health, available at: [https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ambient-\(outdoor\)-air-quality-and-health](https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/ambient-(outdoor)-air-quality-and-health).
- WHO (2015): *Trends in maternal mortality: 1990 to 2015*, estimates by WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group and the United Nations Population Division, Geneva.
- WHO (2013): *Global and regional estimates of violence against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and nonpartner sexual violence*. Geneva.

III. Human security and the environment

*Albert Orta*¹

The magnitude and impact of the various ecological transformations taking place today have placed the environment at the top of the public policy agenda. Much of the media attention is on climate change, due to its planetary scale and multiple effects, but other processes such as air pollution, loss of biodiversity or impoverishment of soils also require action by public authorities.

One of the elements among these problems arising from environmental changes is security: to what extent do they pose security challenges? For several decades, many institutions and government bodies have included this issue among their concerns. For example, as early as 1987 the influential publication of the United Nations “Our Common Future” (also known as the “Brundtland Report”) devoted a section to warning of the risks that environmental degradation would pose to peace and security (CMMAD, 1987: 326-330). Likewise, the current “National Security Strategy” of the Government of Spain includes climate change as one of the main challenges that security policy must face and the protection of the environment as one of its objectives (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017).

However, the relationship between different ecological changes and security concerns are far from obvious; there are multiple approaches to these issues and each of them has important practical consequences. Fundamen-

1. A political scientist specialized in political geography, security and the environment, he collaborates with the Delàs Centre and has worked for the Institute of International and Strategic Relations of Paris (IRIS). He studied at Pompeu Fabra University, Humboldt University (Berlin) and Warwick University. He is currently preparing a doctoral thesis at University College Dublin.

tally, every security policy answers three key questions: what/ who should be protected? From what threat? and By what means? The answers to these questions express what the actor's priorities are, how to interpret the context, and what mechanisms are considered appropriate and/or legitimate to deal with the problems faced. So, far from being a mere "technical" matter, it's steeped in a political context.

In this chapter we propose an approach based on human security. This means putting human beings as individuals and members of a social group (or groups) at the centre of the security agenda, and going beyond the military as an instrument to face the challenges posed by environmental change. The central argument is that this approach is much better suited not only to better protect people vulnerable to ecological instability, but also to address the root causes of these transformations. On the contrary, the classical security-based approach is not only inefficient, but often counterproductive as well. In order to develop this argument in the first part, we will critically analyse the "classic", or militarist perspective of environmental security. This will help us to see the issues and problems at stake in the debate on which approach is best suited to tackling environmental challenges. After this more deconstructive analysis, the second part will develop an approach based on human security.

The environment as a threat: the classic national security approach

Before we begin, it is important to clarify what is meant by "classical security": a perspective whose central objective is the protection and survival of the state, where the threats are mainly military and violent, and where the main mechanisms for dealing with them are the use of force and diplomacy. Although this approach is being reconsidered and criticized for its oversights and weaknesses, the associated geopolitical imagery continues to influence how we understand the relationship between security and the environment.

From this perspective, the main thesis is as follows: environmental degradation decreases the available natural resources (or ecological goods) in a given space. This decrease in resources generates instability, either through violent conflicts for the available supply of scarce assets, or through the supposed negative impact of the migration of the impoverished population to

richer areas. Thus, the main risk is that these tensions contribute to the disintegration of the existing social order and a climate of violence where the survival of the state is threatened. Strangely, the countries most vulnerable to this degradation process – the potentially failed states – are the so-called “developing” countries, since they would not have the stability or the technological capacities to solve the mismatch between population and resources. In this way, a new geopolitical map emerges with geographically localized pockets of instability and tension, and a set of states that seek to contain these threats to their security by increasing and/or adapting, among other things, their military apparatus.

This reasoning, which follows the tradition of Hobbes and Malthus, can be found in numerous publications and speeches concerning the impact of the environment on safety. In what is still recognized as an important text within this paradigm, “The coming anarchy”, influential analyst Robert D. Kaplan (2000) argues that the environment will be the number one security issue of the 21st century. According to the author, phenomena such as population growth, deforestation, soil erosion, the spread of diseases, water pollution and rising sea levels will have a central strategic impact by destabilizing entire regions such as Bangladesh, the Nile delta or the Gulf of Guinea. In a similar vein, the current “National Security Strategy” of the Government of Spain states that

There is a growing relationship between the effects of climate change and competition for access to resources, especially water, forced migratory movements and the emergence of vectors that favour the spread of disease. These factors have a particularly intense impact on regions such as Africa and the Asia-Pacific area, and sometimes function as structural causes of armed conflict. (Prime Minister’s Office, 2017: 77)

In short, a classical national security approach reproduces the vision of a world divided into states seeking protection from external threats, whether it is mother nature that must be dominated by technology, or pockets of instability and tension located in vulnerable states; it is therefore necessary to increase military capabilities in order to cope with new conflicts (or, to use Kaplan’s expression, the “coming anarchy”).

However, despite the apparent plausibility of these arguments, they contain a number of assumptions that are worth examining. First, from this per-

spective, people's safety is only important insofar as it can generate regional instability and lead to failed states, but not in terms of their vulnerability to ecological changes in terms of their well-being. Secondly, despite the fact that this thesis is usually presented as an established fact (especially in the case of climate change), the causal relationship between environmental variations and conflicts is far from proven. On the one hand, from an empirical point of view, there is no scientific consensus on whether transformations such as climate change lead to an increase in conflict (Deudney, 1990; Homer-Dixon, 1999; Buhaug, 2010; Buhaug et al., 2013; Bernauer et al., 2014). On the other hand (and this is the third criticism), if the environmental conflict hypothesis seems so attractive, it is because it simplifies the causes of violence to a single variable while omitting economic and political factors; thus, it accepts and normalizes armed conflicts as inevitable since they come from variations in the natural environment (Dalby, 2002; Livingstone, 2015). However, as the extensive literature on political ecology shows, conflicts related to the environment have much more to do with conditions related to access and distribution of resources, such as the expropriation of resources by minorities or the transformation of agricultural land into monoculture of cash crops intended for export. Presenting environmental changes as the main cause of instability and conflict only serves to ignore and therefore reproduce social, political and economic relations at a local and global scale that are indeed demonstrated to bring about poverty, exploitation and violence.

Furthermore, this reading of ecological crises as quasi-natural external phenomena whose main risk is to threaten state stability, only serves to further legitimize the use of military force as the main instrument for dealing with them. However, there are serious doubts as to whether increased militarization is an appropriate tool to address environmental challenges. On the one hand, there are numerous historical cases where the use of force has resulted in the destruction of habitat necessary for human life, either intentionally as documented by Yves Lacoste in his classic work on the Vietnam War (1976), or collaterally. On the other hand, the maintenance of the military industry and armies requires a high consumption of resources that contributes even more to the degradation of the environment.

Finally, another problematic element is the use of the national security discourse to address a series of problems that have nothing to do with anything that is 'national'. Approaching ecological challenges from this perspective only served to distract us with a nationalist rhetoric. This 'us vs. them'

dichotomy only hinders the international cooperation so essential to finding collective solutions to shared problems. As Deudney (1990) points out, the causes of environmental degradation are more likely to be found among ‘us’, than among ‘them’.

Vulnerability to ecological changes: a human security approach

In contrast with the perspective that sees the environment as a threat to national security, a human security approach broadens the focus to visualize the social factors linked to the degradation of ecosystems and puts people at the centre of the issue.

To do so, the first step is to overcome the Culture/Nature dichotomy, so rooted in contemporary Western thought and which structures much of public policy related to the environment, including security. Behind the classical approach to security is the vision of nature as an entity separate from human beings, disconnected and pre-political, and when necessary, states must use military force to protect themselves from uncontrollable Mother Nature. However, what we actually call “nature” or “environment” is nothing more than the result of a system of ecological relations conditioned by cultural, economic and political factors (Descola, 2001). The most obvious example is climate change, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concluded with “90% certainty” to be the result of human activity. The notion of the Anthropocene, as the current geological era is known, where the main factor of change in ecosystems is the human being, helps to challenge this distinction. But even what we commonly call “natural disasters” such as earthquakes or hurricanes have little ‘natural’ about them, when the impact suffered varies so widely depending on the socio-economic level or the colour of people’s skin. Human existence is much more than mere opposition to the “environment” that surrounds us, we are one with it.

Rethinking things in these terms, the question is not so much how to protect ourselves militarily from a disruptive nature full of threats, but how we can establish sustainable ecological relationships that minimize people’s vulnerability to environmental changes. More specifically, a human security approach implies a change in four dimensions:

- a. We must “think locally” about security, concerning itself with grass-roots issues by placing the individual people dependent on specific ecosystems and their vulnerabilities at the centre of policy.
- b. We must “act globally” about ecology: the sustainability of the planetary and/or regional ecosystem transcends the borders of the nation-state, and we must act accordingly.
- c. We must have a “wider perspective”: without downplaying the importance of military threats, security challenges must be re understood as economic, cultural and political factors that put at risk the sustainability of different forms of human and non-human life.
- d. Finally, there must be many more actors responsible for ensuring this “security” than just defense agencies at the national level. They should include international, regional and local institutions, as well as non-state entities.

Let us take the example of deforestation to better illustrate this approach. From this perspective, the threatened subjects are the people who depend on the resources of the forest to live, either as a space where they reside or for their biodiversity. The “threat” then is not the instability and violence that these impoverished people may eventually cause, but deforestation itself as it destroys the ecological relationships that sustained their way of life. A human security policy does not accept violence and conflict as natural phenomena, but acts on the causes of insecurity: What is the political economy that allows deforestation? Where does the wood go? Who benefits from this exploitation and who is harmed? What cooperation, economic, trade, and planning policies can we use to reduce people’s vulnerability and ensure a sustainable and equitable use of natural resources?

This approach differs from the classic national security approach based on a world map divided up into hermetic states that seek to protect themselves from sources of instability and violence by military means if necessary. On the contrary, by placing environmental degradation in its broader social context, the global, regional and local relationships that contribute to increasing people’s vulnerability to ecological crises and addressing their causes are made visible.

Conclusions

As we have seen, there is no single way to address the security problems arising from environmental degradation. In addition, each of them has important practical consequences as it offers different answers to the fundamental questions of security policies: what/who should be insured? In the face of what? By what means? In this chapter we have argued that to reduce people's vulnerability to ecological changes, an approach based on human security is more appropriate than the use of military force. The basic premise of this perspective is that what is often presented as an ecological catastrophe is little more than a problematic relationship with the world in which we live. It follows that responsible security policy cannot be based on military containment of instability arising from environmental degradation, but on fostering the kinds of social and ecological relationships that are sustainable and equitable in the long term.

From this approach emerges a new map of environmental security, where public policy objectives address the ways in which people and the sustainability of their way of life are threatened by the degradation of the natural environment in which they live. In addition, these policies are not military in nature, but instead touch on some of the key causes of ecological crises, such as the reduction of polluting emissions, halting deforestation and promoting sustainable use of forests and jungles, supporting agricultural systems that distribute the benefits among local people and reduce their vulnerability to ecological changes, avoiding the destruction of ecosystems rich in biodiversity, etc.

Security is not limited to relationships between human beings, but also includes the links we establish with non-human organisms and entities such as rivers, animals, forests, oceans or the air we breathe. All forms of life, no matter how technologically developed and industrialized they may be, depend on a given ecosystem. Only by taking into account can we design security policies that address people's vulnerability head-on and do not reproduce the causes of their insecurity.

Bibliography

- BERNAUER, T. et al. (2014): “One effect to rule them all? A comment on climate and conflict” *Climatic Change*. Vol. 127 (3-4), p. 391-397.
- BUHAUG, H. (2010): “Climate not to blame for African civil wars” *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*. Vol. 107 (38), p. 16477-16482.
- BUHAUG, H. GLEDITSCH, O. N. P. THEISEN (2013): “Is climate change a driver of armed conflict?” *Climatic Change*. Vol. 117 (3), p. 613-625.
- DALBY, S. (2002): *Environmental Security*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- DESCOLA, P. (2001): *Beyond Nature and Culture*. London. University of Chicago Press.
- DEUDNEY, D. (1990): “The case against linking environmental degradation and national security” *Millennium – Journal of International Studies*. Vol. 19 (3), p. 461-476.
- HOMER-DIXON, T. (1999): *Environment, Scarcity, and Violence*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- KAPLAN, Robert D. (2000): *The coming anarchy*. Random House.
- LACOSTE, Y. (1976): *La géographie, ça sert, d’abord, à faire la guerre* [Geography is used, first and foremost, to wage war]. Paris: Ed. Maspéro.
- LIVINGSTONE, D. (2015): “Stop saying climate change causes war”, *Foreign Policy*, 4 de December. available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/12/04/stop-saying-climate-change-causes-war-paris-cop-21-bernie-sanders/> [Accessed on 12 September 2018]
- Prime Minister’s Office (2017): *Estrategia de seguridad nacional*. [National Security Strategy] Madrid: Prime Minister’s Office. available at: http://www.defensa.gob.es/Galerias/defensadocs/Estrategia_Seguriad_Nacional_2017.pdf [Accessed on: 10 September 2018]
- World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) (1987): *Our Common Future*. New York: United Nations. available at: <http://www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf> [Accessed on 10 September 2018].

IV. A nonviolent economy

Jorge Guardiola and Jordi Calvo Rufanges¹

The economy is one of the key elements of the policies of any government or public administration. Economic policy choices have a definite impact on people's lives, on the environment, and on international relations. In this chapter we go into detail on some different types of economics that peace researchers have identified. Defence Economics can be defined as that branch of economic science that is "at the intersection between economics and international relations and pays attention both to the so-called deterrence strategies and to the allocation of scarce resources to the military in a given economy" (Calvo Rufanges, 2015: 136) Peace Economics goes beyond that, also adding elements related to peacekeeping, but not exclusively from a pacifist or nonviolent paradigm. In this chapter, from the analysis based on a Culture of Peace, we will strive to pin down an Economics which covers every aspect of the economy related to the construction of a peaceful world, or, on the contrary, makes violence possible.

1. Jorge Guardiola is a Professor in the Department of Applied Economics and a member of the Institute of Peace and Conflict at the University of Granada. His research interests focus on the interactions between sustainable development, happiness and nonviolence. He is the author of about 30 scientific articles and book chapters. He has field experience in development issues, mainly in Guatemala and Mexico.

Jordi Calvo Rufanges is a doctor in peace, conflicts and development, economist and researcher on peace, security, disarmament and economics for peace. He is coordinator and researcher of the Delàs Centre and professor of international relations, armed conflicts and economy (UJI, URL, UOC). Member of the International University of Peace, vice-president of the International Peace Bureau and coordinator of the Global Campaign on Military Spending (GCOMS), consultant of l'Osservatorio Banche e Assicurazioni (Fiare Banca Etica); research coordinator on Peace and Conflicts at GlobalCoDeS (URL) and coordinator of the Master in Peace and Conflict Studies (URL)

Therefore, in this chapter we present for the first time the concept of Nonviolent Economics, in which we analyse Economics and the political decisions it entails, but from a pacifist viewpoint. Our hope is to shine new light on reality from the perspective of a Culture of Peace. To this end, our goal is to identify the violence of the economy and work for its reduction or elimination in such a way as to generate the necessary conditions for peace. A Nonviolent Economics could well be called a Pacifist Economics, since it irremediably implies an active work for peace, and incorporates a clear dose of pacifist activism. It is essential to question and transform the current economic model which, as we will demonstrate below, generates all kinds of violence. The proposal for a Nonviolent Economics is influenced, in a natural and conscious way by other Economics that have arisen from critical thought and social movements. Transformative fields which have gone beyond theory and are in many cases have practical applications, particularly Feminist Economics and Ecological Economics. We intend to complete them, from the logic of the New Social Movements of 1968 (ecologist, feminist and pacifist) and their influence on politics today, with Nonviolent Economics.

Accordingly, the chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first, we expose how violence manifests itself in the economy. In the second, we deal with the concept of nonviolence, we expose the change or transition necessary to pass from a violent economy to a nonviolent economy, and finally, we deal with the definition of nonviolent Economics.

Violence in the economy

Violence manifests itself in many and diverse forms in our daily lives, through physical, verbal or other forms of aggression, carried out by individuals or groups of individuals against other individuals, material goods or against nature. However, many other kinds of violence exist, ones that are characteristic of our culture, system and way of life, and these, though undesirable, often go unnoticed. We are referring to the violence resulting from a particular political, economic or social system that generates inequality, oppression, marginalization and exclusion from the society.

Mathematician Johan Galtung, founder of scientific studies for peace, argues that there are three types of violence: cultural, structural and direct (Galtung, 2004). Cultural and structural violence are the least obvious or

visible. Direct violence is the most visible. Sometimes it spills blood, and in one way or another, at its root we find cultural and structural violence. Direct violence refers to physical violence against nature (e.g. damage to biodiversity, pollution of natural spaces), against people (e.g. rape, murder, robbery, sexual assault, verbal and psychological violence) and against the community (e.g. material damage to buildings, infrastructure). Another form of direct violence is the natural disasters resulting from climate change, an environmental problem generated by fossil fuels used largely in production processes.

Cultural violence is a symbolic and intangible violence, present in aspects of culture such as art, religion or ideology, which legitimates structural and direct violence. A very important component of cultural violence is the legitimization and normalization of violence; that is, making violence something we tolerate seeing everyday. This legitimacy is present in gender violence, in racism, or in the acceptance of misery as something normal. An old example which is still relevant today, is that in the conquest of America so much violence towards the indigenous people of that continent was justified on the basis of considering them as inferior beings, “lacking souls”. Today, much of the violence endured by some rural communities, migrants, citizens of countries in eternal armed conflict is justified because those who exercise it perceive them as barbarians or underdeveloped (Galeano, 2009).

On the other hand, structural violence refers to the political, economic and social structures at a given time in a given society that generate by themselves the necessary preconditions for the development of violence. Structural violence is sometimes invisible and subtle, but a face can be put on it when we count how many people are hungry, exploited or socially marginalized.

Neither capitalism nor attempts to create communist societies, as distribution systems for goods and services, have succeeded to enable all people to meet their needs, or to prevent the attack on other forms of life. Any economic system is a failure, from the pacifist point of view, the moment that people can not satisfy their needs. In trade and trade agreements there is also structural violence, as governments often sign treaties that go against people and nature to favour economic power groups, with the promise of greater job creation but with economic and social damage to health and to the most disadvantaged people. One frequent example of structural violence is military spending, which has a double effect: 1) Its expenditure allows direct violence to be encouraged (through the use of weapons) and 2) Its expenditure pre-

vents resources from being spent on more important items (such as health and education), thus generating a significant opportunity cost.

In this connection, it is worth mentioning that war is probably the most complex example of violence of all. In war there is every kind of violence: direct violence with the deaths of civilians and soldiers; cultural violence with discourses exalting armed violence and the army, dehumanizing the enemy, exploiting national identity and patriotism to legitimize the elimination of others; and structural violence, with all those elements that are necessary to prepare for war, such as the formation of armies and weapons production. It is in this field that the Defence Economics we have previously mentioned was developed. Moreover, in terms of a War Economy, or economic dynamics that occur in the context of armed conflict, while it is true that these have many causes, there are many wars in history in which a major reason for a country's participation is related to the economic motive of enriching themselves at the expense of another social group or country. In Economics we talk about the paradox of abundance or the curse of natural resources, which states that countries with greater natural resource endowments have lower rates of economic growth and development than those to which nature did not give these endowments. Among the causes of this economic underdevelopment are the existence of internal conflicts in the societies cursed by these resources, and external conflicts from other societies that want to dominate them. A well-known example is the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, where a War Economy has developed around a coveted mineral, coltan, indispensable for the production of mobile phones, computers and tablets.

An example of the kinds of legitimization of the structural violence of the economy is found in the following phrase, very related to this discipline: "Capitalism has many problems, but it is the best system we know"; as if humanity did not have enough capacity and imagination to look for productive and distributive alternatives that can resolve problems such as hunger and climate change. Another one, very common in the economic crisis that broke out in 2008, is the following: "We have lived beyond our means and so now we must pay the costs of the crisis". This phrase masks the real culprits of the crises, and socializes the costs through economic and social cuts. The direct and structural violence legitimized by both statements can be found in countless examples of economic decisions resulting in austerity policies. In the case of Spain during the 2008 economic crisis, we can cite the increase in inequali-

ty and poverty, evictions, and the “gag” law that reduced social and individual freedoms (Guardiola and Guillen-Royo, 2015; Guardiola, Picazo-Tadeo and Rojas, 2015; Guillen-Royo, Guardiola and Garcia-Quero, 2017).

But violence in the economy also manifests itself in the economic behaviour of producers and consumers in a given economic system. Starting in the 1990s, capitalism had free reign and extended to become a planetary system (Oliveres, 2005). Since then, the economic system has been defined by neoliberal capitalist globalization, which although it is not the only world economic system, has become the hegemonic one. A system based on profit maximization, dominated by transnational corporations, whose goal is undoubtedly the accumulation of profits, for which market values are more important than human values (George, 2004). Indicators show some of the violence generated by globalization: the richest 20% of the world’s population consumes 86% of world production, while the poorest 20% consumes 1.3%; the assets of the three largest fortunes are equivalent to the Gross Domestic Product of the 48 most impoverished countries; the 200 richest people on the planet have as much accumulated wealth as 41% of the world’s population; 1.2 billion people live in extreme poverty (on less than a dollar a day), and more than 3 billion people live on less than two dollars a day, with 60,000 people dying of hunger every day (Calvo Rufanges, 2011, based on Taibo, 2009 and Oliveres, 2010).

As we can see, the current economic system generates, promotes and accepts violence of all kinds. The viewpoint of the Culture of Peace shows us that the neoliberal capitalist economy generates direct violence by the deaths of thousands excluded from the globalized economy; produces cultural violence by creating acceptance for economic inequality, labour exploitation or the plundering of natural resources; and develops structural violence from the moment in which business activity privileges the contributions of capital over labour, or in economic policy when it favours large transnational corporations to the detriment of local production.

Nonviolence in Economics

The definition of nonviolence has been constructed from the nineteenth century to the present day by various authors with complementary approaches. These include the inspiring work on civil disobedience by Thoreau in 1849,

Tolstoy's pacifism (Castañar, 2014), which proposed non-cooperation with state violence, and the influential theoretical-practical contributions of Mahatma Gandhi. Later works, undoubtedly inspired by those that came before, marked the beginning of a broad theoretical development of nonviolence, works such as Richard Gregg's (1935) approach to holistic nonviolence, inspired by Satyagraha and Gandhi's Ahimsa. Holistic nonviolence refers to all aspects of the person and society, thus incorporating the need to question the economic model and the violence it generates. In fact, Gandhi did so through his proposals to question the colonial economic order of the British Empire over the Indian people, with the famous Salt March or the boycott of British textile imports, proposing local and self-sustainable economic alternatives. Nonviolence also raises the question of coherence between ends and means in the economy.

Thus, starting from the previous idea of nonviolence and its relation to the transformation of the political, economic and social system, we will approach the relationship of nonviolence with the economy, through the work of Mario López Martínez (2017), who affirms that nonviolence does not consist only in a refusal to use violence, but has much more to do with the search for alternatives to overcome conflict, in such a way that there is more freedom and well-being for the people involved in the conflict. Nonviolence is a means and an end in itself, and involves a series of moral practices that are translated into actions that seek to free people (not only the oppressed, but also the oppressors) from cultural, structural, and direct violence. In addition, he adds, the path of nonviolence sometimes involves resisting and making use of civil disobedience in order not to cooperate with what is considered unjust or morally unacceptable.

López distinguishes four principles of nonviolence:

- Do not kill: preserve life, defend and respect it, not only human life but also animal and plant life.
- The search for truth: to shed light on conflicts and their resolution.
- Dialogue and active listening: to maintain contact with the other party and avoid dehumanizing the relationship.
- Thinking in an alternative and creative ways: cultivating an awareness that other models and other paradigms of reality are possible and necessary, and that they bring well-being and freedom to people.

Therefore, by applying these four principles from López's nonviolence, it is necessary to have a perspective in Economics that has a truth that allows

conflicts to be resolved, is active in listening, and is enriched by ideas and alternatives. In this sense, it is essential to reclaim the economy as a means, and not as an end in an of itself. A system that is at the service of people and the environment (the satisfaction of human needs and respect for life, present and future); since life was not created to conform to Economics, but rather Economics was created to conform to life. It is therefore necessary for a transformation to take place and for the ends and means to be changed, as proposed in Figure 1.

Figure 1
An economy at the service of life rather than
life at the service of the economy

	Media	Aims
Capitalist Paradigm	Human resources Natural resources	Companies: Maximize profit People: Earn money or power
New nonviolent paradigm	Economic sustainability	Human needs Respect for nature

Source: the authors

In a nonviolent economy, people must be able to satisfy their needs and live in harmony. The capitalist paradigm, from the moment it prioritizes the goal of maximizing economic profit, interprets it the other way around, dehumanizing people and denaturing the environment, thus becoming an economic model that is itself violent. The capitalist economic structure reflects a hierarchy of values: “capital commands labour; amassed things, that which is dead, are of superior value to labour, to human powers, to that which is alive” (Fromm, 2003: 66). Capitalism has produced a human being “alienated from himself, from his fellow men, and from nature” (Fromm, 2003: 82), which has been transformed into an commodity, whose human forces and powers are a possible investment that should produce the maximum possible benefit in the market. In this framework, “life has no goal except to move, no principle, except that the one of fair exchange, no satisfaction, except that of consuming” (Fromm, 2003: 82).

In this context, changes in the economy are needed. While the description of what needs to be changed is simple, making the change is complicated. Recognizing that people are not human resources, and nature is not a natural resource implies using a change of language, but also a decolonization of ideas. It is necessary, therefore, to create new thoughts, new acts and subtly

begin to generate new emotions according to the new paradigm, but one that is much healthier, not only for society but also for each person. In a phrase attributed to Gandhi: we must be the change we want to see in the world; and that change must begin with oneself according to one's possibilities. In such a way, it is necessary to invest in values such as empathy, solidarity, respect, love, cooperation and fraternity and to reduce the influence in the economy of anti-values such as selfishness, greed, competition and the oppression of an economic model that in Freire's terminology generates dominators and dominated, bosses and employees, masters and slaves, oppressors and oppressed (Freire, 1980). These anti-values would be related to the violence identified in the hegemonic capitalist and neoliberal economy.

Nonviolent Economy: A definition

A nonviolent economy is an economy in which people, companies and states produce and distribute sufficient goods and services from the scarcity of nature, to satisfy the needs of everyone without compromising the needs of future generations, all the while respecting the world's living beings and the environment and, consequently, without making use of violence of any kind.

This definition of Nonviolent Economics does not stray too far from the standard definition of Economics: the science that manages scarce resources to meet people's needs. However, in our definition of Nonviolent Economics, we emphasize:

- That all people's needs be met, without situations of abuse of power, oppression and exploitation. For example, by preventing one person from satisfying his or her needs at the expense of those of another person.
- People who are not yet born have the right to enjoy the environment, so we cannot leave them the legacy of a shattered and polluted planet.
- The importance of sustainability and respect for human life, and other animals and plants.

The concept of Nonviolent Economics essentially implies a distinctly critical approach toward capitalism. Not only must we question the so-called neoliberal globalization, which has generated incalculable violence, especially since the economic crisis of 2008, but the very essence of capitalism itself. Nonviolent economics calls for business models that are not based on

a return on capital or on the maximization of profits, as these generate the structural conditions that facilitate the behaviour of economic agents who act based on competitiveness, exploitation and the plundering of resources. In this way, the Nonviolent Economy follows the principles of the Social and Solidarity Economy² with its commitment to the cooperative economy as a model that generates the conditions to combat structural violence in business organizations.

In order to make the content of this definition a reality, the role of care, love and respect for others is essential. In this sense, dialogue with other disciplines of Economics on a similar path is indispensable. An outstanding discipline in this sense would be, first of all, Feminist Economics, because it proposes a reinterpretation of the economic paradigms so that life is prioritized over things, and that the work of caretakers, so essential for the maintenance of life, is recognized and made visible (Carrasco, 2001; Pérez Orozco, 2014). Another discipline concerned with the life and sustainability essential to a nonviolent perspective is that of Ecological Economics. The ideological alternatives that nourish these disciplines, such as ecofeminism (Herrero, 2012) and degrowth (Taibo, 2009) are also fundamental to a non-violent interpretation of the economy.

Bibliografía

- CALVO RUFANGES, Jordi (2011): *Globalización capitalista Neoliberal y movimientos antisistémicos* [Neoliberal capitalist globalization and antisystem movements], Cuadernos Deusto de Derechos Humanos, Bilbao, Universidad de Deusto.
- (2015) “Economía de defensa” [Defence Economics]. En: Calvo Rufanges, J. and Pozo Marin, A. (Coords). *Diccionario de la paz, la guerra y el desarme*. Barcelona: Icaria.
- CARRASCO, C. (2001): “La sostenibilidad de la vida humana: ¿un asunto de mujeres?” [The sustainability of human life: woman’s issue?], *Mientras tanto*, (82), p. 43-70.

2. This paradigm shift is directly inspired by the Social and Solidarity Economy. More information at: http://www.economiasolidaria.org/files/ecosol_dic_ed.pdf.

- CASTAÑAR PÉREZ, Jesús (2014): *Teoría e història de la revolució nonviolenta*, [Theory and history of nonviolent revolution] Barcelona, Virus.
- FREIRE, Paulo (1970): *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, London, Continuum.
- FROMM, Erich (1985): *The Art of Loving*, London, Thorsons.
- GALEANO, Eduardo (1997): *Open Veins of Latin America*, London, Monthly Revue Press.
- GALTUNG, J. (2004): Violence, war, and their impact: On visible and invisible effects of violence. In *Polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy*, Vol. 5, p. 6.
- GEORGE, Susan (2003): *Another World Is Possible if...*, Verso.
- GREGG, Richard (1935): *The Power Of Nonviolence*. Greenleaf books, Canton, Maine.
- GUARDIOLA, J. and M. GUILLEN-ROYO (2015): "Income, Unemployment, Higher Education and Wellbeing in Times of Economic Crisis: Evidence from Granada (Spain)", *Social Indicators Research*, 120(2), 395-409. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-014-0598-6>.
- GUARDIOLA, J., A. PICAZO-TADEO and M. ROJAS (2015): "Economic Crisis and Well-Being in Europe: Introduction", *Social Indicators Research*, 120(2), p. 319-322. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-014-0594-x>.
- GUILLEN-ROYO, M., J. GUARDIOLA and F. GARCIA-QUERO (2017): "Sustainable development in times of economic crisis: A needs-based illustration from Granada (Spain)", *Journal of Cleaner Production*, 150, 267-276. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2017.03.008>.
- HERRERO, Y. (2012): "Propuestas ecofeministas para un sistema cargado de deudas. *Revista de economía crítica*, 13.
- LÓPEZ MARTÍNEZ, M. (2017): *Noviolencia o barbarie*. [Nonviolence or Barbarism], Dyckinson, Madrid.
- MUSTE, Abraham Johannes (1949): *Nonviolence in an aggressive world*.
- OLIVERES, Arcadi (2005): *Contra el hambre y la guerra* [Against hunger and war], Barcelona, Angle Editorial.
- (2010): *Aturem la crisi. Les perversions d'un sistema que és possible canviar* [Stopping the crisis. The perversions of a system that it is possible to change], Barcelona, Angle Editorial.

- PÉREZ OROZCO, A. (2014): “Subversión feminista de la economía. Aportes para un debate sobre el conflicto capital-vida.”[Feminist Subverion of the economy. Contributions for a debate over the capital vs. life conflict] *España: Traficantes de sueños. Programme Paper*, nº3.
- TAIBO, Carlos (2009): *En defensa del decrecimiento. Sobre capitalismo, crisis y barbarie* [In defense of degrowth. On capitalism, crisis, and barabarism], Madrid, Catarata.

This research has been partially supported by the Ministry of Economy, Industry and Competitiveness, the State Research Agency and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) (project reference eco2017-86822-r).

V. Feminist policies for peace

*Blanca Camps-Febrer*¹

In 2000, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on “Women, Peace and Security” was adopted. It was an important step to cast light on the discrimination of women in peace processes and the disproportionate impact by gender of armed conflict², and to try to outline inclusive objectives that would allow an approach to conflict resolution that would be more long-lasting and coherent with different realities. The resolution was the result of efforts and organizing by many feminist, pacifist and women’s movements.

After two decades, we are still faced with a chilling situation.³ The resolution and the subsequent work agenda of the United Nations “have not served to transform the militarized security model” (ICIP, 2016:6). Gender-based violence is still hidden in most conflicts and societies, states continue their militarization at the expense of privacy and freedom, the arms trade continues to grow, private military and security companies are increasingly common. Peace seems to many to be an unattainable dream and, in short, security is scarce and access to it is tremendously unequal.

In this chapter I briefly present some of the current issues surrounding peace and security, with the aim of opening the debate on possible feminist

-
1. Political scientist and specialist in International Relations. Has worked in several countries in North Africa and the Middle East with social and human rights networks and movements. Currently studying for a doctorate and researching the role of militarism in North Africa and the Middle East. She is an associate professor at the UAB and collaborator with the Delás Centre.
 2. We understand gender to mean “the culturally defined and socially sanctioned roles, usually differentiated, that are attributed to and practiced by men and women, and the characteristics attributed to these as a rationalization of those roles” (Jenkins & Reardon, 2007:213).
 3. See the interesting document edited by ICIP (2016) from a working session in Barcelona in November 2015.

policies for peace. The reader will find a list of proposals that is still open to new ideas. From my perspective, peace policies must be comprehensive and require a critical analysis of the political and economic model on which they are based. My perspective for this chapter is feminist and decolonial, and does not propose to merely “add women and stir”, as has been criticized of some “gender” policies which have received much hype and fanfare. True policies for peace involve deconstructing patriarchal, racist, and warmongering structures, and doing away with the mass exploitation of natural resources.

In this article we will focus specifically on three topics:

- War and militarization
- Mobility (migration)
- Economic model

Providing new insights

Speaking of peace and security from a feminist perspective means first and foremost questioning a set of concepts that we may have taken for granted until now. Without deep consideration, these assumptions could misguide our approach to the reality we seek to transform. Thus, we must reflect on that which generates insecurity and violence: conflict and armed conflict. Unveiling “patriarchal privilege” implies understanding the continuity between war and non-war in women’s bodies, but also the link between patriarchy and other forms of authoritarianism and inequality. (Jenkins and Reardon, 2007:211).

Thus, when addressing security we will need to ask ourselves: what security are we talking about? What security are we talking about? Security for what, from whom or for whom? Who and what is being served by the security policies? (Blanchard, 2003: 1290). In other words, what is the *referent object* that is being protected? Who is empowered to communicate that “security” and to plan the policies to be implemented for that purpose?⁴ To attempt an answer to these questions is to delve into the asymmetries of protection and the limits attributed to the concept of security by those who claim to be defending it.. Indeed, when security policies are implemented,

4. Another question for debate, but which goes beyond the framework of this text: To what extent is it possible to seek security?

they are often carried out from the perspective of elites in power, those who make the decisions and therefore benefit from them: border security, investment security, energy security. Do we all understand the same thing by “security”? Security as it is conventionally understood is often opposed to freedom, privacy, or even the security of other peoples or geographic areas.

Authors who have developed Feminist Security Theory/ies (FST) have managed to problematize the concept of security, overcome gender blindness⁵ and raise awareness for existing insecurities, which are often a consequence of the (in)security policies themselves.

Blanchard (2003: 1290) points out that 4 relevant aspects are brought to the discussion by FSTs:

- Critical thinking about the supposed irrelevance of women and gender in International Relations⁶
- Critical thinking about the ability of states to protect and ensure women’s safety (based on case studies, etc.)
- Critical thinking about the essentialist/biologist link between women and peace
- The subsequent problematization the idea that FST target only women and identify the pressing need to integrate the study of masculinities in order to understand security issues.

Feminist activists and researchers from queer studies or critical studies in masculinities, have explored and demonstrated how gender structures in each context and time period contribute to legitimizing and reinforcing certain types of violence, as well as to perpetuating discrimination against women and those people who do not fall within the accepted definition of heteronormativity. These findings, of profound significance for questioning the rationalization of war and the state, have not been integrated comprehensively into public policies, but rather often in an *ad hoc* manner, by creating

-
5. Gender blindness refers to the purported neutrality of security theory, the supposed vision that ignores gender. Elshain criticizes the supposed ‘strategic voice’, that is supposedly abstract, professional, and unbiased. As Ann Tickner (1988) has demonstrated, the majority of security writings and policy arise from a masculine view of the world, from the priorities and from the nature attributed to international relations from the masculine. Cohn also speaks of ‘technostrategic’ discourse, an aseptic discourse detached from human suffering and supposedly based on rational worldviews that ultimately ‘rationalizes’ the use of force and imposition over cooperation and peace (Cohn 1987).
 6. A classic and indispensable book by Cynthia Enloe (2014), which shows us several fundamental examples (women and diplomacy; migrant workers; women and the tourism; and women and military bases).

committees, groups, etc. which work in parallel and participate marginally if at all in the direction and decisions of foreign or defense policy.

A feminist analysis of (in)security implies a change from the state-centric idea of national security, which focuses mainly on the protection of the state and its internal order from threats, mostly external. In that sense, it means setting displacing what is understood as state security, in which it is essential to preserve border sovereignty and internal stability, and to analyse the “degree to which the internal functioning of the state reflects and carries out feminist social and political objectives in society” (Cohn, 2011: 582). As to whether we should extend or restrict “security”, we call for an “extension”, even beyond the already well-known concept of “human security”. Despite the great deal of diversity of opinions within feminist studies, our proposal is closest to ecofeminism, as it replaces not only the state but also the human being as a referent object in security, and focuses on global ecosystems, interdependence and the relational.

In that sense, we need to analyse and understand the consequences that the socialization of men and women has in perpetuating war and militarism and violence. Even a brief look at war movies and war games, or even the patriotic propaganda of enlistment in times of armed conflict is enough to demonstrate the enormous role played by socially attributed gender roles (the brave man as a soldier, the woman to be protected...). For example, in a British propaganda against conscientious objectors during World War I, a German soldier threatens a man in pose who pretends to be weak. The caption reads: “Oh, you naughty unkind German— really if you don’t desist, I’ll forget I’ve got a conscience and I’ll smack you on the wrist!”

Demilitarizing security policies

When we talk about feminist security policies, the typical proposal is to integrate more women into all areas and levels of the security industry. Policies get implement with the goal of recruiting women as police officers, military personnel, etc. In fact, what we often see is that women and recruits who don’t fit traditional notions of masculinity suffer discrimination and sexual abuse in forming part of structures as hetero patriarchal as the security forces. Although there are voices that argue that in some cases the presence of more women lowers the repressive or aggressive violence of the security forces

(Caprioli, 2000), these practices do not question the essence and purpose of these institutions, which ultimately consists of using force to impose a certain social order.

But if state security forces are to include more women, what about the emergence of private military and security companies (PMSC), often hired by Western countries to “pacify”, “protect”, and preserve the security and interests of these countries and their elites? Should the PMSCs also be “feminized”? Or can we go to the root and ask why it is that armed conflict, border controls, etc. are increasingly privatized, and what are the effects on the population and how do they differ by gender?

In order to develop feminist peace policies it is essential to make a strategy for the demilitarization of security itself. On one hand, demilitarising security means transforming the discourse of what (in)security means, and with it, developing needs and resources different from those currently associated with it. Demilitarizing security also means democratizing and demasculinising decision-making and the management of the protection of communities, particularly given that defense and the military are the most masculinized spheres within the state.⁷ In addition, its discourse should be dismantled by freeing up resources that are now destined to promote military security. In practical terms, this means rethinking defense missions, rethinking private contracts for security and surveillance. Broadening the concept of security, then, does not mean militarising other aspects of our lives under this doctrine of (in)security, as would have us do in response to climate change or sexual violence. In short, it is a question of detaching the concepts of security and military, and really delving into policies that contribute to the well-being and real protection of communities. At the local level, this means delving into policies affecting housing, community (Badenes, 2016-17), care policies, the creation of inclusive, open and non-commercial public space, etc. An example relevant to our situation in Spain is that of bombs being sold to Saudi Arabia, which will likely be used in Yemen (Font, 2018). (Font, 2018). Using the “job security” of the Navantia shipyards in Cádiz to justify their sale obviously generates the direct insecurity of the Yemeni population, when in reality what is being sought

7. In the case of the Spanish Army, in 2015, only 12.51% of its troops were women. See the Delás Centre's Gender and Militarism Database: <http://www.centredelas.org/ca/base-de-dades/genero-i-militarisme/genero-i-militarisme>.

is profits for owners of Spanish arms companies. A feminist security policy would involve ensuring a dignified life for the people of Cádiz through policies for employment and conversion of arms industries into projects that provide labour and peace.

Mobility, borders and migration policies

Another issue to bear in mind when developing feminist security policies is the current model regarding mobility. Despite the development of global transport, communication technologies, etc. mobility and the possibility for change, is often reserved for social classes located in the global centre, and not to the populations of the periphery (or in the peripheries of the centres). These migration processes involve very different risks depending on the gender of the migrant.

It is therefore essential to reflect on migration policies and take into account the experience of migrant women and girls. As has been studied in recent years, the overwhelming majority of people arriving at European borders are men and boys. Why? There are many factors that could explain this imbalance, starting with the patriarchal context at the origin of the migration. In this sense, policies considering the security of migrants must also take into account the root causes of the inequalities that push or permit men and women to initiate the process of migration. These often are the search for a better life, but the resources and starting conditions are often different based on the gender of the person.

If the question is of security, it should be of explicit interest that many of the women and girls who initiate a migratory process end up disappearing. Instead of arriving at their place they hope for, they are forced to enter networks of human trafficking, whether of prostitution or other types of slavery. To address the disappearances of women and girls who begin a migratory process, as well as the policies intended to manage these problems, an analysis of gender and the migratory process is essential.⁸ As well, it is also essential to take into account transgender people and the added insecurity of

8. See the discussion on this issue and on the impact of Canadian mining companies on the impoverishment and displacement of populations in Latin America: <https://www.opencanada.org/features/women-and-girl-migrants-who-disappear-and-feminist-policies-could-save-them/> and <http://www.migrantwomennetwork.org/our-team/>

their migratory process. In many countries, including Spain and the United States of America, transgender women are locked up with men, suffering humiliation, violence and total lack of protection.⁹

A feminist peace policy must also take into account the economic model generated by the promotion of transnational corporations, as we will see in the next section. The mining and extractive industry, often carried out by large multinationals, for example, has caused a socio-economic and environmental impact in the Global South with dire consequences of population displacement and community impoverishment. Detaching these actions and their consequences from security policy obviously excludes a large part of the population from access to security. In this sense, a feminist policy for mobility must consider the fundamental causes of people's migration and the different projects for movement that gender constructions generate in each case.

In addition to the violence that women experience in their context of origin or during migration, the violence and insecurity that they will experience in the society in which they arrive must also be taken into account. To illustrate, it is worth remembering the case of the strawberry workers in Huelva, an example of the "creation of vulnerability" in which spaces are specifically created for impunity for employers to commit rights violations, by selectively hiring women at origin specifically because of the characteristics that make them easy prey for exploitation (family ties they must return to, possible moral and social reprisals if they rebel, etc.). The insecurity and violence suffered by migrants throughout the whole cycle of emigration must be part of the concerns of feminist security policies.

Economic model: Environmental security, economic security

When talking about human security, some ecofeminists have expressed doubts and criticisms about the effectiveness of placing the human being at the centre, and looking down upon the rest of life.¹⁰ They have criticized the

9. See the testimony of Karla Avelar, founder of the Salvadoran NGO Comcavis Trans, at: <https://www.opencanada.org/features/women-and-girl-migrants-who-disappear-and-feminist-policies-could-save-them/>

10. Entre sus pensadoras más destacadas encontramos María Mies, Ariel Salleh, Vandana Shiva, Alicia Puleo, o Yayo Herrero.

hierarchical ideas of domination and superiority, that human beings, since the dawn of patriarchy, have built separating themselves from nature.

This separation and differentiation of human beings and nature leads to the domination, transformation, exploitation and destruction of the latter without remorse. Ecofeminists therefore advocate recovering emotional and material ties with that which sustains life, a relationship which is traditionally attributed to femininity. But as Badenes and others point out:

While feminism soon showed that the naturalization of women was a tool to legitimize patriarchy, ecofeminism understands that the alternative does not consist of separating women from the natural, but in “renaturalizing” political, relational, domestic and economic organizations and living conditions that subordinate neither women nor nature. (2016-2017: 21)

That is why security policies made for people must also be consistent with the economic, environmental, and energy model they promote, both internally and with foreign policy or business promotion. This involves rethinking the economic model and the long-term security it generates, making transnational companies responsible for their impact beyond state borders and throughout their value chain, but also promoting a global system that prevents business profits at the expense of the most vulnerable populations and ecosystems.

As far as armed conflicts and militarism are concerned, in this book we have provided much-needed explanations of the role that arms, financing, etc. companies play in the perpetuation of insecurity and armed violence. Other apparently innocuous companies, however, normalize the illegal occupation of territories obtained by force, as is the case of Palestine or Western Sahara, where companies of all kinds do business plundering natural resources, and consolidating and normalizing the occupation and insecurity of indigenous populations.

Conclusions

In October 2014, Swedish Foreign Minister Margot Wallström announced her intention to draw up a Feminist Foreign Policy with the aim of promoting gender equality and human rights. After a participatory process with

different civil society actors and the design of an action plan, one of the effective wins of the new policy was the diplomatic confrontation with Saudi Arabia for its policies of segregation and discrimination on the basis of sex. The Swedish government has continued to promote its feminist policy, promoting education for the economic empowerment of women in Iran or Saudi Arabia. In the overall balance, however, the truth is that structurally few things have changed. The military industry in Sweden is increasing its exports and includes among its new clients the Philippines, where Duterte's "war on terror" has resulted in thousands of victims of torture, extrajudicial executions, and numerous human rights violations in the country. Sweden's feminist foreign policy can be congratulated on opening the debate not only academically or theoretically, but based on a concrete, deliberate practice of exercising a feminist policy with the objective of "global solidarity". In Sweden, they are developing programs for international mediation, funding studies on the impact of masculinities on regional development councils, and have an important diplomatic presence in the spaces for advancing policies for gender equity.

The balance of these first years shows the difficulty of transforming the liberal model of Western domination over the rest of the planet. The Swedish politician, however, may come off as naïve in her claim that "what is good for women is good for all", and in the link between women's security and state security. One of the dilemmas faced by a feminist security policy for peace is that, even if it seeks to have a comprehensive and global vocation, it arises from the interest or initiative of a state actor. That is why it is so difficult to move from theory to practice without incurring contradictions, hypocrisies or Eurocentrisms, as we have seen in the case of Sweden. If the initiative is born of a state, the drives to benefit the interests of the state and its elites may be stronger than the real impact of policies on the patriarchal privileges underpinning violence and armed conflict in the world today.

To undo this, it is essential not only to expand the concept of security, but also the actors involved in building a safe world and communities. National security, as has already been demonstrated, is security for a few, often at the expense of others within and beyond those "national" borders. Global security, which includes environmental, individual and community security, implies a transversal, horizontal and vertical vision of how armed interventions that affect us, from the global to the local level.

The participation and inclusion of different life experiences that highlight discriminatory structures based on sex, gender or sexual orientation are fundamental in order to build truly comprehensive and transformative peace policies. In short, it is not a question of constructing new policies of training or empowerment for subordinated women, nor of including more women or gays in the security forces in order to make them friendlier, but of unmasking and dismantling all those structures that contribute to war, violence and the destruction of our global world.

Bibliography

- BADENES, I., I. SERRA, M. CASTRO and T. BLANCO (2016-2017): *Dones, Feminismes Diversos i Drets Col·lectius* [Women, Diverse Feminisms and Collective Rights]. Col·lecció Drets Col·lectius. Barcelona: CIEMEN. https://www.nationalia.cat/documents/coldc_17_18_dones_conflictes.pdf
- BAGUR, M. (2016): Report 31: *The incorporation of women into the Spanish army. Opacity, sexism and violence*. Delàs Center for Peace Studies. Barcelona. http://www.centredelas.org/images/INFORMES_i_altres_PDF/informe31_eng.pdf
- BLANCHARD, Eric M. (2003): "Gender, International Relations, and the Development of Feminist Security Theory", *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* n°28 (4): p. 1289–1312. doi:10.1086/368328.
- CAPRIOLI, M. (2000): "Gendered Conflict", en *Journal of Peace Research*, n°37(1), p. 53-68.
- COHN, C. (1987): "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" *Signs* n°12(4), p. 687-718.
- (2011): "Feminist Security Studies': Toward a Reflexive Practice", *Politics & Gender* n°7(4), p. 581-586.
- (ed.) (2013): *Women and Wars*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- ENLOE, C. (2014): *Bananas, Bases and Beaches: Making Feminist Sense of International Politics*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press.

- FONT, T. (2018) “Un paso atrás. Robles venderá las bombas a Arabia Saudi” [A step backward. Robles will sell bombs to Saudi Arabia], *Tribuna Abierta, el Diario*. En línea: https://www.eldiario.es/tribunaabierta/Robles-vendera-bombas-Arabia-Saudi_6_812678730.html
- ICIP (2016): *Dones, Pau i Seguretat: 15 anys de la Resolució 1325 de les Nacions Unides*. [Women, Peace and Security: 15 years since UN Resolution 1325] Documents n°14/2016. Barcelona: The International Catalan Institute for Peace.
- JENKINS, T. and REARDON, B. A. (2007): “Gender and peace: towards a gender-inclusive, holistic perspective”, Charles Webel and Johan Galtung (eds.) *Handbook of Peace and Conflict Studies*, Oxon and New York: Routledge, p. 209-231. Online: <https://www.mkgandhi.org/ebks/handbook-of-peace-and-conflict-studies.pdf>.
- SALLEH, A. (2017): *Ecofeminism as Politics: Nature, Marx, and the Postmodern*. London: ZedBooks.
- SJOBERG, L. (2013): *Gendering Global Conflict: Toward a Feminist Theory of War*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- TICKNER, A. J. (1988): “Hans Morgenthau’s Principles of Political Realism: A Feminist Reformulation”, *Millennium*, n°17(3), p. 429-440.
- TICKNER, A. J. (1997): “You Just Don’t Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists”, *International Studies Quarterly* n°41, p. 611-632.

VI. Policies for diversity and tolerance

*Ares Perceval*¹

As a society we acquire an identity whose purpose is to provide us with a place and a sense that helps us know how to relate to the world (Ruiz, 2009). From a need to form part of a community, we create an “us” that gives us the same coherence as a society. The idea of the “other” will always be present, being a fundamental element to delimit the “we”. The intervention of the other makes us aware of the differences, since we define ourselves in opposition to the categories we assign to everyone else, to the “other”.

This social reality is as positive for the inclusive formation of a group as it is negative for its exclusionary characteristics. It must be confronted as an enrichment rather than as a threat, in the face of the unknown and dangerous, which must be annulled and eliminated as these “others” diverge from a dominant identity to which we give categories that we consider universal. We must seek to know the other in order to establish a dialogue to give the possibility for a participative coexistence with the other, rather than dominate and subjugate them as was done in imperialist and colonial periods. The West must not be single, closed culture but one of dialogue and openness (Ruiz, 2009).

1. A degree in Arab and Hebrew Studies with a postgraduate in African Societies. She studied a Master's Degree in International Relations at the Universitat Pompeu Fabra-IBEI with the dissertation “Management of European borders during the refugee crisis”. She has worked in human rights organizations in countries in the Middle East and North Africa. She collaborates with the Delàs Center for Peace Studies on issues related to the Arab world.

Problem or issues to consider

The first step for a diversity policy is the formation of a theory of the other. In the classical Greco-Roman world, the Aristotelian model was imposed, converting patriarchy into an anthropomorphic theory based on the *polis*, the canon or perfect entity. The ethnically Greek adult free male prevailed, and otherness was understood as the limits of this canon, things a man should exclude from his virile identity. In contrast to the man was the child – a stage to grow out of –, the woman – an entity who could not change her status as dependent on either her father or her husband –, the slave – an entity that lost its character of humanity and was seen as a mere commodity –, and the foreigner – who was the non-Greek possessing strange or exotic characteristics, that is, exogenous to the Greek model. It was the androcentric model or virile archetype, clearly expressed in the Greek aesthetic revolution with the standards of male beauty (Moreno, 1988).

After the conversion to Christianity of the Roman Empire, this make-up was reaffirmed by the fusion with the biblical inheritance run by a patriarchal creator god as described in the Bible according to Genesis – man was created by god and nature was his to dominate. In this scheme, the woman was always a subordinate entity, a sub-creation, divinely pulled from man, as she had been created from his rib.

European enlightenment separated science – knowledge provided by reason – from religion, but continued to assert patriarchalism – the model of the virile archetype – in the new bourgeois revolutions. The change of mentality meant a shift of the divine mandate and a placement of the rights of “man” rights at the centre, the right to European citizenship. The French Revolution of 1789 proclaimed equal rights under the law with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, but women were explicitly excluded.

This situation was reaffirmed by the Napoleonic Code of 1804, which also restored slavery. It added the opposition of the authentic man, the one who had the values of the West, to the other cultures that were described as childish, feminine or slaves. Man was the explorer, the scientist, the conqueror, who brought knowledge and civilization to other peoples in exchange for their submission. Colonial science and anthropology reinforced this archetype by seeking evidence of the superiority of the “white man” over the

others. This superiority was not only an abstract concept but it was put into practice, as the historian Hobsbawm said, with the imposition of the three C's: Civilization, Capitalism and Christianity.

Meanwhile, the idea of tolerance – an ambiguous word that means both accepting and enduring the other – spread progressively. It took anthropology a century to accept the idea of the equality of human beings, and colonial politics did not accept the idea of the equality of humanity until the creation of the United Nations after the two great world wars. The concept of Universal Human Rights aims to overcome this past by admitting the common background of humanity with the variety of cultural richness it offers. This idea was implemented in a framework of nation-states. Globalization, however, adds a new variant: cultures are no longer within a specific geographical framework, limited by stable borders, but merge and mix in an increasingly interconnected world. This new reality forces us to think anew how to articulate and defend the equality of humanity at the same time as we defend the personal identities that make it up.

So the theory of the other has always existed. What is necessary is to admit the other into society not only as something that is tolerated but as someone who enriches your culture by shining light on your own cultural values and personal creativity.

There is no recognition of the other without the recognition of their human rights. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights allows for a common basis that is not respected by globalization or unbalanced globalization. The world is increasingly economically united and more humanly separated. This contradiction between the almost automatic movement of capital and the impossibility of the movement of human bodies causes a problem – dramatic on a personal level, terrible on a moral level – but above all illegal, if we take into account the previous protocols signed by the nations – and which are precisely the basis for legal trade without reproducing a neocolonial situation.

The rights of the other in a society begin with their ability to move freely, to express their interests and opinions, to maintain their personal and cultural identity wherever they are... rights do not end with formal rights – which are in any case breached at the present time by the new frontiers established as a limit to the practical consequence of human globalization and its mobility. Rights should include the possibility for every person anywhere on the planet to express herself, and create and build a life fully independently

for her personal happiness as well as the general happiness of the society in which she lives (United Nations, 1948).

Considering the human personality as a whole, otherness is not only cultural or geographical, it is a matter common to every person anywhere on the planet. It begins within Western societies themselves which are still hampered by the patriarchy of free and productive white adult heterosexual men, still confronting children, women, dependents, people with other sexual choices, different cultures than the dominant – ethnic and religious minorities... This patriarchy is intertwined with capitalism and racism which use oppression to justify the accumulation of capital (Adlbi, 2017). For capitalism to work there must be an oppressed class and those who work for free as invisible care within the family environment (Federicci, 2013), it needs this racial and colonial division, since the system grants different levels of humanity to people according to gender, class, nationality, religion, sexual orientation... A hierarchical classification system is established where the accumulation of wealth is found in the upper classes. To put an end to this you have to fight all the monster's heads at once or it will be continually reconstituted. And this challenge encompasses all societies on the planet, Western societies and those that constitute their model of nation-state with the same pattern in post-colonial countries. It is necessary to incorporate all the discourses and strategies of any oppressed community in order to achieve the creative implementation of universal human rights.

All oppressions must be taken into account, not just those that affect us as a concrete society. And, fundamentally, it is the people who suffer from this violence who must decide which strategy they want to follow in order to face them. *Intersectionality*, a term coined in 1989 by Kimberle Williams Crenshaw, needs to be implemented. This theory suggests that it is necessary to see all the dimensions that are part of a person, to study all the overlapping identities that interact at the same time. The violence a person suffers does not act independently, but is interrelated, creating multiple forms of discrimination (Crenshaw, 1991).

In addressing the problem globally, internal and external policies must be designed to preserve the right to difference. Endogenous and exogenous otherness requires the implementation of policies of acceptance, understanding and treatment of this difference from the “others”. The deconstruction of patriarchy must be coordinated with the construction of

rich and inclusive identities. One cannot theorize about societies that are stagnant and immobilized in static cultures. It is a dynamic and mestizo process, where people can choose the cultural, social and sexual elements that make up their identity.

These existing practices and experiences must be framed within an alternative vision of a culture of peace and human security, based on dialogue rather than confrontation, on consensual conflict resolution rather than the imposition of a vertical or hierarchical model. These policies should lead to possible actions in local communities which treat diversity as an element of wealth and not of danger.

Existing practices or experiences from an alternative vision

The local community is the place where relationships, cohabitation, cooperation, and conviviality can be developed into concrete policies that begin in the distribution of the habitat and the school system to take shape in the workplace, the public space of cohabitation or public gatherings (community parties and rituals).

In 2017, the mayor of the municipality of Mechelen in Antwerp, Bart Somers, won the Mayor of the Year award for the integration policies carried out in his city. Mechelen has become a model to follow, since more than 20% of the population has origins in North Africa, inhabitants who feel like citizens of the city. The mayor proudly emphasizes that no young people from the city have gone to fight in Iraq or Syria. Bart Somers comments that it is very complicated to follow everyone, so what we must do is prevent radicalization by making everyone feel part of the same society and preventing anyone from capturing them for “totalitarian dreams”. Somers increased security on the streets but combined it with integration policies. It changed the narrative of nostalgia for the past, which excludes diversity and a discourse where all outsiders are either victims or delinquents. Its municipal policy is implementing a programme to end segregation both in neighbourhoods and in schools and thus create a stronger society that rejects intolerant ideas (CIDOB, 2017).

Educational for the promotion of tolerance

School is a place that must prevent the isolation, marginalization and ghettoization of the “other” while at the same time developing a critical awareness for diversity that is inclusive. We can consider this context as a microcosm that reproduces society.

A good example is that of the Joaquim Ruyra public school in Hospitalet del Llobregat, which has achieved the best results in basic skills tests with a new education project with 90% of migrant children or children located in cultural contexts different from the dominant one.

The shift from multiculturalism to interculturalism is the paradigm shift needed in this global and local process. Each person is a world, with diverse origins and concrete personal choices. Her culture is her free choice at all times, if accompanied by policies that protect it and a school that develops its values and critical capacity, at the same time as it favours dialogue with other cultural options. It is the passage from a simple tolerant admission of the presence of the other to the inclusion of their customs in an enriching intermarriage with cultural loans that become values that belong to the new community. It is the step in a dialectic dynamic from the simple admission of the different, to the construction of a society rich in complexity and variety. And it is the doorway to a society inheriting universal human rights, as long as no-one is excluded from their application.

Bibliography

ADLBI, Sirin (2007): “Más allá del feminismo islámico: redefiniendo la islamofobia y el patriarcado” [Beyond islamic feminism: redefining islamaphobia and patriarchy]. *Journal of Feminist, Gender and Women Studies*. Universidad Autonoma de Madrid.

CIDOB (2017): *What is going on in the world? How are European Societies Countering Jihadist Terrorism?*, CIDOB, Barcelona, 8 June.

CRENSHAW, Kimberle (1991): “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence against Women of Color”, *Stanford law Review*.

- FEDERICI, Silvia (2013): *Revolution at Point Zero: Housework, Reproduction, and Feminist Struggle*, Oakland. PM Press <https://www.traficantes.net/sites/default/files/pdfs/Revolucion%20en%20punto%20cero-TdS.pdf>
- MORENO, Amparo (1988): *La otra política de Aristóteles* [Aristotle's other politics], Icaria.
- RUIZ, Cesar (2009): *La alteridad [Otherness]*, Casa del tiempo, Vol. III, nº25. Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana. http://www.difusioncultural.uam.mx/casadeltiempo/25_iv_nov_2009/casa_del_tiempo_eIV_num25_99_101.pdf
- United Nations (1948): *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*. Paris.

VII. Demilitarising public space

Ainhoa Ruiz¹

Security in cities and metropolises is one of the great challenges of the 21st century worldwide. People move to large cities in search of quality of life, work and security, as they have become major providers and distributors of resources. Local governments have also become key for implementing social welfare policies. But cities also present their own security challenges, many of them a result of international events.

The public space of cities is territory under dispute. It is eroded and transformed by global dynamics, international terrorism, the advance of neoliberalism and the processes of securitization of public policy, as well as the increasing militarization of cities. All of these processes produce profound transformations in cities' public space, shaping it and reinforcing processes that turn them into war zones and undermines the commons of public space. For this reason, this chapter analyses the effects of major threats to global security that are reproduced in cities, and how the expansion of security policies and urban militarism in the city erode public space and generate urban tensions, as well as the factors that contribute to the intensification of securitization and militarization of cities. Urban

1. PhD student with a thesis on the militarization of borders at Universitat Jaume I. She is a researcher at the Delàs Center for Peace Studies, author of the reports: *The arms trade and armed conflict. An analysis of european weapons exports to countries in armed conflict.* (Delàs Centre, 2017), and *European arms that foster armed conflicts. conflicts that cause refugees to flee* (Delàs Centre, 2017). She is also co-author of the books *Mentes Militarizadas* [Militarized Minds] (Icaria, 2016) and *Trenta preguntes sobre l'OTAN, 30 anys després del referèndum* [30 questions about NATO, thirty years after the referendum] (ICIP, 2016). Her research focuses on militarism, securitization and the arms trade.

space is also understood by various academics as territory under dispute, reflecting different social tensions and reproducing class dynamics, which are intensified by securitization and militarism. But, as we shall see, there are examples of appropriation of space for gathering and the construction of alternatives, which challenge and question policies which make exclusive spaces for the exercise of power.

The analysis is carried out from the perspective of a culture of peace, recognizing the importance of full rights to public space and its democratization as an essential factor to build urban security and to guarantee the full right of access to the city. With this in mind, the first section analyses the effects of major global security challenges and how securitization and militarism are applied at the local level to deal with them, as well as their consequences. A second section deals with the question of urban space as territory under dispute and the different policies that erode it and turn it into a space of exclusion. A third section briefly presents some examples of the appropriation of public space as a meeting place. To conclude with two points on conclusions and recommendations. The aim of this chapter is to give a global image of the challenges encountered in making public space a meaningful and truly inclusive territory.

From global to local: an expansion of the securitization of public space and urban militarism

In terms of security, the cities of the 21st century are being affected by the same global processes affecting states. The attacks of the 11th of September 2001, the expansion of neoliberal policies and globalization are phenomena that go spill over from the international sphere to affecting the local sphere, cities and large cities of the 21st century (Kaufman, 2016: 72; Gaffikin, McEl-downey and Sterrett, 2010: 496; Amooore, 2009:52; Graham, 2012: 136; Molnar, 2015: 235).

Transnational terrorism has brought the doctrine of securitization into everyday life, in what Stephen Graham has called “new military urbanism” (Graham, 2010), consolidating new security paradigms and expanding militarism.

The same characteristics of securitization apply to cities as they do at the international level. These tendencies are:

- Issues in the public sphere move to a security agenda and are dealt with by traditional security means, the police and the military. Public security issues are militarized (Salazar and Yenissey, 2010: 33).
- The securitization of issues that are part of the public sphere broaden and diversify the threats cities can suffer from, overburdening the administration.
- Policies are implemented to govern by risk, the “zero risk” doctrine (Muller, 2009). By assigning risk levels to social problems, the deployment of extraordinary measures is justified by emergencies.
- Technology will be a key element in establishing security systems through control and surveillance, leading to a *technologization* of security. This includes the expansion and collection of biometric data for the control of society in the name of security (Amoore, 2009: 51).
- Treating elements of the public sphere as security risks prevents the underlying structural problems that generate them from being addressed.
- External and internal threats to the state are closely related, which means that what happens at the international level has an impact on the policies to be developed in the cities and the security policies that are applied.
- New century securitized cities are subject to what Stephen Graham has called “new urban militarism”. According to Graham (2012: 137) urban militarism is consolidated by the expansion of the idea of “permanent war” that tends to intensify the militarization of life, and because the military, especially in the United States, analyses cities as a new scenario for so-called “fourth generation” wars (Graham, 2012: 139).

The characteristics of this new urban militarism would be, according to Graham (2012: 137):

- The doctrine and practice emerging from militarism, that the key security challenges of our time are in the spaces of everyday life, in cities.
- Cities are carrying out biopolitics through technology, i.e. the expansion of the surveillance society and the control of people in the name of security. A public space that begins to be defined by an obsession with security (Di Masso, Berroeta, Vidal, 2017: 59)
- Elements typical of war zones are transferred to the urban environment.

Securitization and urban militarism have an impact on the development of life in cities, in the unfolding and development of the space, affecting and

shaping people's daily lives and the way public space is constructed, produced, interpreted and used. There are several examples of how the securitization of cities and urban spaces, ongoing since the beginning of the 21st century, affects everyday life.

New York City has been analysed by various academics (Graham, 2010: 103; Kaufman, 2016; Németh and Hollander, 2010) and it is a case example for the observation of where the securitized city model takes us. As Kaufman (2016) explains, New York City neighbourhoods are securitized within the framework of "Operation Impact" developed by Michael Bloomberg's mayor's office in 2003, which established risk profiles for the city's neighbourhoods. Some neighbourhoods are classified as high-risk because of their levels of crime and called "Impact Zones", neighbourhoods with this profile are conceived as war zones or militarized (Kaufman, 2016:72). In these neighbourhoods, police control and surveillance over residents is strengthened, so that all people are treated as potential criminals, even if they are also victims of crime.

The implementation of security policies by neighbourhood introduces militaristic ideas of registration, control and tracking in daily life that produce impediments to the normal development of the daily life of the people who inhabit them, generating dysfunctions in their movement through urban space (Kaufman, 2016: 76) and the stigmatization of the residents. A state of structural control is established based on profiles that are usually of a racist type as analysed by Kaufman (2016: 75). Securitization expands policies of inequality, where a person's daily life becomes a threat.

Securitization also has an impact on the very creation and loss of urban space. Research carried out by Németh and Hollander (2010) analysed two New York neighbourhoods where the restriction to public space is increasing, resulting in a progressive loss. Researchers studied two major city districts, the Civic Center district, where as of 2010, 36.3% of public space had been limited or closed off. In the Financial District, more than 17.7% of public space was located between security zones where people's passage is monitored and controlled (Németh and Hollander, 2010: 25). In these districts, the urban militarism model has also been implemented with checkpoints registering entry and passage, and a reorganization of the space and movement of people through surveillance systems, data analysis and barricades (Graham, 2010: 103), showing an obsession for the conversion of the city into a *panopticon* of monitoring devices (Di Masso Tarditti, Berroeta and Moranta, 2017: 59).

The appearance of elements typical of war scenarios in cities show social conflict at different levels: urban and international, and contribute to the sensation of defense and aggressiveness (Young Song, 2016: 57) as well as practice the segregation of space.

The city of Nairobi is another example of how governments use anti-terrorist and securitarian measures to shape urban space, sometimes completely radically, with the example of “Operation Usalama Watch” (Gluk, 2017: 298). The Nairobi policy, following on the 2013 terrorist attack in the *Westgate* shopping mall by the Al-Shabbab group, approved the demolition and razing of the Eastleigh neighbourhood in 2014, a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood with a high population of Somali refugees. The neighbourhood was highly securitized with police reinforcements and more than 4,000 people were arrested and disappeared (Gluk, 2017: 299), which was denounced by human rights organizations. The neighbourhood was finally razed to the ground and hundreds of people lost their homes and belongings. “Usalama Watch” is the security model of the Kenyan government’s policy for dealing with the war on terror in urban space.

Major events such as the Olympics and football world cups are also a catalyst for expanding the security model and urban militarism in large cities, linked to the economic development of certain spaces (Molnar, 2015: 235). Since the 1972 attacks on the Munich Olympic Games, major events have been described as high-risk, and since the attacks of September 11th 2001, the securitization process of the cities where they take place have been reinforced.

The case of the 2010 Olympic Games in Vancouver is one of the many examples that reproduce the dynamics of securitization, militarism and neo-liberalism in urban space. During the Olympic Games in Vancouver the city invested more than ever before in security, with a total of one billion euros, 50% of the total expenditure for that year’s Olympic Games (Molnar, 2015: 237). As Molnar explains, the Military Liaison Unit (MLU) was an essential part of the civil-military coordination of the security operation.

The security and militarist policies developed in Vancouver during the Olympics allowed the expansion and consolidation of the urban deployment of the MLU in police activities with greater coordination, expanding the policies of militarization of urban space in Canada (Molnar, 2015: 238). The intrusion of military organizations in urban events allows the militarization of everyday life and the normalization of militarism in spaces that have traditionally been alien to it.

Urban militarism is also evident as in the case of the city of Rio de Janeiro in Brazil, with the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE) a military police corps created in 1978 during the military dictatorship. Where the state has abandoned areas of urban space, the presence of paramilitary bodies such as the BOPE is reinforced to combat crime in the slums in order to “pacify” them (Myar, 2015). The slum “pacification” programme began in 2008 in order to regain control from drug gangs.

The deployment of the BOPE contributes to the militarization of the police, space and cities and to the expansion of the narrative of urban space as a space of war, which must be dealt with using armed force (Myar, 2015: 535).

The conflict of “what is public” and rights to the city

Urban public space has special dynamics that turn it into a disputed territory, where conflicts that have to do with social privileges and power are reproduced (Lefebvre, 2013: 418). The way in which space is shaped is closely related to culture and conditions the way in which we live in our surroundings, think about the city, and makes us aware of the existence of “the other”. Securitization, militarism and neoliberalism have an impact on how dynamics affecting development, creation, access and use of public space are reproduced.

Some academics analyse that the expansion of securitarian and neoliberal policies lead to a progressive loss of public space as we have seen in the study by Németh and Hollander (2010), which specifically analysed the case of two districts in New York City. In the same vein, Sequera (2014: 69) showed that neoliberal policies generate a tendency for the “appropriation” of public space by the middle and upper classes, forcing it into a type of hyper-consumerism, spaces revolving around and reserved for those who focus their activity on consumption. In the same way, Sequera (2017) explains that social relations are conditioned by the type of use and access to public space, detecting the growing ejection of groups of “unwanted” people (homeless, children at play, street vendors...).

This exclusion of groups from public space reproduces injustices between social classes, generating hierarchies of space, movement and the right to use public space (Sequera, 2017: 74; Gaffikin, McEldowney, and Sterrett, 2010: 494). The urban environment becomes a territory under dispute.

One example of urban space under dispute was the New York City government's campaign in the 1980s to expel homeless people from Tompkins Square Park. The campaign declared that homeless people were "hijacking" public space, an institutional discourse that exposed space as disputed territory in a struggle between social classes. Another example is the persecution experienced by immigrant street vendors, as can be seen in Barcelona and many other European cities. It shows us that making a living in the public space is not allowed, and must be dealt with through coercion. These measures seek to "sanitize" public space and not to development it for the people who inhabit the city, who come from very different realities.

Security policies reinforce these dynamics of expulsion, identifying sectors of the society as threats to security and increasing monitoring and surveillance in the public space, which in turn reinforces social stigma. There are already more than four million cameras in the UK, some with suspicious behaviour detection systems (Sequera, 2017: 76). The implementation of these security policies reinforces narratives and results in the creation of an insecure and unequal society, with exclusive access to public space under conditions and controls, stigmatizing certain social sectors that are perceived as "undeserving" of public space. Mass surveillance and control are exercised under a narrative of "care" and "protection" of the population (Botello, 2015: 150), although the population itself is analysed as a threat.

Securitization creates societies that perceive themselves as more insecure, and lead to spatial segregation (Botello, 2015: 150), as is often the case in many Latin American cities. The security model of Latin American cities is not so much affected by the dynamics of transnational terrorism as by the securitization of poverty and the advance of inequality. The progressive privatization of space is the response to the threat posed by poverty, generating more and more closed and compact spaces with high security measures and private surveillance (especially gated communities and spaces for consumption and entertainment), which promote the segregation of the population.

All these dynamics of exclusion, expulsion and insecurity have also influenced the way in which urban space is built, generating what Di Masso Tarditti, Berroeta and Moranta (2017: 58) call "dead public space". The creation of spaces for individualism and indifference, where social relations are discouraged or are done in a deficient and/or exclusive way, where public places for play or relaxation are replaced by passageways and places of constant movement, as is the case of spaces centred on consumption. No loiter-

ing signs and individual park benches impede social relations, and inhabitants are discouraged from appropriating the space. The authors give the example of the proliferation of closed collective use spaces in the United States and Canada, in the form of tunnels and corridors isolated from the dangers of the street.

Creating gathering spaces for peace

Global dynamics not only serve as an example for analysing the militarized security policies implemented in cities, they can also serve to analyse examples of a break with militarist policies, in order to achieve an “appropriation” of space in favour of gathering, where the policies of fear and insecurity are counteracted, even in the most inhospitable and conflicted places.

The North and South Koreans have managed to create a space for meeting and reconciliation in one of the areas that might seem less likely: the Demilitarized Zone between the two Koreas, which despite its name is highly militarized. The creation of a cultural space, the “DMZ Cultural Center” in the Demilitarized Zone, was built based on the idea of reconciliation, collective memory and shared space (Young Song, 2016: 61). The cultural center allows the creation of space for Koreans of both States to share and meet each other that re-configures the established order of the militarized space and its historical weight.

The experience of shared space has also been popped up in other places where gathering might seem inhospitable due to high levels of conflict. The construction of spaces for gathering has also taken place in Cyprus, in the Buffer Zone (Green Line) managed by the United Nations separating North and South Cyprus, and the Turkish-Cypriot population from the Greek-Cypriot throughout the country since 1963. Its capital, Nicosia, was also divided by the Green Line.

In October 2011 a group of Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots decided to take over the Buffer Zone in the city of Nicosia by camping for eight months. This appropriation allowed people to develop a community and modify the meaning of space by transforming its meaning collectively and generating a new space for shared memory. This re expropriation of public space carried out in the Buffer Zone of the city of Nicosia was useful to question the international conflict, the social order and the segregation of

the population, generating a space with completely a new meaning through the active commitment of inhabitants on both sides.

The creation and appropriation of meeting spaces by an organized population in places that present extreme difficulties shows that it is possible to find ways to appropriate the space for the purposes of plurality, gathering, and collective memory. In this case, in places as complex as national borders under dispute.

Conclusions

Policies regulating urban space can allow for the expansion of securitization and militarization or, on the contrary, for the construction of democratic urban spaces where full freedom of movement and use can be exercised, where public space is endowed with its full meaning. The militarization and securitization of cities means governing by fear, creating more insecure societies, and making it easier to deploying the elements of war scenarios that prevent, condition and control freedom of movement.

Securitization and militarization therefore lead to an erosion of public space, hierarchies in use and access, or even expulsion. They also strengthen control and surveillance over everyone moving through the space, either with technology or police checkpoints.

Constructing urban space from a sensation of fear or under the doctrine of militarized security is to strip the public of its sense of freedom and democratic encounter. We must not forget that those who create public space and give it meaning are those who make use of it, not those who maintain it as a mere operation of urban cosmetics.

Recommendations and good practices

If we transfer Galtung's theory of positive peace and negative peace to the urban context, we will see that in order to deploy positive peace in cities, access to services must be guaranteed in order to put an end to the different types of violence (direct, cultural and structural). The full right to public space implies progress in positive peace policies to avoid cultural violence, which legitimizes expulsion, and structural violence, which practices exclusion using institutional tools.

Building democratic and egalitarian spaces requires leaving behind securitarian and militaristic policies that contribute to social control and reinforce the public space as a hierarchical and disputed territory, and contribute to reinforce and implement dynamics of power and social segregation.

The ultimate goal of public space must be to collectively produce socio-cultural capital and to foster people's self-realization. Processes of exclusion erode the egalitarian production of public space and generate deficiencies in memory and collective representation, leading to privilege and the stratification of city life.

For urban space to take on the meaning of public space, it must allow appropriation, collective creation and facilitate people's social interactions, for example through the elimination of physical and psychological frontiers and the implementation of elements that facilitate interaction and freedom of movement.

Collective creation is more easily developed by locating and allowing the manipulable elements that allow the diversity of functions that people want to give to space, contemplating different uses and the representation and inclusion of different social sectors.

Public space must contribute to the transformation of society towards dissolution of privileges and an end to exclusions, and the equal representation of collectives and the full right to use of the city. Legislation on the use of space, inclusive political discourse, fleeing from "hygienic" policies and guaranteeing full rights of use can contribute to this.

Space must enable the creation and preservation of collective memory and contribute to the generation of new collective heritage. To this end, elements of commemoration and memory that contribute to the cohesion and memory of neighbourhoods and cities must be permitted and promoted.

Bibliography

AMOORE, L. (2009): "Algorithmic war: Everyday geographies of the war on terror", *Antipode*, 41(1), p. 49-69. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8330.2008.00655.x.

- AZNAR FERNÁNDEZ-MONTESINOS, Federico (2015): “Las generaciones de guerras: Guerras de primera generación” (I). Documento análisis. *Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos*, available at: http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_analisis/dieeea54-2015_GeneracionesdeGuerras_xIx_FaFM.pdf
- BOTELLO, N. A. (2015): “Introduction : the securitization of Latin American cities”, *urbe. Revista Brasileira de Gestão Urbana*, 7(2), 149-153.
- GAFFIKIN, F., MCELDOWNEY, M. and STERRETT, K. (2010): “Creating shared public space in the contested city: The role of urban design”, *Journal of Urban Design*, 15(4), p. 493-513. doi: 10.1080/13574809.2010.502338.
- GLÜCK, Z. (2017): “Security Urbanism and the Counterterror State in Kenya”, *Anthropological Theory*, 17(3), p. 297-321. doi: 10.1177/1463499617729295.
- GRAHAM, S. (2011): *Cities Under Siege: The new Military Urbanism*, Editorial Verso.
- (2012): “When life itself is war: On the urbanization of military and security doctrine”, *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 36(1), p. 136-155. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-2427.2011.01026.x.
- HARTO DE VERA, F. (2016): “La construcción del concepto de paz: paz negativa, paz positiva y paz imperfecta”, *Cuadernos de estrategia*, (183), p. 119-146. available at: <https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=5832796>.
- YOUNG SONG, Jim (2016): “DMZ Cultural Center: The Role of Shared Space in the Korean Peninsula Crisis”, *Revista de Arquitectura de la Universidad de los Andes*, p. 56-67, available at: <http://dx.doi:10.18389/dearq18.2016.05>.
- KAUFMAN, E. (2016): “Policing mobilities through bio-spatial profiling in New York City”, *Political Geography*. Elsevier Ltd, 55, 72.81. doi: 10.1016/j.polgeo.2016.07.006.
- LAFEBVRE, H. (2013): *La producción del espacio (1974)*, Editorial Capitan Swing. Madrid.
- MAYR, A. (2015): “Spectacles of military urbanism in online representations of the Elite Squad of the military police of Rio de Janeiro: a multimodal approach”, *Social Semiotics*. Taylor & Francis, 25(5), p. 533-557. doi: 10.1080/10350330.2015.1046215.

- MOLNAR, A. (2015): "The geo-historical legacies of urban security governance and the Vancouver 2010 Olympics", *Geographical Journal*, 181(3), p. 235-241. doi: 10.1111/geoj.12070.
- MULLER, B. J. (2009): *Borders, Risks, Exclusions*, 3(1), p. 67-78.
- NÉMETH, J. and HOLLANDER, J. (2010): "Security zones and new york city's shrinking public space", *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 34(1), p. 20-34. doi: 10.1111/j.1468- 2427.2009.00899.x.
- SALAZAR P., Robinson, YENISSEY ROJAS, Ivonne (2011): "La securitización de la seguridad pública: una reflexión necesaria". *El Cotidiano* (March-April), available at: <http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=32518423004>.
- SEQUERA, J. (2014): "Ciudad, espacio público y gubernamentalidad neoliberal", *Urban*, 507, p. 69-82.
- TARDITTI, A. D. M., BERROETA, H. and MORANTA, T. V. (2017): "El espacio público en conflicto: Coordenadas conceptuales y tensiones ideológicas", *Athenea Digital. Revista de pensamiento e investigación social*, 17(3), p. 53-92, available at: <http://atheneadigital.net/article/view/v17-n3-dimasso-berroeta-vidal/1725-pdf-es>.

VIII. Education for peace and nonviolence

Olivia Viader and Camino Simarro¹

An indispensable condition for achieving new forms of security that benefit people is the strengthening of civil society (Fisas, 1998: 263). This strength should come from a concept of peace understood in its broadest and most holistic interpretation, full of content and meaning that can, and must, be taught and learned.

What does it mean to educate for peace? As Galtung reminds us, “A major focus of peace education is to enable and empower people to handle conflicts more creatively and less violently” (Fisas, 1998: 370). Education for peace implies positive values based on the non-violent resolution of conflict, which places dialogue above all else, uses negotiation and agreement as basic tools, and leads to the achievement of a agreements that satisfy everyone (Bastida, 2004), so that conflict leads to enriching and positive results in the relationship between the parties.

Education for peace has a very important role to play, in two ways in particular: the development of a global consciousness and the promotion of creative imagination in seeking alternatives and putting them into practice (Lederach, 2000: 157-188).

1. Olivia Viader is an educator with a degree in Humanities and a Postgraduate degree in Culture of Peace and the Project Cycle Management for International Cooperation. She works with different institutions creating and implementing peace education workshops in schools and institutes. Author of the educational guide “Activisme Pacifista” for the ICIP and collaborator of the book *Mentes militarizadas: cómo nos educan para asumir la guerra* [Militarized minds: how we are educated to accept war] published by the Delàs Centre.

Camino Simarro is a social educator and anthropologist. She is a member of the Delàs Centre, where she has contributed to researcher on the arms industry and the arms trade. She collaborates with various organizations as an activist, researcher, and educator of the culture of peace and disarmament.

When we look at traditional education in our society, we realize that education for peace is most present in students' free time. What we call non-formal education, that which takes place outside schools, is characterized by the use of democratic, experiential, playful, participatory and socially critical and active methodologies. These spaces become privileged educational environments, where educators can bonds with children and young people can develop relationships among themselves and with the community that are very difficult to achieve through the traditional model of schooling. Even so, we believe that education for peace should have much more weight in formal education, and it is this education that should be promoted by the acting policies of our society.

Given these assumptions, in this chapter we will specify the key aspects of an education for peace and nonviolence: the values, attitudes and skills that it promotes, as well as the methodologies, tools and strategies that can help accomplish that goal. Afterwards, some examples of practices and experiences that address peace we will present education as a tool of social transformation towards a culture of peace and a more humane understanding of security. Finally, we will analyse obstacles that we currently face that hinder the promotion and implementation of peace education, as well as what opportunities can be seized in the current context, such as Agenda 2030 of the Sustainable Development Goals. Finally, we present a few brief conclusions.

Key concepts in education for peace and nonviolence

According to the definition of Xesús Jares, educating for peace is:

A dynamic, continuous and permanent process, based on the concepts of positive peace and the creative perspective of conflict, and which, through the application of socio-affective and problematic approaches, seeks to develop a new culture, the culture of peace, which helps people to observe reality critically by standing in front of it and acting accordingly [...] (Jares, 1999).

Also for Lederach:

Education for peace has a dual purpose: on the one hand, the investigation of the obstacles and causes that prevent us from achieving a condition of high justice and

reduced violence, and on the other hand, the development of knowledge, values and capacities (2000: 52) that help us to build a true culture of peace.

In this same line, we speak of *nonviolence*, above all, as a way of acting to reduce violence/s. Following Barbeito and Caireta (2008), nonviolence seeks, like the culture of peace, “to promote the conditions that favour peace and not to collaborate, or even to put an end to the violent conditions that make it difficult”. The Ghandian term combines the principles of pacifism with action, not only rejects violence but promotes an active attitude with the aim of changing the internal violence and violent structures of society.

On the other hand, John W. Barton’s *provention*, introduced in 1990, argues that the important thing is to be able to deal with conflict in a constructive and nonviolent manner, rather than working to avoid (prevent) conflict. This requires providing individuals and groups with the skills, resources and strategies necessary to transform conflicts positively so that they become an opportunity for personal and collective growth, and allow us to act before violent crises arise. In order to achieve this objective, it proposes to use the creation and experience of the group-community as a didactic tool, to generate spaces and relationships of trust, to learn tools of non-violent communication and to promote cooperation (Barrientos and Caireta, 2017). This is part of what Paco Cascón called “education in conflict” or education for a *conflictual peace*. Depending on how the conflict is dealt with, it can be destructive, or it can serve as an engine of change for the transformation of relationships in a positive way.

As Barbeito and Caireta (2008: 173) state, “to promote the culture of peace means, first and foremost, to behave in a peaceful manner that is also active, loving, and at the same time decisive, with firmness and flexibility at the same time”. Thus, it is as important to live according to the values of the culture of peace (to be peaceful) as it is to seek to advance socially towards peace (to be pacifist).

In this process of learning to transform ourselves and our environment, the concept of empowerment takes on special importance, as “the process whereby we ‘discover our bases of power and influence and make use of them. It involves discovering our own capacities, possibilities and resources, as individuals and as a group, and using them, expanding them and transmitting them’” (Barbeito and Caireta, 2008: 176).

Therefore, peace education seeks to train people at the personal level and at the relational level with others and with the following attitudes and skills for social transformation (Barbeito and Caireta 2008: 174):

- Know our strengths and weaknesses.
- Exercise self-criticism, recognize our errors and try to correct them.
- To value ourselves, to believe in our capacities and to value our strengths.
- Practising assertiveness, defending our arguments, make them explicit and respecting our own needs.
- Empathize with others, recognize their feelings and understand their causes.
- Listening, actively to understand others' reasoning.
- Be flexible, adapt to situations to reconcile the needs of all parties.
- Cooperate, work as a team to find a solution together.
- Being critical people, questioning reality, habits, etc.
- Be constructive, value the positive aspects.
- To be proactive, to find alternative ways of acting.
- Be creative, imaginative, original.
- To disobey, to refuse to collaborate with that which is contrary to our own values.
- To take responsibility, to be aware of the consequences of our actions and to minimize their negative consequences.
- Motivate, involve more people in transforming what we don't like.
- Argue, explain one's arguments convincingly and relate them to the needs of the other parties.
- To commit ourselves, to provide energy until the end of the process, with constancy and conviction.

To this end, the proposed methodologies are participative and dynamic in order to strengthen the critical and thoughtful attitudes of the participants, involving them in creative thinking and the curiosity to ask questions. The idea is to start from self-knowledge, from the experience of one's own emotions, to deepen individual and collective reflection and experience, and to move towards a collective analysis of information. It is also important to look for and propose ways to transform your ideas into concrete individual and collective actions and projects.

Existing practices and experiences from a vision of Education for peace in the Spanish state

One of the best examples in the world for the study of education for peace is the Education Programme of the School for a Culture of Peace, at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, founded in 2002. This programme focuses on the training of teachers, educators, university students and other community agents and aims at research into peace education and the publication of pedagogical and didactic materials.

In their report “Education for a peaceful community in the school setting. For the training of teaching professionals” (2013) highlights three examples of well thought-out and structured peace education programmes in the Autonomous Communities, although in most cases they were interrupted by changes of government.

- **Andalusian Education Plan for the Culture of Peace and Nonviolence.** Started in 2001 by the Regional Government of Andalusia after the Andalusian government adopted the United Nations Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace. The Andalusian Plan is based on three guiding principles: to promote peace through collective and individual action, to know how to live despite conflict and to propose creative and peaceful solutions, and to stop, reduce and prevent manifestations of violence. It is a plan sustained by a strong theoretical basis of education for conflictual peace. In addition, it is a regional strategy that places many resources at the disposal of the centre and prevents measures of articulation and cooperation between the different actors in order to optimize resources and guarantee their efficiency.
- **Basque Education Plan for Peace and Human Rights.** The Basque Government decided to promote this plan within the Basque Peace and Coexistence Plan approved in 2006 as a strategy to advance towards the end of the armed conflict and reconciliation, as well as to respond to the treatment of victims and to join the international movement to promote education for human rights. Following an in-depth diagnosis of the situation, it was drafted by consensus with the various educational agents and approved by the Basque Parliament in December 2007. It thus became a government strategy involving every educational and social sphere (formal and non-formal education, administration, the media and the general populace). Adapted to the Basque context

and its particular situation, and strongly committed to teacher training, this project is based on a perspective of positive peace, conflict transformation, nonviolence, and human rights. It was designed to conform to international legislation and recommendations.

- **Catalonian Project for Peaceful Coexistence and Educational Success.** As of the 2009-2010 academic year, all Catalan educational centres were obliged to draw up their own peaceful coexistence project over the next few years, with the idea that the drafting of a project would be an extended, grassroots, pedagogical process. The work was approached from a broad perspective and explicitly included education for a culture of peace both as a general goal and one of the themes to be developed in the classroom. It proposed work on attitudes and values, encouraged the positive management of conflicts, and also insisting on revision and improvement of the organization of the centres and the classroom, thus affecting the structure of the centres themselves (Caireta, 2013).

In Catalonia, the involvement of education for peace and development into formal education has been ongoing for more than 20 years in the hands of the Pedagogical Renewal Movement and Non-Governmental Development Organizations (NGDOs). While it is true that during all this time very diverse proposals for pedagogical resources and ideas for action have been made, it is also true that many of them have been based on pedagogical materials and resources elaborated by NGDOs or dedicated education professionals in their spare time, and as such, in many cases, they are one-off works. The spaces for exchange and collaboration created from these experiences have been very important and have been held up as examples: the Network of Schools Committed to the World (XECMón); the Edualter Resource Bank on Education for Peace, Interculturality and Development; the Centre of Resources for Peace and Solidarity (Girona Coordinating Committee for Solidarity NGOs); the teacher networks promoted by various NGOs (Oxfam Intermón, Interred, SED and Vols, among others) and the Education Commission of the Catalan Federation of NGOs for Peace, Human Rights and Development.

The publication “Pedagogical Guidelines for the Incorporation of Education for Development in the Primary and Secondary Curriculum from the Perspective of Basic Competencies” is the result of work by a group of education professionals (technicians from public administrations and educational

institutions, teachers, and NGDO technicians). The goal was to connect the official curriculum with the contents, principles, and values of education for development, so that it could be incorporated in a more comprehensive and continuous manner in educational centres. This proposal was elaborated after a process of reflection carried out between 2011 and 2013 within the framework of the project “Competencias and EpD²” and proposes different paths to follow to carry out educational processes connected to solidarity, peace, sustainable human development and the analysis of global inequalities, prioritizing the knowledge considered most appropriate in the context of formal education, and in a more concrete way, for primary and secondary school students. As for peace education, the proposal is to promote the different learning contents necessary to foster a citizenship committed to the eradication of all forms of violence, the promotion of positive peace through the analysis of the concepts of violence and peace, and the implementation of creative conflict transformation procedures. The guide structures this content into three thematic blocks:

1. Analysis of the reality of violence and opportunities for peace (where we are).
2. Personal and collective strategies to transform conflict (how to transform).
3. Models and proposals for achieving a culture of peace (where we want to go).

And it proposes two general objectives:

- In primary education (6-12 years of age) that the pupils are competent to stop direct violence and promote peace in their immediate environment, through the analysis of the factors leading to violence or peace in the classroom or centre, through skills that facilitate empowerment and peaceful coexistence.
- In secondary education (12-18 years old) that students be competent to eradicate all forms of violence and promote positive peace through the analysis of factors leading to violence or peace, and the implementation of procedures for the creative transformation of conflict.

Finally, we would like to highlight the Textbook Observatory, an initiative carried out by the Catalan International Peace Institute with the collaboration of the School for a Culture of Peace, with the aim of facilitating the

2. Proficiency and Education for Development.

incorporation of the criteria of peace education in textbooks. In line with the concept of positive peace inspired by United Nations General Assembly resolution 53/243 on the Declaration and Programme of Action on a Culture of Peace, the reports analyse the cross-cutting perspectives of peace, development, gender, diversity, environment, democracy and human rights and the methodology of the teaching exercises. As these same reports indicate, their milestones are:

- diagnose the extent to which peace education criteria have been incorporated into textbooks and make proposals for improvement
- guiding schools and teachers in their use of textbooks from a peace education perspective
- influencing publishers and the Department of Education to make the incorporation of these criteria into textbooks a reality.
- in educational and tertiary sector spaces, contribute to reflection on ways to amplify the impact and reinforce the general goal.

Thus, we see that some political actors have begun to introduce a structural change in favour of the culture of peace through the education system. However, there is little experience and many of these are implemented for short periods of time. Theoretical content, deeper reflections and initiatives of education for peace go hand in hand with social and educational entities that are independent of the state.

Obstacles to and opportunities for advancing peace education

We live in a model of society which is generating ever increasing injustice and social inequality, turning us into predators of natural resources, reproducing structural and cultural violence, and forcing millions of people to flee their places of origin in search of supposedly better living conditions. We could even say that we are in a context of crisis, more than just economic and political, but of values. And that is where we feel the duty to act, at every level of education, to raise awareness, to develop the capacity for critical analysis and empowerment for social transformation towards a more just and less violent model of society.

We must bear in mind that the dominant model of formal education is based, according to Paulo Freire (1980), on a "banking" concept of education.

We are starting from a hierarchical model, a vertical relationship between educator and educated (which in turn reflects the social structure), where learners are little more than containers in which to dump instructional content. Their only function is to memorize and repeat the content previously selected by the figure of the educator. In other words, the learner acquires a passive role, instead of being an actor capable of directed learning. Not to mention the prevailing evaluation systems, consisting of examinations in which the rote repetition of content is a priority, and which also promote values such as competitiveness (once again, the educational system is a reflection of the values present in society).

Galtung pointed out decades ago what he considered to be one of the obstacles to the promotion of peace education: “What is taught is a reflection of the past transmitted to the present, in order to ensure continuity for the future and, normally, also in accordance with national ideology and the thinking of the upper classes” (Galtung, 1973, in Lederach, 2000: 42). A fact that is still fully valid today.

According to Lederach (2000), educational values are reflected in two concrete ways: the content and the way of educating. In this sense, he points out that “an education for peace has to promote a content and a structure to transmit it, in a way that allows dialogue and promotes full participation, integration and cooperation between all educational endeavours and society”. In other words, one cannot educate for peace by using structures and forms of education that are contrary to the values, attitudes and skills represented by the concept of peace. In traditional education, values such as competitiveness and rivalry (instead of cooperation), obedience (with little room for questioning authority), student classification, and vertical relationships are often present.

In line with the principles of nonviolence, peace education seeks to maintain coherence between ends and means, paying attention to content, but also to how it is used (methodologies and structures). This is why peace education is committed to using methodologies in accordance with a socio-affective, participatory and dynamic approach, favouring learning dynamics where educators and learners become co-learners, since both are capable of generating knowledge.

However, as Caireta (2013) points out, the current model of education also offers some opportunities to introduce content which includes education for peace, sustainable development and human rights. In particu-

lar, it highlights two initiatives of great relevance in the field of education policy at a European level. On the one hand, at the end of the 1990s and first decade of 2000, education for democratic citizenship and human rights became a central pillar of European educational policies, facilitating the incorporation of contents related to the culture of peace (with themes such as education for peace, gender equality or education for development). In 2000, the European Union also recognized the importance of investing in education to promote the transmission of civic values in favour of social cohesion and the future of Europe. This resulted in the development of a common frame of reference for the development of official educational curricula that will revolve around the development of eight basic competencies.³ Although these basic competencies do not explicitly refer to the culture of peace, Caireta points out how these have represented a new scenario of opportunities to introduce the contents of peace education in the educational sphere (as shown in the previous section with the example of “Competencias y EpD”).

Finally, in a more recent and global framework, another window of opportunity has opened with the Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, approved in August 2015 within the framework of the United Nations. This Agenda has 17 Sustainable Development Objectives broken down into 169 goals to be achieved by 2030 by member states and which are intended to cover three basic dimensions: economic growth, social inclusion and environmental protection. In this new proposal, there are at least two objectives in which the promotion of peace education has an explicit place:

- Goal 4: Quality education. “Ensure inclusive, equitable and quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all”. Specifically, target 4.7 refers to the acquisition of “knowledge and skills needed to promote sustainable development, including, among others, through education for sustainable development and sustainable lifestyles, human rights, gender equality, promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence, global citizenship and appreciation of cultural diversity”. In addition, in point 4.a. it considers it necessary to provide safe, non-violent, inclusive and effective learning environments for all.

3. These eight core proficiencies are: Communication in native languages, communication in foreign languages, competence in maths, science and technology, digital competence, learning to learn, social and civic competence, a sense of initiative and entrepreneurship, cultural awareness and expression.

- Goal 16: Peace, justice and strong institutions. Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies. In order to achieve a fairer and less violent world, effective public institutions are needed, capable of analysing and identifying their own structural and cultural violence and of promoting fair economic and social policies, in addition to guaranteeing quality education, institutions are needed that are capable of promoting the participation of civil society in a secure and democratic manner, without distinction as to gender, identity or religion; or of encouraging the adoption of measures to increase control of the arms trade and move towards disarmament.

Conclusions

In order to truly build a security that is our own, we need a strong, peaceful and pacifist social fabric, and we must find political means that are compatible with this end. We know that it is in education and culture where the tools are found to turn a new page in human history, one in which places real value on our ability for creativity and transformation (Fisas, 1998: 393).

We would like to insist once again that positive peace is a clear, concrete and meaningful concept, but it is important to explain how peace is understood so that we can educate in it. It is also necessary to insist on the concept of nonviolence and its methodological value when thinking about how to construct social processes (Caireta, 2013).

We have seen that there are very interesting opportunities for the promotion of a culture of peace, as well very positive examples of its implementation. Education for peace requires a space in the curriculum and teaching materials that deal with the subject, but it is essential that transversal work be done which impregnates every aspect of life in the educational centres (Caireta, 2013) involving other social agents in a coordinated and collaborative way so that the impact is greatest.

Bibliography

BARBEITO, Cécile (2016): *122 acciones fáciles (y difíciles) para la paz* [122 easy (and difficult) action for peace], Los libros de la Catarata, Madrid.

- BARBEITO, Cécile and Marina CAIRETA (2008): *Jocs de pau. Caixa d'eines per educar per una cultura de pau* [Peace games. A toolbox for educating for a culture of peace], Los libros de la Catarata, Madrid.
- BARRIENTOS, Andrés and Marina CAIRETA (2017): *Educación para la transformación de conflictos desde el deporte escolar. La experiencia de la FEEB* [Educating for the transformation of conflict from school sports], available at: https://escolapau.uab.cat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1016 [accessed on: 21/09/2018].
- BASTIDA, Anna (2004): *Educación para la paz desde la guerra* [Educating for peace by talking about war], Bakeaz, Bilbao.
- CAIRETA, Marina (2013): *L'educació per la pau i la convivència en el marc escolar. Una mirada des de la formació del professorat* [Education for peace and peaceful coexistence in schools. An approach for teacher training], Bellaterra: Escola de Cultura de Pau, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona.
- CASCÓN, Paco (2001): *Educación en y para el conflicto* [Educating in and for conflict], Escola de Cultura de Pau, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, Bellaterra.
- FISAS, Vicenç (1998): *Cultura de paz y gestión de conflictos* [A culture of peace and conflict management], Icaria, Barcelona.
- FREIRE, Paulo (1970): *Pedagogy of the oppressed*, London, Bloomsbury.
- JARES, Xesús (1999): *Educación para la paz* [Education for peace], Ed Popular, Madrid.
- LEDERACH, Jean Paul (2000): *El abecé de la paz y los conflictos. Educación para la paz* [An ABC of peace and conflict. Education for peace], Los libros de la Catarata, Madrid.
- Multiple Authors (2014): *Competencias y EpD: una propuesta para la integración de la educación para el desarrollo en el ámbito escolar* [Proficiency and Education for Development: a proposal to integrate development education in formal compulsory education, available at: http://escolapau.uab.cat/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=677 [accessed on: 20/09/2018].
- (2012): *Competencias y EpD. La Educación para el desarrollo en el currículum escolar desde la perspectiva de las competencias básicas* [Proficiency and Education for Development: Education for development in the school curriculum from the perspective of basic skills], available at: <http://www.edualter.org/documents/competencies/mec/mec.pdf> [accessed on: 21/09/2018].

IX. Living without fear

Jose Maria Perceval¹

It's impossible to live without risk. Human life is subject to a series of random occurrences and accidents with every action we do, whether it's an insignificant home improvement to the smallest trip by car. Social life is full of incidents and mishaps, human interaction inevitably entails constant conflict needed for life in society, transport leads to unprecedented mishaps, nature causes cyclical catastrophes and the human body is subject to occasional disorders and ailments, illnesses and eventually, death. Any plan that an individual or a group makes in the hope of a change carries with it the possibility of a potential misfortune.

However, humanity is not satisfied to accept the inevitability of accidents. Although no one is invulnerable to misfortune, it is held up as a goal despite the evidence of everyday events. The social illusion of immunity to mishap is a dangerous instrument in politics, as unexpected events that can lead to situations of panic. Political elites can manage fear to their own benefit or, in situations of infighting, use it to weaken other political groups in the face of an unexpected situation that they have not foreseen or known how to control.

1. He is an associate professor in the Department of Journalism of the Faculty of Communication Sciences of the Autonomous University of Barcelona and coordinator of studies at the International University of Peace. He holds a doctorate in Social Sciences from the École des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales de Paris (1993) and a doctorate in Communication Sciences from the Faculty of Communication Sciences (UAB, 2003), with a thesis on political advertising. He is the author of *Historia del terror y el terrorismo. ¿Cómo ha gestionado la humanidad sus miedos?* [A history of terror and terrorism. How has humanity dealt with its fears?] Cátedra (2017).

This utopia means that in every catastrophe in modern society, there is an obsessive search for causes and possible culprits. Any disaster, cataclysm or attack places social managers in front of a public opinion that is increasingly complex, determining and, due to social networks, endowed with the weapon of immediacy in their reaction to events. Public opinion thrives on the news and frames every event in a dynamic of causes and consequences. The reception of a news item depends on how shocking it is. Whatever produces the most surprise gets the most coverage, especially a drama that is *unfolding live*. The more alarm a news event causes, the quicker it spreads. Anxiogenic practices are constant in the news media and are foundational to the construction of a story.

Uncertainty about the future and the instability of the present are the basis of fear and political action. Social scientists of every period have believed that a little anxiety is not negative if it motivates people to support policies that would help solve problems. But false alarms of catastrophic risks can trigger defensive strategies that actually lead to the announced catastrophe (Pinker, 2018: 360). We are faced with the paradox that those who promise immunity, protection and tranquillity are those who manage fear for their own benefit. But they can also be on the receiving end of negative consequences of the terror caused by the announced danger, much like the sorcerer's apprentice.

A fear-mongering news media

The problem with a media of fear is that they make a living by selling news, so they compete for our attention with alarmism: warning of existential threats, mortal danger, etc. News of “waves” of migrants and crime, justified by shocking cases that are little more than anecdotes, provide the basis for a general theory of threat that justifies and pressures politicians to increase security spending. In turn, those same expenses, when made public, do not diminish the concern but only increase it. Any politician who reduces the investment in security will be attacked as soon as the next tragic event occurs, whether it is a terrorist attack or a common crime that is responsible for those wounded or killed. Statistical evidence of declining criminality or facts that relativize the impact of terrorism cannot fight with the reality of *sensational* or *shocking* news reporting that appeals to sensations and shock factor. In the thirty years that have passed since the privatization of tele-

vision, television news has increased the space dedicated to events mixing natural disaster and human catastrophes – they are given equal coverage. This space is only surpassed by the transfer of the tabloid press to these same news programs. Public broadcasters have had to give in to this wave and compete by offering the same sensational and intimidating content. Detailed information about distant suffering has only increased this feeling of a lack of protection of the spectator from misfortune (Bolstanski, 1999).

Commentators' terms have increased their vehemence in the competition for audience attention: every migrant entry is transformed into a *wave*, every common crime event becomes a *very serious event*, resulting in the construct of *social unrest, clashes amongst rival groups*, or in the case of an inter-ethnic conflict – the product of *centuries-old hatred*. The whole thing is a *humanitarian catastrophe* – a self-fulfilling prophecy, since the best stage for amplifying demands that political contenders have is the media. This eventually results in the complete trivialization of any violent event, a kind of continuous spectacle of the circus of violence, but also a constant sensation of impending disaster.

The audiovisual industry, which accounts for one fifth of the world's GDP, bases its fictional strategy on storytelling where a whole varied selection of victims suffer a series of horrible catastrophes. They are the most popular TV series. Everything imaginable could happen in the realm of evil will be played out on the hypnotic screen, and there will be humans beings, bad guys, or diabolical creatures, who will do everything within their power to ensure it happens. The vilification of bad guys, a glorification of the immense capacities they possess to do evil, has been the main inspiration for war cinema (Altares, 1999) and is also the basis for the television series which draw in the largest audiences. Never before in the history of the fictional tale have we seen so much triumphant evil and so many massacred victims.

The Hobbesian Trap

The discourse of fear is based on the dilemma of security or Hobbesian trap (argued by the philosopher Hobbes in *The Leviathan*): Those who manage fear endanger vital elements of the existence of citizens in order for them to claim that they are protected. When you need insurance, it's because there's danger. The insurance industry, since its creation by Scottish shepherds Alex-

ander Webster and Robert Wallace in 1774, has been based on an assurance against possible mortality within a given population. Insurance calculations and indeed, the entire business model depend on the risk that underlies the insured sphere. Certain political elites also depend on this danger, in order for the security they promise to be accepted. Those who manage security need a credible threat to be convincing: either external, with the increase of possible enemies, or internal, endangering the welfare of society, through the threat of terrorism or migration.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the western world has all of the ingredients for living in fear: a rich and ageing society, a sensationalist media, thriller fiction dedicated to action and disaster, all amplified by the development of social networks where the most fearful and alarmist content creates new sources of anxiety. It is the paradox of a hyper-connected but progressively isolated humanity, a condition that has grown exponentially since the beginning of the century. Jacqueline Olds and Richard Schwart describe the process that began with suburbanization at the beginning of the 20th century, parallel to the development of increasingly sophisticated and effective technological means of communication, and which has continued to alienate the individual from society over these two decades (Olds and Schwart, 2010). As Susan Pinker has analysed, digital friendships increase the sense of emptiness of social relations and increase fear with a substitution of real people for virtual ones. (Pinker, 2014).

Liquid Fear

The philosopher Zygmunt Bauman, in his book *Liquid Fear* (2010) raised the question of this dead end road for an anguished modernity. The enlightenment had promised for three centuries that the fears of the past would disappear and humans would be in control of their lives while eliminating the negative forces of the social and natural world. Instead, uncertainty is the landscape of the future as anxiety invades minds in the face of dangers that can strike without warning. People no longer go to the polls to vote for an option that offers them hope for a better world but to avoid a future that frightens them. Nature rebels with provoked environmental catastrophes and the urban society lives in a constant alert of indiscriminate terrorist attacks. The screens, from the television to the Smartphone, concentrate bad news

for a fascinated spectator, hypnotized by the immediacy with which the end of the world can be lived.

Perhaps the first step is to “lose the fear of fear” (Muiño, 2007). Seeing what terrifies us is the first step in getting rid of the worries of the future. And for this we must contemplate the long past of humanity’s fears. Societies that promised to end fear by decree, promising future paradises of common happiness in the hereafter or in the near future, deployed enormous violence against the bad guys, transforming their own societies into hells. And they demanded that their citizens give up their present freedoms and leave their destiny in the hands of an elite of psychopaths who promised a protection that wound up being imprisonment. Awareness of history is the best protection against a resurgence of these enlightened terrorists.

Evil is not done by terrible bad guys but by citizens as normal and you and me, who manipulate these concerns to assert their power and ensure their business interests. Some are afflicted with psychic pathologies derived from personal frustrations and fears but the majority, both those who seek to terrorize us with the explosion of a bomb and those who offer us security against terror, are a mafia of fear mongers, managers of one of the largest businesses in the world, and one that has paralysed the progress of humanity. By studying the panic that seized past societies we can avoid the traps used by these manipulators of worry.

Learning to live with fear is the most reasonable thing to do because fear will never cease to exist. The future is not predefined, and perhaps that is a good thing. It will be good or bad, depending on the historical communities that live in it. Catastrophes, whether they are natural or of human origin, are part of that history of humanity. What can lead us to overcome them is the collaboration and contribution of all, as has happened all throughout history.

Pessimism is conservative, and so it was condemned by organizations that wanted to change society and make a better world. However, in the last four decades, it has invaded collaborative and solidarity organizations, heralding the death of the idea of “progress”. What remains in the timid defense of the welfare society or the noisy technophobia argued by postmodernist philosophers Spengler, Heidegger or Nietzsche. Fatalism, disillusionment and hypochondria are much more more plausible and easier to sell than hopes for change. The strategy of promising catastrophe has proved catastrophic.

People are much more likely to admit that there is a problem when presented with solutions than when frightened with a coming catastrophe. Ter-

ror leads to paralysis, a feeling of helplessness, and as a consequence a denial of the problem or a resigned acceptance leading to inaction. If it can't be solved, why act?

Fear as the basis for a big business

One way to counter fear-based politics is to uncover the business interests of fear mongers, a trap that involves the knowing or unknowing complicity of governments and media. Threats are exaggerated in order to increase funding, and those most interested are those who control the information and the police and military forces and infrastructure, as they can justify their demands for greater investment.

As well, there are many companies on the periphery. "Illegal" migration has become a serious business, as Claire Rodier, a lawyer at Gisti (Group for the Information and Support to Immigrants) and co-founder of the Euro-African network Migreurop, points out. The *fear exploit* feeds the security economy. In his book, he analyses the company G4S, which had a monopoly on the repatriation of deportees in England until an incident in 2010 (death by suffocation of an expelled Angolan) or Boeing, which manages the electronic system controlling all the borders of the United States, as well as Indra, Sagem, EADS Defensa, Thales, Erickson... the economic derivations of Frontex, Sive, Eurosur, Amass, Oparus... the budgets of these direct or indirect organizations have skyrocketed in recent years. As has the income of the prison industry that manages the retention centres (Rodier estimates there are half a thousand in all of Europe). Another source of income is derived by the construction of walls in Greece/Turkey, Mexico/USA, Botswana/Zimbabwe, India/Bangladesh not to mention Palestine or the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. Another source of business is outsourcing and direct or indirect payment to regimes that obstruct the passage of migrants northwards from Senegal, Mauritania, the countries of the Maghreb, Ukraine, Belarus, the Balkans, or in Turkey. Let us not forget that in 2006, Gaddafi asked for ten billion dollars for operations to retain African migrants. Add to all this the growth in the demand for police in airports and checkpoints and the growth of the cybersecurity industry, a wide set of the leading companies hailing from the Israeli state. Uncovering these interests is a foundation for shaking off fear by showing how fear has big business interests behind it.

Unmasking fear, an elementary principle for living without fear

Against notions of the effectiveness of terror, social psychology studies indicate that civilians reaffirm a sense of community in the face of catastrophe and cooperate more (in Hiroshima, in Estonia during the cyberattack, or the exemplary behaviour of citizens in New York, Madrid, Paris and Barcelona in the recent terrorist attacks).

One of the foundations of terror and cause of the millions of preventable deaths of World War II was the belief by political elites that enemy populations would collapse in the face of the massive attacks and all-out warfare. It didn't happen. Another mistaken belief is the so-called "Winston Churchill phenomenon", which helped a politician who was otherwise useless and picaresque, is that populations would turn against their governments with defeatism. The basis of the hope conveyed by Churchill was simply to unite the population behind the sign of victory. The third belief to be questioned is the idea that populations will yield to blackmail and terror. There is no such effect. On the contrary, they bring with them the danger that security spending will increase the power of fear mongers. For this reason, it is necessary to disarm both the "theatre" of the terrorists as well as the "theatre" of the counter-terrorists. And to achieve this it is essential to denounce the exorbitant expenditure dedicated to the tiny threat of terrorism, trivial compared to the danger of two major threats facing humanity: that of nuclear war and climate change. We need to focus on these obvious threats and not trivialize every threats by making an extensive and sometimes unbelievable list of dangers. Ten thousand nuclear warheads and nine nuclear armies are the real danger hanging over humanity. It is essential to demonstrate that mechanism for peace can be effective at the global level, and can overcome setbacks. Criticism is necessary just as much as the demonstration of results, the failures of a peace organization in Bosnia or Afghanistan must be contextualized with studies such as that carried out by Virginia Page Fortna. (2004, 2008).

The myth that armed intervention is humanitarian must be replaced by strengthened calls for pacifism and dialogue. According to evidence from Erika Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011) three quarters of successful struggles – as well as those of Gandhi and Martin Luther King – did not use violence even given a widespread belief that violence was inevitable or effective. Where violence was used, in 100% of cases, the struggle was left in

the hands of leaders who used violence against their own members and the general population. In the case of nonviolent movements, however, more than half yielded nonviolent results later.

Finally, we must reverse the focus of the intimidation, and before investigating the scary facts, put more effort into investigating the motives of individuals or groups who sow panic, question their interests and the consequences of the risks that they pose. The visibility of those “things” that are supposedly in danger may hide others that are perhaps threatened by those same groups that manage fear.

Therefore, our attitude in showing things that are really threatened must be different than the strategy of fear mongers. We must start from the premise that it is possible to overcome fear and face risk, and prevent premature defeatism. From this basis, we can ask what difficulties and actions can overcome both the dangers we face, and the fear they bring. The action must be joint. To live without fear is not to live without concern or precaution, it is to accept risk as an inevitable challenge of human existence, part of the enriching process of having free will.

Bibliography

- ALTARES, Guillermo (1999): *Esto es un infierno. Los personajes del cine bélico* [This is hell. Characters in war cinema]. Alianza Editorial, Madrid.
- APKARIAN, A. VANIA, M. Catherine BUSHNELL, Rolf-Detlef TREEDE and Jon-Kar ZUBIETA (2005): “Human brain mechanisms of pain perception and regulation in health and disease”, *European Journal of Pain*, 9 (4), p. 463-484.
- BOLSTANSKI, Luc (2004): *Distant Suffering: Morality, Media and Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
- BOURKE, Joanna (2005): *Fear. A Cultural History*, Shoemaker Hoad.
- BRUNET, Pere (2016): “La militarización a través de Internet” [Militarization through the Internet], en Calvo Rufanges, Jordi (coord.) *Mentes militarizadas. Cómo nos educan para asumir la guerra y la violencia*, p. 123-135, Icaria, Barcelona.
- CHENOWETH, Erika, STEPHAN, Maria (2011): *Why civil resistance Works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict*, Columbia University Press, Nueva York.

- FRANCESCUTTI, Pablo Francisco (2004): *La pantalla profética*, Cátedra, Madrid.
- MUIÑO, Luis (2007): *Perder el miedo al miedo*, Madrid, Espasa.
- OLDS, Jacqueline; SCHWARTZ, Richard S. (2010): *The Lonely American: Drifting Apart in the Twenty-first Century*, Beacon Press.
- PERCEVAL, José María (2017): *El terror y el terrorismo. Cómo ha gestionado la humanidad sus miedos*, Cátedra, Madrid.
- PAGE FORTNA, Virginia (2004): “Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War”, *International studies Quarterly*, 48, p. 269-292.
- (2008): *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices After Civil War*, Princeton University Press.
- PINKER, Susan (2014): *The village effect: How Face-to-Face Contact Can Make Us Healthier and Happier*, New York, Spiegel & Grau.
- PINKER, Steven (2018): *Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress*, Random House, New York.
- RODIER, Claire (2012): *Xenophobie Business. A quoi servent les contrôles migratoires?* [A xenophobic business. Whose interests are served by migration checkpoints?], La Découverte, París.
- VERES, Luis (2006): *La retórica del terror: sobre lenguaje, terrorismo y medios de comunicación* [The rhetoric of terror: on language, terrorism and the mass media], Ediciones de la Torre, Madrid.

Security policies for peace is a collective publication made by members and collaborators of the Delàs Center for Peace Studies and the International University for Peace, which aims to contribute from a rigorous and committed analysis to the creation of new narratives of security. Through eighteen chapters there is a first approach to critical visions with traditional militaristic security policies that make up today's hegemonic security and reflects on possible local and global security alternatives. Being aware of the limitations of this publication, we hope to have contributed to the construction of another and necessary security as possible, to give value to peace and security policies that are truly consistent with the culture of peace and human security.

With the participation of: Xavier Bohigas, Pere Brunet, Jordi Calvo Rufanges, Blanca Camps-Febrer, Jorge Guardiola, Josep Maria Julià, Maria de Lluç Bagur, Eduardo Melero, Chloé Meulewaeter, Anna Montull Garcia, Teresa de Fortuny, Arcadi Oliveres, Albert Orta, Pere Ortega, Ares Perceval, Jose María Perceval, Alejandro Pozo, José Ángel Ruiz, Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto, Camino Simarro i Olívia Viader.



With the support of:



Agència Catalana
de Cooperació
al Desenvolupament



Diputació
Barcelona